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1.1	Research	Background	The	main	argument	of	this	thesis	is	to	examine	whether	cultural	diplomacy	could	maintain,	enhance	and	even	create	state	trust	or	not.	Based	upon	this	argument,	it	 is	 quite	 necessary	 to	 understand	 the	 general	 background	 in	 today’s	international	society.	In	recent	decades,	almost	every	state	attempts	to	devote	a	significant	 amount	 of	 efforts	to	 improving	 soft	 power.	 Joseph	 Nye	 emphasises	that	soft	power	of	a	state	rests	primarily	on	three	resources:	its	culture	(in	places	where	it	 is	attractive	to	others),	 its	political	values	(when	it	 lives	up	to	them	at	home	and	abroad),	and	its	foreign	policies	(when	they	are	seen	as	legitimate	and	having	moral	authority)	(Nye,	2005,	p.12).		The	 concept	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 lies	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 soft	 power.	 From	 the	reciprocal	gifts	of	ancient	rulers	to	today’s	Expos,	various	forms	of	culture	have	been	used	by	state	actors	to	exhibit	who	they	are,	assert	their	claim	in	the	global	governance,	 shape	 national	 image	 and	 build	 long-lasting	 relationships	 with	others.	Nye	 also	 argues	 that	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 considered	 as	 the	 ‘ability	 to	persuade	 [others]	 through	 culture,	 values	 and	 ideas’	 (Nye,	 2004,	 p.	 22).	Therefore,	 along	 with	 the	 economic	 globalisation	 and	 closer	 interdependence	regarding	 the	 national	 interest	 of	 each	 state,	 more	 and	 more	 states	 have	gradually	 realised	 the	 importance	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 especially	 its	 role	 in	solving	 international	 conflicts	 and	 frictions	 to	 thereafter	 enhance	 international	mutual	understanding	and	trust	building	with	other	states.	Besides	that,	cultural	diplomacy	 seems	 to	 be	 diversified,	 which	 means	 that	 the	 practice	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	 is	 not	 merely	 confined	 to	 the	 developed	 countries;	 developing	countries	can	also	take	advantage	of	this	concept	to	have	practical	applications	in	order	to	exhibit	their	unique	culture.	Just	as	the	previous	chairman	of	the	Senate	Foreign	Relations	Committee	of	the	USA,	J.	William	Fulbright	argues	‘in	the	long	course	 of	 history,	 having	 people	 understand	 your	 thought	 is	 much	 greater	security	than	another	submarine’	(	quoted	by	Simpson,	1988).	Fulbright’s	quote	
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reminds	us	that	cultural	diplomacy	is	not	only	about	the	quest	for	image	building	but	also	is	a	matter	of	winning	hearts	and	minds.	In	an	increasingly	interlinked	global	society,	state	actors	attempt	to	communicate	not	only	through	traditional	diplomacy	 but	 also	 beyond	 national	 borders	 under	 the	 name	 of	 cultural	diplomacy.	Culture	 is	no	 longer	as	 subordinate	 to	politics,	 and	 it	 is	 the	 time	 to	unlock	the	full	potential	of	cultural	diplomacy	as	offering	the	operational	context	in	international	relations.	 		Trust	is	a	widely	studied	and	acknowledged	concept	including	diversified	forms	of	 operationalisation.	 In	 the	 academic	 area,	 Carsten	 Schultz	 argues	 that	‘researchers	 operationalise	 trust	 differently	 depending	 upon	 the	 focus	 and	phases	 of	 trust	 studies’	 (Schultz,	 2006,	 p.1).	 To	 Wheeler,	 ‘the	 challenge	 of	building	 trust	 between	 states	 that	 have	 a	 history	 of	 conflict	 and	 acrimony	 has	attracted	 the	 attention	 of	 scholars	 in	 the	 field	 of	 International	 Relations	 for	several	decades’	(Wheeler,	2012,	p.1).	It	can	be	seen	that	the	term	‘state	trust’	is	not	 easily	defined.	The	 inspiration	 for	 conceptualising	 the	notion	of	 state	 trust	comes	 from	 the	 concept	of	 social	 capital,	which	was	evoked	 in	a	book	Bowling	
Alone	written	by	Robert	D.	 Putnam	 (2000).	As	 an	 important	 category	 of	 social	capital,	social	trust	is	applied	as	an	analytical	tool	in	the	research	of	international	relations.	Therefore,	when	thinking	about	the	term	trust	at	the	state	level,	I	draw	on	the	essence	of	social	trust	as	well	as	take	other	scholars’	findings.	For	example,	Aaron	 M.	 Hoffman	 did	 some	 studies	 in	 the	 area	 with	 regard	 to	 “trust	 in	international	relations”	(Hoffman,	2002),	and	then	coin	the	concept	of	state	trust.	 		Additionally,	 since	a	 lot	of	scholars	and	politicians	have	placed	much	emphasis	on	the	role	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	building	trust	among	individuals	and	states,	for	example,	Philip	Seib	argues	that	‘nearly	everyone	likes	cultural	diplomacy	in	principle,	 but	 some	 remain	 sceptical	 about	 its	 value.	 Trust	may	 seem	 to	 be	 an	ephemeral	 quality,	 but	 it	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 relations	 between	 states	 and	 is	 a	principal	goal	of	public	diplomacy.	Cultural	diplomacy	can	remove	 the	mystery	and	debunk	mythology	about	a	 country	and	 its	people,	 and	by	doing	 so,	 and	 it	can	allow	that	country’s	policies	to	receive	attention	without	distractions’(Seib,	2012).	 Scholars	 have	 documented	 differences	 and	 similarities	 in	 cultural	
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diplomacy	 behaviour	 and	 management	 across	 different	 states	 and	 elaborated	why	 they	occur.	However,	 they	have	not	developed	 theoretical	 frameworks	 for	the	 comparative	 study	 concerning	 the	 relationship	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 and	state	trust	between	different	states.	 		As	 Frédérique	 Six	 mentions	 in	 his	 book	 that	 ‘trust	 requires	 dependence,	vulnerability	 and	optimism	about	 a	positive	 income,	 conditions	 that	 give	 some	indications	of	why	so	many	people	may	be	hesitant	to	actually	engage	in	it’	(Six,	2005,	p.2).	This	could	also	be	quoted	to	further	explain	the	situation	why	states	might	 be	 hesitant	when	 they	 need	 to	make	 a	 choice	whether	 to	 trust	 another	state	 or	 not.	 Moreover,	 culture,	 as	 the	 essence	 of	 ideology,	 does	 tend	 to	 lead	many	 states	 to	 become	 afraid	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 once	 they	 let	 the	 culture	 of	another	state	steps	onto	the	civil	society	of	their	own	state,	the	ideology	of	their	people	 might	 be	 influenced	 in	 a	 dramatic	 fashion	 with	 associated	 unintended	consequences.	 Therefore,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 key	 argument	 of	 this	 thesis,	then	several	relevant	questions	that	need	to	be	answered:	can	cultural	diplomacy	be	 actually	 applied	 in	 state	 trust	 building?	 If	 the	 answer	 is	 yes;	 then	 how	 to	explore	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 state	 trust	 building?	 These	questions	 and	 academic	 perspectives	 concerning	 the	 importance	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	 and	 state	 trust	 present	 a	 significant	 challenge	 to	 further	 research,	particularly	 for	 the	 relationship	of	 these	 two	 concepts	 in	 the	 academic	 field	 as	well	as	its	practical	application	and	implementation	issues	in	the	political	arena.	 	
 The	relation	between	China	and	the	United	Kingdom	is	a	good	case	study.	Firstly,	these	 two	 states	 have	 different	 political	 rationales	 and	 approaches	 to	 their	cultural	diplomacy.	This	reasoning	is	agreed	upon	by	scholar	Da	Kong,	who	has	conducted	extensive	research	studies	on	the	cultural	diplomacy	between	China	and	the	UK.	He	states	that	‘the	UK	is	a	democratic	country	with	an	arm’s	length	attitude	to	its	cultural	institutions,	while	China	is	a	one-party	state	with	a	more	authoritarian	approach	to	its	cultural	institutions’	(Kong,	2015,	p.28).	 		Secondly,	 the	UK	is	one	of	the	pioneers	 in	promoting	cultural	diplomacy	across	the	world.	 It	has	a	number	of	historical	and	contemporary	cultural	advantages:	
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its	 collections	 and	 performing	 companies	 rank	 at	 the	 top	 level	 in	 the	 global	cultural	 area.	 It	 has	 already	 achieved	 outstanding	 successes.	 As	 other	 scholars	agree,	 the	 UK	 boasts	 a	 strong	 tradition	 of	 international	 cultural	 exchanges	through	the	British	Council’s	presence	around	the	world,	and	also	via	the	dense	global	 networks	 of	 its	 national	 cultural	 institutions	 and	 diaspora	 communities	(Bound	et	al.,	2007).	China	has	a	large	amount	of	significant	cultural	heritage	as	well.	 In	 recent	 decades,	 the	 desire	 and	 efforts	 of	 the	 Chinese	 government	 to	strengthen	 its	 cultural	 soft	 power	 and	 polish	 its	 national	 image	 on	 the	 global	stage,	 using	 various	 methods	 in	 order	 to	 implement	 its	 cultural	 diplomatic	programs,	has	attracted	increasing	attention.	 		Thirdly,	 determined	 joint	 efforts	 of	 cultural	 interaction	between	China	 and	 the	UK	that	has	shown	an	upward	trend	clearly	in	recent	years.	Such	as	the	project	of	Cultural	 Year,	 Connections	 through	Culture,	 programs	 of	 the	British	 Council	 in	China	 and	 programs	 of	 the	 Confucius	 Institute	 in	 the	 UK,	 those	 of	 which	are	beneficial	 for	 scholars	 as	well	 as	 the	 governmental	 bodies	 to	 explore	 for	more	advantages	 and	 avoid	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 their	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs.	Hence,	due	to	the	amount	of	data,	events	as	well	as	available	evidence	already	in	existence	over	a	relatively	long	period	of	time,	the	thesis	uses	China	and	the	UK	as	 the	 subjects	of	 this	 research	and	endeavours	 to	explore	 the	effectiveness	or	otherwise	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building	between	them.		
1.2	Objectives	and	Aim	of	This	Research	The	academic	contribution	of	this	thesis	is	the	discussion	and	analysis	of	cultural	diplomacy	and	state	trust	within	the	social	and	political	background.	In	essence,	this	research	is	a	study	of	the	relationship	between	cultural	diplomacy	and	state	trust.	 More	 specifically,	 the	 primary	 aim	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 examine	 the	effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 improving	 state	 trust	 building	 between	China	 and	 the	 UK	 or	 otherwise.	 To	 somewhat	 degree,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	recent	surge	in	the	studies	of	cultural	diplomacy	and	trust	in	social	science,	both	concepts	 have	 been	 discussed	 respectively	 while	 the	 linkage	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	and	state	trust	has	not	been	explored	comprehensively	yet.		
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The	following	objectives	have	been	designed	in	pursuing	this	aim:		1. To	conceptualise	the	notion	of	cultural	diplomacy.	In	order	to	clarify	the	main	body	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 this	 research	 attempts	 to	 differentiate	 similar	semantic	 concepts,	 such	 as	 public	 diplomacy,	 cultural	 soft	 power,	international	cultural	communication	and	intercultural	relations.	 	 	 	 	2. To	 conceptualise	 the	 notion	 of	 state	 trust.	 The	 concept	 of	 state	 trust	 is	 the	original	 creation	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Therefore,	 in	 order	 to	 elaborate	 the	 new	concept	logically,	it	is	necessary	to	discuss	the	related	concepts,	such	as	social	capital	and	social	trust.	3.   To	explore	the	relationship	of	cultural	diplomacy	and	state	trust.	It	could	help	to	 understand	 the	 potential	 influences	 on	 state	 trust	 building	 during	 the	implementation	process	of	cultural	diplomacy. 4.   To	 set	 up	 methods	 to	 evaluate	 the	 immeasurable	 through	 developing	identifiable	 indicators	of	state	trust. Both	cultural	diplomacy	and	state	trust	are	concepts	that	cannot	be	easily	measured.	Hence,	 in	accordance	with	the	detailed	elaboration	regarding	the	two	concepts	in	the	previous	chapters,	it	is	necessary	 to	 come	 up	 with	 some	 measurable	 ways	 to	 examine	 the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building. 5.   To	evaluate	 the	application	of	cultural	diplomacy	 in	both	China	and	the	UK,	then	this	thesis	adopts	a	case	study	in	an	attempt	to	verify	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building	between	China	and	the	UK.	  	
1.3	Methods	of	This	Research	The	research	has	involved	an	in-depth,	empirical	study	of	the	cultural	diplomatic	efforts	of	both	China	and	the	UK,	and	the	methodological	approach	would	have	been	 significantly	 different.	 This	 thesis	 will	 describe	 in	 what	 way	 the	 main	problem	will	be	approached–including	the	core	concepts,	theories,	data	and	the	analytical	approach.	A	cross-state	comparative	study	 in	any	discipline	 is	not	an	easy	 task	because	of	 the	overwhelming	 logistical	 barriers,	 among	other	 things.	The	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	and	its	relationship	with	state	trust	is	an	umbrella	topic	covering	a	wide	range	of	disciplines	with	the	integration	of	other	subjects,	such	as	international	politics,	history,	cultural	studies,	philosophy,	etc.	
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3. “The	 History	 of	 Xiabu	 Exhibition	 and	 its	 Development	 on	 the	 International	 Stage”	organised	by	Shangrao	Government”	(30th	September	2016) 
Figure	1.	Attended	cultural	activities	of	fieldwork	in	China	
 2. United	Kingdom:	academic	conferences,	 seminars,	and	workshops;	political	conferences	and	activities;	 activities	of	non-government	 institutions;	 individual	cultural	 enterprises.	 The	 United	 Kingdom	 is	 another	 main	 subject	 of	 this	research;	moreover,	its	excellent	track	records	in	cultural	diplomacy	could	offer	a	vast	amount	of	inspiration	and	sources	while	evaluating	the	efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	this	thesis.	In	the	past	three	years,	this	research	has	been	inspired	by	a	 lot	of	academic	and	cultural	events	 in	 the	UK.	 I	also	took	an	active	part	 in	
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organising	 some	 of	 these	 events,	 which	 offered	me	 a	 platform	 to	 examine	 the	practices	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 both	 academic	 area	 and	 political	 field.	 The	trackable	records	are	listed	as	follows: 
 




5. “Jiangsu	 Province	 Cultural	 Industry	 Overseas	 Project	 Conference”	 in	 London	 (12th	September	2016)	
6. “Belt	 and	 Road	 and	 Sino-EU	 Relations”	 workshops	 in	 the	 University	 of	 London	 (6th	September	2016)	
7. “Grand	 Chinese	 Paintings	 and	 its	 Development”	 organised	 by	 Shanghai	 Intercultural	Association	in	the	SOAS	of	University	of	London	(7th	September	2016)	
8. “Global	China	Dialogue”	in	the	British	Academy	(2nd	December	2016)	
9. “Chinese	 New	 Year	 Orchestral	 Concert”	 Organised	 by	 Council	 of	 Clacton-On-Sea	 and	Colchester	Chinese	Culture	Society	(5th	February	2017)	




	Thirdly,	 questionnaire	 (see	 Appendix	 3)	 has	 been	 designed	 to	 collect	 the	opinions	 from	 the	 public	 on	 the	 discussion	 of	 these	 two	 concepts:	 cultural	diplomacy	 and	 state	 trust.	 It	 helps	 to	 foster	 a	 better	 understanding	 and	generation	of	assumptions	on	the	key	argument	of	this	thesis. This	questionnaire	
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started	in	July	2014,	ended	in	January	2015	and	collected	2,215	valid	samples	in	total.	 This	 questionnaire	 has	 three	 channels	 to	 collect	 data:	 1)	 postal	questionnaire	(285	samples),	which	had	been	sent	to	some	interviewees	by	post;	2)	 online	 questionnaire	 (1624	 samples),	 which	 had	 been	 published	 on	 the	website;	 3)	 street	 questionnaire	 (306	 samples),	 which	 had	 been	 distributed	randomly	to	the	passengers.	Further,	questionnaires	of	this	research	are	divided	into	two	editions:	English	language	edition	(984	samples)	and	Chinese	language	edition	 (1231samples),	 which	 could	 help	 to	 collect	 responses	 from	 both	Chinese-speaking	and	English-speaking	people.	Additionally,	 these	respondents	were	also	from	different	countries,	different	occupations,	and	different	ages.		Fourthly,	 semi-structured	 interviews	 have	 been	 undertaken.	 It	 is	 beneficial	 to	test	 the	 level	 of	 knowledge	 of	 the	 general	 public	 on	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 state	trust	 and	 to	 evaluate	 the	 benefits	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 state	 trust	 building	between	 China	 and	 the	 UK.	 Furthermore,	 these	 interviews	 are	 also	 used	 to	identify	 the	 problems	 and	 difficulties	 that	 exist	 in	 both	 academic	 and	 political	areas.	The	interviewers	can	be	divided	into	several	groups:		1. Political	 area:	 government	 officials,	 politicians,	 diplomats	 and	 advisors	 of	foreign	policy	(see	Appendix	1).	2. Academic	field:	academic	scholars	(See	Appendix	1),	student	majored	in	the	related	subjects(see	Appendix	2).	 	3. Relevant	non-governmental	Institutions:	director	and	staff(see	Appendix	2).	4. Individuals	 who	 have	 interest	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 (see	 	Appendix	2).		Due	to	the	various	situations	of	interviewers,	there	is	a	range	of	ways	to	collect	and	record	data	from	the	structured	interview,	which	could	ensure	the	efficiency	of	 the	 interview.	This	 thesis	has	adopted	 the	 following	manner:	1.	Paper-based	interview,	 for	example,	questionnaire	and	post	mails;	2.	Face-to-face	 interview;	3.	 Telephone	 interview;	 4.	 Internet-based	 interview,	 for	 example,	 emails	 and	communication	on	the	social	software	of	mobile	phones.	 	 		
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Lastly,	one	case	study	has	been	employed	as	useful	as	an	exploratory	tool	in	this	thesis,	 which	 will	 provide	 an	 understanding	 of	 a	 complicated	 progress	 to	examine	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	 in	state	 trust	building	between	China	 and	 the	UK.	Therefore,	 I	 choose	 the	2015	China-UK	Cultural	 Year	 as	 the	case	study	of	this	thesis.	 		
1.4	Limitations	of	Research	Methods	 	It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 note	 the	 methodological	 limitations	 of	 this	 thesis.	 For	example,	 insufficiency	 of	 questionnaires.	 The	 participants	 of	 the	 questionnaire	presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	mostly	 affiliated	with	 different	 universities,	which	could	 not	 ensure	 the	 variety	 of	 the	 sample.	 This	 means,	 strictly	 speaking,	 the	conclusion	of	the	obtained	samples	could	not	represent	the	reality	well	due	to	a	lot	of	factors,	such	as	sample	size,	sample	varieties	and	questionnaire’s	content.	 	 		Additionally,	 during	 a	 host	 of	 interviews,	 a	 researcher	 may	 give	 out	 indirect	signals	 or	 clues	 that	 guide	 the	 respondents	 to	 provide	 the	 answers	 he/she	expects	(Miles,	Huberman,	and	Saldaña,	2013,	p.193).	It	can	be	avoided	as	much	as	 possible	 by	 the	 researcher	 retaining	 himself	 neutral	 and	 giving	 the	interviewees	 the	 confidence	 to	 answer	 the	 questions	 truthfully.	 While	interviewing	 respondents,	 researchers	may	 find	 it	 far	 from	 straightforward	 to	determine	whether	 they	 are	 truthful	 or	 not.	 Respondents	may	 not	 consciously	conceal	 information	 but	 may	 have	 an	 imperfect	 recall.	 It	 could	 be	 one	 of	 the	limitations	 of	 this	 research	 as	 the	 interviewees	 were	 asked	 questions	 about	experiences	that	had	occurred.	 		
1.5	Overview	of	Thesis	Structure	 	In	order	to	achieve	the	objectives	and	aim	of	this	research,	this	thesis	is	laid	out	in	seven	chapters	in	total:		This	 introductory	 chapter	presents	 a	 general	 introduction	 to	 this	 thesis,	which	includes	 research	 background,	 aims	 and	 objectives,	 methods	 and	 overview	 of	thesis	 structure.	 To	be	 able	 to	 provide	 a	 thorough	 answer	 to	 each	of	 the	main	research	 questions,	 it	 is	 foremost	 necessary	 to	 provide	 more	 background	
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information	 in	 this	 chapter.	 Following	 on	 from	 this,	 the	 detailed	conceptualisation	 of	 these	 two	 concepts	 that	 upcoming	 chapters	 will	 be	provided.	 	
Chapter	 2	 conceptualises	 the	 notion	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 based	 upon	 its	multiple	 definitions	 across	 a	 range	 of	 social	 science	 disciplines.	 This	 chapter	argues	 that	 the	 main	 subject	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 the	 state	 actor,	 such	 as	government	 institutions	 or	 non-governmental	 institutions	 authorised	 by	 the	government	 to	 join	 programs	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 Additionally,	 this	 chapter	attempts	to	differentiate	several	semantic	concepts	so	as	to	ensure	the	essence	of	cultural	diplomacy,	 such	as	public	diplomacy,	 cultural	 soft	power,	 intercultural	communication	and	international	cultural	relations.	Furthermore,	it	outlines	the	general	development	of	cultural	diplomacy.	It	also	arguably	discusses	the	limits	and	merits	of	cultural	diplomacy.	 		 	
 
Chapter	3,	the	concept	of	state	trust	is	elaborated	at	length.	The	beginning	of	this	chapter	 clarifies	 and	 highlights	 the	 important	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	misconceptions	 regarding	 the	 key	 terms	 as	 follows:	 trust,	 confidence,	 social	capital	and	social	trust.	The	next	section	combines	the	essence	of	both	trust	and	social	 capital	 to	 conceptualise	 a	 new	 concept--state	 trust.	 The	 next	 section	outlines	 the	 relationship	 of	 state	 trust	 and	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 Three	propositions	 are	 put	 forward	 in	 this	 part	 to	 discuss	 the	 key	 argument	 of	 this	thesis,	assuming	that	when	everything	else	being	equal,	 if	cultural	relations	can	be	strengthened	and	improved,	the	challenges	of	cultural	identity	can	be	solved	well,	 and	 reciprocal	 behaviour	 can	 be	 increased	 or	 maintained,	 then	 cultural	diplomacy	can	maintain,	enhance	and	even	create	state	trust.	Besides,	in	order	to	explore	how	cooperation,	 state	 trust	and	cultural	diplomacy	can	 reinforce	with	each	 other,	 the	 last	 section	 introduces	 and	 discusses	 the	 Game	 of	 State	 Trust,	explicitly	and	arguably.	The	concept	of	state	trust	tailored	for	this	thesis	that	later	will	be	empirically	tested	across	the	comparative	case	studies.	 		
Chapter	4	concurred	with	the	establishes	view	by	other	scholars	that	measuring	the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 far	 from	 straightforward,	 and	 that	
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attempting	 to	 gauge	 precise	 level	 of	 state	 trust	 is	 particularly	 difficult.	 This	chapter	 thus	 puts	 forward	 five	 indicators	 to	 examine	 different	 levels	 of	 the	existing	 state	 trust:	 a)	 high	 level	 of	 state	 trust--	 discretionary	 power	 in	 the	policy-making;	b)	upper	medium	 level	of	 state	 trust	 --	 types	of	 rules	 that	 state	actor	 employ	 in	 the	 written	 forms	 and	 with	 leeway;	 c)	 medium	 level	 of	 state	trust--carrying	out	benevolent	policies	between	states;	d)	lower	medium	level	of	state	trust--advantageous	orientation	of	states’	policies;	e)	minimal	level	of	state	trust--cooperation	among	states.	This	chapter	discusses	five	obstacles	of	cultural	diplomacy	 in	 state	 trust	 building.	 Additionally,	 nine	 factors	 that	may	 influence	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	are	proposed	as	well:	a)	some	content	of	cultural	 policies	 and	 foreign	 policies;	 b);	 a	 clearly	 defined	 social	 roles,	 formal	contract	 and	 well-established	 obligations	 between	 states;	 c)	 the	 quality	 of	cultural	 diplomatic	 programs;	 d)	 coordination	 among	different	 governmental	departments	and	other	institutions	within	and	across	states;	e);	existing	mistrust	and	conflictual	issues	between	states;	f)	misuse	of	funding	for	cultural	diplomatic	programs;	 g)	 the	 operation	 of	 overseas	 cultural	 institutions;	 h)	 publicity	concerning	 the	 programs	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy;	 i)	monitoring	 the	 impact	 after	cultural	diplomatic	activities.	These	 indicators	and	 factors	will	 thus	serve,	over	the	course	of	the	empirical	case	studies,	as	the	measurement	tool	to	examine	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building.	 	 		
Chapter	5	looks	at	how	cultural	diplomacy	has	developed	in	China	over	the	past	eight	 decades	 and	 what	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 Chinese	 government	 are.	 It	predominantly	discusses	the	application	of	China’s	cultural	diplomacy	from	the	following	aspects:	the	historical	origin	of	China’s	cultural	diplomacy;	the	Chinese	government	 official’s	 promotion	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy;	 the	 practice	 of	 China’s	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building.	It	helps	to	locate	my	research,	related	questions	and	concerns	in	the	practical	situations	and	academic	fields	in	China.	Additionally,	 this	 chapter	 takes	 the	 2014	 APEC	 Beijing	 CEO	 Summit	 as	 an	example,	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 improvements,	weaknesses	 and	outcomes	 of	state	trust	building.	 		
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2.1 Introduction	Since	 human	 civilisation	 evolves	 and	 develops,	 cultural	 elements	 start	 to	 be	utilised	in	the	global	diplomatic	arena.	Cultural	diplomacy,	as	the	name	implies,	is	 the	 combination	 of	 culture	 and	 diplomacy:	 culture	 +	 diplomacy	 =	 cultural	diplomacy.	Culture	is	not	a	simple	concept,	and	diplomacy	is	a	rather	tricky	word	in	politics.	Both	of	them	are	vague	terms	that	can	have	different	meanings	with	variable	 usages,	 which	 could	 spawn	 a	 string	 of	 contrasting	 associations	 with	mixed	fortunes	as	a	result.	The	mix	of	culture	and	diplomacy	generates	the	term	“cultural	diplomacy”,	with	an	increasingly	sophisticated	but	distinctive	meaning.	As	the	main	component	of	soft	power,	culture	is	also	regarded	as	one	of	the	most	important	 elements	 in	 diplomacy;	 this	 is	 particularly	 so	 in	 terms	 of	 the	significance	of	cultural	communications	among	international	relations.	When	the	word	diplomacy	is	used,	the	first	 impression	that	springs	to	mind	will	 likely	be	diplomatic	representatives,	heads	of	state	visiting,	foreign	affairs	or	negotiations.	Cultural	 diplomacy,	 which	 seems	 to	 be	 more	 of	 an	 abstract	 concept	 and	 will	produce	factors	of	an	intangible	nature,	for	instance,	the	statecraft	of	a	country.	 	 	





a	range	of	topics,	processes,	differences	and	even	paradoxes,	and	that	it	may	only	be	 possible	 to	 apply	 it	 in	 a	 vague	 and	 intuitive	 way.	 A	 large	 number	 of	anthropologists	and	scholars	from	various	disciplines	have	attempted	to	define	it	in	different	ways	and	emphasised	the	countless	aspects	of	culture.	Therefore,	it	is	noted	 that	 the	 term	 culture	 varies	 with	 numerous	 changes,	 and	 can	 never	actually	be	described	as	a	single	entity.	Furthermore,	it	is	also	considered	to	be	a	complicated	matter	with	dynamic	as	well	as	evolving	features.	 		Looking	back	to	the	origin	of	culture,	from	the	aspect	of	etymology,	both	English	and	 French	 use	 the	 same	 word	 “culture”	 deriving	 from	 the	 Latin	 expression	“cultura”,	which	means	to	cultivate	and	tend	to	the	earth	and	grow,	or	cultivation	and	 nurture	 (Rossi,	 2015).	 Sir	 Edward	 Burnett	 Tylor,	 the	 founder	 of	cultural	anthropology,	 once	 argued	 that	 ‘culture	 is	 that	 complex	whole	which	 includes	knowledge,	belief,	art,	law,	morals,	custom,	and	any	other	capabilities	and	habits	acquired	by	man	as	a	member	of	society’	(Tylor,	1871,	p.1).	Since	the	era	of	Tylor,	the	concept	of	culture	has	become	the	central	focus	of	anthropology.	Moreover,	it	is	also	one	of	the	reasons	why	political	scientists	of	the	period	became	interested	in	exploring	cultural	questions	in	the	late	1950s,	because	they	felt	it	necessary	to	limit	 their	 relevant	 cultural	domain	 to	 “political	 culture”(Spencer-oatey,	2012).	Additionally,	 to	 George	 Simmel,	 ‘culture,	 as	 it	 were,	 formed	 intentional	subjectivity	that	emerges	out	of	human	life	and	 its	 intentions	and	 is	created	by	human	beings	as	objectified	contents	or	entities	in	language,	religion,	normative	orders,	 legal	 systems,	 traditions,	 artistic	 artefacts,	 and	 so	 on’	 (Simmel,	 1997,	p.103).	 To	 Bound	 and	 Briggs,	 ‘culture	 stems	 from	 the	 wider,	 connective	 and	human	values.	Culture	is	both	the	means	by	which	we	come	to	understand	others,	and	an	aspect	of	life	with	innate	worth	that	we	enjoy	and	seek	out’	(Bound	and	Brigg,	 2007,	 p.13).	 Furthermore,	 Franz	 Boas	 argued	 that	 ‘culture	 embraces	 all	the	manifestations	of	social	habits	of	a	community,	the	reactions	of	the	individual	as	affected	by	the	habits	of	the	group	in	which	he	lives,	and	the	product	of	human	activities	 as	 determined	 by	 these	 habits’	 (Boas,	 1911,	 p.159).	 To	 Kroeber	 and	Kluckhohn,	 ‘culture	 consists	 of	 patterns,	 explicit	 and	 implicit,	 of	 and	 for	behaviour	 acquired	 and	 transmitted	 by	 symbols,	 constituting	 the	 distinctive	achievements	 of	 human	 groups,	 including	 their	 embodiment	 in	 artefacts;	 the	
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 Culture	itself	contains	many	abstract	and	unaccountable	norms	and	international	society	is	full	of	numerous	kinds	of	culture,	and	cultural	conflicts	will	inevitably	emerge	now	and	again,	in	a	light-hearted	fashion	or	in	a	much	more	serious	way.	In	 the	 questionnaire,	 the	 first	 question	 is	 “do	 you	 think	 different	 cultures	will	cause	 conflicts”,	 the	 proportion	 of	 their	 responses	 can	 be	 seen	 clearly	 in	 the	columns	as	follows:	
 
       
       
Figure	 1.	 Data	 result	 of	 questionnaire	 “Do	 you	 think	 different	 cultures	 will	 cause	
conflicts?”	 	






















“Yes”	or	“It	depends”	that	most	of	them	argue	that	cultural	differences	and	value	clashes	 do	 exist,	 and	 they	must	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 dealing	with	 political	issues	 so	 as	 to	 promote	 international	 understanding.	 Less	 than	 7%	 of	respondents	 gave	 the	 ‘positive’	 answer	 that	 different	 cultures	 would	 not	generate	conflicts.		These	 figures	 could	 not	 provide	 the	 affirmative	 and	 authoritative	 level	 of	certainty	 to	 any	 extent,	 but	 the	 answers	 to	 this	 questionnaire	 highlight	 the	argument	regarding	the	relationship	between	culture	and	conflict.	It	can	be	seen	from	 the	 responses	 that	 almost	 50%	 realised	 and	 agreed	 on	 the	 connection	between	 culture	 and	 conflict	 and	 this	 kind	 of	 connection	 could	 not	 be	 just	ignored.	Since	the	September	11	attacks	in	New	York,	state	actors	have	gradually	realised,	 perhaps	 more	 thoroughly	 than	 previously,	 that	 due	 the	 shortage	 of	cultural	understanding,	which	largely	inspire	global	conflict	to	an	extent	far	less	controllable	 than	 the	 superpower	 conflict	 during	 the	 Cold	War	 (Gienow-Hecht	and	Donfried,	2010,	p.13).	Even	with	the	best	security	check	 in	the	airport	and	bordering	 areas	 or	 any	 sorts	 of	 harsh	 visa	 policies,	 one	 can	 never	 replace	 the	power	 that	 derives	 from	 a	 sustainable	 cultural	 dialogue	 and	 cultural	understanding	 between	 various	 cultures	 and	 civilisations	 across	 the	 global	villages.	 Human	 society	 is	 not	 able	 to	 fulfil	 the	 civilised	 evolvement	 or	development	 if	 there	 is	 no	 culture.	 However,	 how	 to	 understand	 different	cultures	and	avoid	conflicts	caused	by	cultural	clashes	is	quite	crucial,	especially	in	the	aspect	of	trust	building	among	states.	It	is	also	one	of	the	main	purposes	of	this	 thesis,	which	endeavours	 to	come	up	with	useful	methods	so	as	 to	help	 to	resolve	or	avoid	conflicts	caused	by	different	cultures	among	states.		
2.3	What	is	Diplomacy?	 	The	term	diplomacy	has	been	used	for	a	long	period	in	history,	and	the	concept	of	 diplomacy	 is	 an	 agreed	 standard	 term	 without	 any	 further	 contentious	debates.	This	part	provides	a	clear	concept	of	diplomacy	to	lay	the	foundation	for	the	conceptual	analysis	of	 the	parts	 that	 followed	 later	on.	One	of	 the	standard	measurement	 methods	 to	 judge	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 a	 state	 is	 the	 capacity	 for	diplomacy	by	 this	 state	 in	question,	whether	 it	 can	 conduct	 foreign	affairs	 in	a	
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proper	and	generally	accepted	way	or	not.	For	thousands	of	years,	people	of	the	states	had	already	begun	to	engage	in	diplomacy	to	deal	with	foreign	affairs.	In	a	quite	long	period	of	human	history,	whenever	it	was	needed,	a	diplomat	would	have	 been	 sent	 to	 another	 country	 so	 as	 to	 negotiate	 with	 the	 leader	 of	 that	country	on	a	particular	issue.	He	then	immediately	returned	to	the	country	after	the	relevant	talks.	Diplomats	were	typically	members	of	the	general	household	of	the	ruler	of	that	country	or	one	of	the	senior	officials	appointed	by	the	ruler,	in	order	 to	 be	 in	 an	 authoritative	 position	 to	 discuss	 and	 convey	 the	 essential	elements	in	the	actual	negotiations,	and	be	able	to	agree	on	the	results	of	these	negotiations	with	other	countries.	Hence	the	personal	link	of	this	diplomat	with	the	ruler,	and	the	high-ranking	official	post	of	this	diplomat	gave	the	impression	of	authority	and	legitimacy	as	well.	 		In	the	current	era,	the	subject	of	diplomacy	is	the	sovereign	state.	International	organisations,	authorised	by	sovereign	states,	have	increasingly	played	an	active	role	on	the	world	stage	and	have	gradually	become	important	participants.	For	example,	the	United	Nations’	activities	have	close	relations	with	other	sovereign	states	and	have	a	very	significant	functional	effect	upon	a	number	of	diplomatic	coordination.	 The	 purposes	 of	 diplomacy	 include	 many	 issues,	 but	 the	 main	theme	 is	 the	use	of	 peaceful	means	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 goals	 of	 its	 foreign	policy,	to	safeguard	the	interests	of	the	country,	to	expand	its	sphere	of	influence	internationally	 and	 develop	 an	 acceptable	 relationship	 with	 other	 countries.	Accordingly,	“diplomacy	concerns	as	much	the	promotion	of	political,	economic,	cultural	 or	 scientific	 relations	 as	 it	 does	 international	 commitment	 to	 defend	human	 rights	 or	 the	 peaceful	 settlement	 of	 disputes,	 the	 aim	 of	 such	international	 diplomacy	 is	 primarily	 to	 strike	 a	 balance	 between	 state	interests”(Federal	 Department	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 2008).	 Thus,	 diplomacy	 as	 a	critical	 process	 of	 communication	 and	 negotiation	 in	 world	 politics	 and	 as	 an	important	 foreign	 policy	 instrument	 used	 by	 global	 actors	 (White	 and	 Baylis,	2005,	p.388).	 		There	are	internationally	accepted	guidelines	for	diplomats’	interaction.	Among	the	guidelines,	the	best	example	is	the	United	Nations	Charter,	which	illustrates	
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the	 main	 purposes	 and	 principles	 of	 the	 diplomatic	 behaviours	 of	 sovereign	states.	 It	mentions	 ‘the	mutual	 respect	 for	 sovereignty	and	 territorial	 integrity,	mutual	non-aggression,	mutual	non-interference	in	internal	affairs,	equality	and	mutual	benefit,	and	peaceful	coexistence.	Settle	all	disputes	by	peaceful	means,	without	 resorting	 to	 force	 and	 threats	 of	 force.	 The	 diplomacy	 on	 this	 basis	 is	with	 equality	 and	 justice,	 otherwise	 will	 become	 inequality	 and	 injustice.	Equitable	 new	 international	 political	 order	 and	 a	 new	 international	 economic	order	 would	 be	 possible	 to	 build	 if	 the	 premise	 is	 keeping	 peace	 and	development	as	the	main	objective’	(United	Nations,	1945).		In	order	to	ensure	the	main	subject	of	cultural	diplomacy,	it	is	entirely	necessary	to	 clarify	 the	 characteristics	 of	 contemporary	 diplomacy	 in	 the	 international	society.	 Besides	 the	 guidelines	 of	 the	 UN	 Charter,	 in	 accordance	 with	 Lu	 Yi’s	analysis	 regarding	 the	 features	 of	 diplomacy	 (Lu,	 2004,	 p.35),	 contemporary	diplomacy	has	the	following	characteristics:	 		1. Independent	 diplomatic	 power	 is	 one	 of	 the	 hallmarks	 of	 sovereign	 states,	and	it	is	also	the	guiding	principle	of	the	equality	of	diplomacy	with	respect	to	each	sovereign	state.	2. "Limited	 diplomatic	 authorisation",	 diplomacy	 involves	 the	 highest	 national	interest,	 diplomatic	 decision-making	 is	 at	 the	 highest	 national	 organs	 for	policy-making,	 diplomatic	 executive	 authority	 is	 the	decision-making	organ,	which	 can	have	 flexibility	 in	 operation	 but	 only	within	 certain	 limits	 and	 it	must	consult	the	organs	of	policy-making	in	case	of	major	problems.	3. Heads	of	State	and	government	have	gradually	and	directly	been	involved	in	a	variety	of	diplomatic	situations;	the	roles	they	play	tend	to	become	a	lot	more	active	as	well	as	having	been	placed	in	a	significant	and	prominent	position.	4. Comprehensive	 and	 diversified	 participation	 in	 diplomatic	 activities	 is	 the	developmental	 trend	 of	modern	diplomacy.	 Foreign	Affairs	 are	 subjected	 to	their	 own	 political	 and	 economic	 systems	 as	well	 as	 the	 relevant	 domestic	policy	and	the	national	necessity/requirements.		
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For	those	people	who	are	not	quite	familiar	with	the	concept	and	characteristics	of	diplomacy,	 they	usually	use	 the	term	 ‘diplomacy’	without	 thinking	about	 the	meanings	in	a	logical	way	and	sometimes,	even	to	the	degree	of	being	a	little	bit	too	farfetched.	It	is	quite	often	to	find	some	references	which	are	examples	of	the	incorrect	 application	 of	 the	 term	 diplomacy,	 such	 as	 Celebrity	 Diplomacy,	Electronic	 Games	 Diplomacy,	 Media	 Diplomacy,	 Digital	 Diplomacy	 and	 other	similar	terms	are	being	linked	with	the	wording	of	diplomacy.	Additionally,	the	public	also	appears	to	have	confusion	on	the	meaning	of	diplomacy	and	foreign	policy.		The	term	diplomacy	is	not	necessarily	synonymous	with	foreign	policy.	Whereas	foreign	policy	can	be	described	as	the	substance,	aims,	and	attitudes	of	a	state’s	relations	with	others,	diplomacy	is	one	of	the	instruments	employed	to	put	these	into	 effect.	Diplomacy	 is	 concerned	with	dialogue	 and	negotiations,	 and	 in	 this	sense,	it	is	not	merely	an	instrument	of	the	state,	it	is	also	an	instrument	of	the	state-system	 itself	 (Evans,	1998).	This	 study	 takes	as	a	point	of	departure	 that	states	 or	 departments,	 organisations,	 and	 institutions	 authorised	 by	 states	 are	the	main	subjects	of	diplomacy.	The	case	studies	in	the	following	chapters	should	be	considered	with	this	position	in	mind.		
2.4	What	is	Cultural	Diplomacy?	 	Cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 the	 combination	 of	 cultural	 issues	 and	 diplomatic	behaviours,	which	 seems	 to	 be	more	 of	 an	 abstract	 idea	 or	 concept.	 Culture	 is	either	 the	 essence	 or	 the	method	 of	 diplomacy,	 and	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 the	manifestation,	which	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 ‘the	 deployment	 of	 a	 state’s	 culture	 in	support	of	its	foreign	policy	goals	or	diplomacy’	(Mark,	2009,	p.5).	 		The	significance	of	culture	in	diplomacy	is	not	in	doubt;	as	the	former	Secretary	of	 State	 of	 the	USA,	Ms.	Madeline	Albright	 once	 said	 in	 an	 interview:	 “it	 is	 the	time	 to	 show	how	 the	values	we	preach	 in	 the	political	 arena	are	embodied	 in	our	 culture—and	 time	 to	 listen	 to	 what	 the	 cultures	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 world	 are	saying	 about	 us’	 (The	 Aspen	 Institute,	 2010).	 Considering	 the	 current	international	situation,	the	world	today	is	undergoing	major	changes	with	major	
  
	 22	
adjustments,	the	emergence	of	a	new	international	balance	of	power	and	that	the	evolving	situation	will	either	gradually	or	sometimes	very	quickly	have	an	effect	on	shaping	the	international	order	and	system.	The	international	community	has	increased	 recognition	 of	 cultural	 diversity	 with	 a	 variety	 of	 developmental	models	and	become	much	more	concerned	about	cultural	connections	with	other	states.	At	 the	same	time,	against	 the	background	of	economic	globalisation,	 the	rapid	 development	 of	 information	 technology	 and	 its	 widespread	 usage	 have	contributed	a	lot	to	promote	intercultural	learning.	 		Before	2000,	the	concept	of	cultural	diplomacy	attracted	very	 little	attention	in	both	 academic	 and	 political	 areas.	 In	 particular,	 the	 discipline	 of	 International	Relations	 almost	 completely	 ignored	 this	 concept.	 However,	 after	 2000,	increasing	attention	has	been,	slowly	but	clearly,	paid	to	the	concept	of	cultural	diplomacy.	Three	reasons	could	explain	the	increasing	usage	of	this	term	with	a	substantial	 amount	 of	 scholarly	 and	 political	 attention	 being	 attached	 to	 this	particular	phrase:	cultural	diplomacy.		Firstly,	 Joseph	 Nye	 came	 up	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 soft	 power,	 which	 is	 a	controversial	and	 frequently	discussed	concept	 in	contemporary	debates	about	the	nature	of	power.	More	and	more	attention	is	paid	to	soft	power,	and	cultural	exchange	 is	not	 an	 exception.	 “Soft	power”	 can	be	 regarded	as	 a	 substitute	 for	traditional	 forms	 of	 power	 (military	 measures	 and	 economic	 sanctions).	Furthermore,	it	emphasises	peaceful	means	in	obtaining	or	attaining	one’s	goals	and	 establishing	 trust.	 As	 Nye	 notes,	 both	 are	 inextricably	 linked.	 Nye	 also	identifies	culture	as	one	of	three	sources	of	a	nation’s	soft	power,	the	other	two	sources	 being	 political	 values	 and	 foreign	 policies;	 these	 three	 sources	 of	 soft	power	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 fully	 in	 line	 with	 internationally	 consented	credibility	and	moral	authority	(Nye,	2004,	p.36).	 In	most	visible	manifestation	can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 popular	 culture	 including	 food,	 fashion,	 tourism,	 and	entertainment.	 		Barghoorn	defined	cultural	diplomacy	as	‘the	manipulation	of	cultural	materials	and	 personnel	 for	 propaganda	 purposes,	 and	 a	 branch	 of	 intergovernmental	
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propaganda’	(Barghoorn,	1976,	p.48).	As	the	time	goes	by,	in	the	contemporary	era,	American	political	scientist	Milton	Cummings	defines	 it	as	 ‘the	exchange	of	ideas,	 information,	 art,	 and	 other	 aspects	 of	 culture	 among	 nations	 and	 their	peoples	 in	 order	 to	 foster	mutual	 understanding,	which	 can	 also	 be	more	 of	 a	one-way	 street	 than	 a	 two-way	 exchange,	 as	when	one	nation	 concentrates	 its	efforts	on	promoting	 the	national	 language,	 explaining	 its	policies	 and	point	of	view,	 or	 “telling	 its	 story”	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world’	 (Cummings,	 2003,	 p.1).	 In	current	 historiography,	 Jessica	 Gienow-Hecht	 and	 Mark	 Donfried	 agree	 that	‘cultural	 diplomacy	 often	 denotes	 a	 national	 policy	 designed	 to	 support	 the	export	of	representative	samples	of	that	national	culture	in	order	to	further	the	objectives	of	foreign	policy’	(Gienow-Hecht	and	Donfried,	2010,	p.15).		Secondly,	 the	 very	 speedy	 progress	 of	 globalisation	 has	 accelerated	 the	 rise	 of	cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 cultural	 flows.	 As	 one	 school	 argues,	‘globalisation	 is	 not	 just	 an	 economic	 matter	 but	 is	 concerned	 with	 issues	 of	cultural	 meaning.	 While	 the	 values	 and	 meanings	 attached	 to	 place	 remain	significant,	we	are	increasingly	involved	in	networks	that	extend	far	beyond	our	immediate	 physical	 locations’	 (Barker,	 2012,	 p.6).	 Globalisation	 is	 also	 an	ever-more	important	aspect	of	international	relations	because	globalisation	and	advancements	 in	 communication	 technologies	 have	 reconfigured	 the	 power	dynamics	 between	 different	 social	 actors.	 For	 example,	 the	 globalisation	 of	electronic	communications	provides	a	convenient	method	for	people	to	explore	world	 cultures	 almost	 without	 limitation	 of	 space	 and	 time.	 Therefore,	 the	diplomatic	 efforts	 of	 a	 state	 could	 be	 used	 efficiently	 and	 effectively	 by	 niche	targeting.		Thirdly,	 with	 the	 extensive	 emergence	 of	 religious	 conflict,	 the	 importance	 of	understanding	and	respecting	different	religious	cultures	is	an	issue	that	is	fast	becoming	an	increasingly	urgent	necessity.	International	society’s	move	from	the	bipolar	situation	of	the	Cold	War	to	the	uncertainties	of	the	current	multi-polar	world	has	a	profound	influence	on	the	ways	in	which	states	attempt	to	construct	and	 project	 their	 national	 image	 and	 identity.	 Cultural,	 religious	 and	 ethnic	
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factors	are	now	playing	an	increasingly	significant	role	in	defining	the	image	and	sense	of	identity	of	a	state.	 	 	 		A	recent	argument	in	the	academic	and	political	fields	has	asked	whether	culture	can	be	used	 for	political	or	diplomatic	purposes.	As	 for	 the	research	 interview,	which	was	conducted	during	the	period	from	10th	September	2014	to	30th	April	2015,	 fifty-two	 individuals	 from	 various	 occupations	 (scholars,	 university	students,	 government	 officers,	 news	 reporters,	 curators,	 etc.)	were	 selected	 to	provide	 their	 perspectives	 towards	 the	 role	 of	 culture	 in	 politics.	 Most	 of	 the	interviewees	had	a	certain	degree	of	knowledge	in	the	politics.	Therefore,	results	of	the	interview	could	help	to	explore	the	general	opinions	towards	this	topic.	In	this	interview,	eighteen	interviewees	argue	that	culture	is	pure	while	politics	is	full	 of	 tricks.	 Hence,	 they	 could	 not	 possibly	 have	 the	 connection.	 Among	 the	eighteen	 interviewees,	 five	 of	 them	 had	 interest	 in	 the	 politics,	 while	 the	 rest	thirteen	interviewees	had	less	interest	in	politics.	 		Additionally,	 twelve	 interviewees	 argue	 that	 the	 linkage	 of	 culture	 with	 a	diplomatic	 frame	 around	 it	 implies	 that	 culture	 is	 just	 another	 tool	 for	 the	promotion	 of	 national	 interest	 overseas,	 thus	 “cultural	 relations”,	 or	 “cultural	engagement”	would	be	much	more	appropriate	than	the	term	cultural	diplomacy.	Other	 perspectives	 along	 the	 same	 lines	 include	 knowledge	 diplomacy,	 global	cultural	 exchange,	 and	 cultural	 collaboration.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 term	 cultural	diplomacy	has	been	attracting	a	significant	amount	of	support.	In	addition,	in	this	research	 interview,	 some	 scholars,	 PhD	 students	 and	 government	 officers,	 for	example,	Professor	Qingmin	Zhang	 from	Peking	University	 and	Mr.	Rulei	Dong	from	Beijing	Government,	argue	that	if	the	state	takes	culture	as	an	effective	tool	to	 promote	 international	 cooperation	 and	 mutual	 understanding,	 the	contribution	 of	 culture	 to	 politics	 should	 not	 be	 left	 unrecognised.	 As	 for	 the	result	of	questionnaires,	the	question	is	“do	you	think	‘culture’	can	be	used	as	a	means	of	diplomacy?”		
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Figure	 2.	 Data	 result	 of	 the	 questionnaire	 “Do	 you	 think	 of	 “culture”	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 means	 of	
diplomacy?”	 	






















Entertainment,	 2015),	 it	 is	 highly	 likely	 that	 the	 editor	 has	 not	 grasped	 the	differences	between	the	concept	of	cultural	diplomacy	and	cultural	activity.	This	phenomenon,	 to	 some	 extent,	 illustrates	 the	 relatively	 low	 level	 of	 knowledge	regarding	 the	 concept	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 China.	 Because	 a	 substantial	proportion	 of	 members	 of	 the	 public	 would	 tend	 to	 agree	 with	 the	notion--attending	 cultural	 activities	 in	 other	 foreign	 countries	 equals	 to	 the	perceived	correct	behaviours	of	 cultural	diplomacy.	More	specifically,	 this	 type	of	misunderstanding	 is	 also	a	 reflection	on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	public	 is	not	quite	familiar	 with	 other	 respective	 terms	 resulting	 in	 having	 confusion	 with	 their	meanings,	such	as	cultural	communication,	individual	cultural	exchange,	cultural	relations,	etc.		In	the	academic	field,	cultural	diplomacy	is	in	need	of	a	higher	level	of	attention.	According	to	Simon	Mark,	 ‘cultural	diplomacy	has	been	almost	entirely	 ignored	by	the	discipline	of	 IR.	General	 texts	on	diplomacy,	which	might	be	assumed	to	include	cultural	diplomacy,	barely	mention,	or	discuss,	the	practice	(Mark,	2009,	p.9).	 Additionally,	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 research	 report	 published	 by	 EUNIC	(European	 Union	 National	 Institutes	 for	 Culture),	 ‘on	 the	 whole,	 cultural	diplomacy	at	the	academic	level	is	still	relatively	uncharted	territory,	and	there	is	a	 lack	 of	 training	 specific	 to	 the	 subject.	 Programs	 that	 explicitly	 deal	 with	cultural	diplomacy	usually	borrow	content	 from	more	consolidated	disciplines,	including	 political	 science,	 international	 relations,	 and	 public	 communication’	(EUNIC,	2016,	p.2).		The	questionnaire	 in	 this	 study	 identifies	 that	 only	9.97%	of	 the	2,125	 sample	respondents	 consider	 themselves	 quite	 familiar	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	and	45.66%	know	a	little	bit	about	the	concept,	while	42.86%	in	total,	without	any	knowledge	of	this	concept.	
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Figure	 3.	 Data	 result	 of	 the	 questionnaire	 “Do	 you	 know	 the	 concept	 of	 cultural	
diplomacy?”	 	


















Another	question	of	this	questionnaire	is	framed	in	an	interesting	fashion	as	well,	“do	 you	 think	 ordinary	 citizens	 and	non-governmental	 institutions	 rather	 than	government	or	diplomats	also	could	be	a	part	of	cultural	diplomacy?”	The	reason	why	designs	this	question	is	mainly	because	of	that	in	the	current	academic	area,	three	schools	holding	different	perspectives	towards	the	main	subject	of	cultural	diplomacy.	Answers	given	are	shown	in	the	following	figures:		
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activities	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 which	 is	 conducted	 by	 other	 non-state	 actors.	From	 the	 responses	 towards	 this	 question,	 it	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 dispute	concerning	 the	main	 subject	of	 cultural	diplomacy	does	exist	 and	a	 substantial	proportion	of	 them	considers	 that	 the	main	body	of	 cultural	diplomacy	 should	not	be	merely	limited	to	the	political	arena.	 		In	the	academic	field,	there	are	three	schools	grappling	with	the	definitions	and	the	main	subject	of	cultural	diplomacy.	One	of	the	supporters	of	the	first	school	is	Fayet,	who	 insists	 that	cultural	diplomacy	matters	more	with	state	control	and	propaganda.	 To	 Fayet,	 ‘cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 from	 the	 1920s	onward	 took	 the	 dimension	 of	 cultural	 propaganda	work,	 organising	 tours	 by	Soviet	artists,	scholars,	and	exhibitions	outside	Russia	while	welcoming	foreign	journalists	 and	 representatives	 of	 international	 humanitarian	 organisations’	(Fayet,	2010,	p.9).	Another	representative	of	this	school	is	Prof.	Lihua	Zhang,	the	director	 of	 Sino-Europe	 Research	 Centre	 of	 International	 Department	 of	Tsinghua	University	stated	in	an	interview	given.	She	considers	that	the	concept	of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 a	 reference	 to	 the	 sum	 total	 of	 the	 foreign	 cultural	relations	 engaged	 in	 by	 a	 government,	 including	 the	 official	 foreign	 cultural	strategy	and	policy,	 foreign	cultural	exchange	activities	and	projects,	which	are	hosted,	led,	supported	and	financed	by	states	and	governments.	She	also	claims	that	 the	 principal	 subject	 of	 diplomacy	 can	 only	 be	 a	 matter	 for	 states	 and	governments.	In	addition,	she	also	argues	that	if	any	activities	that	could	be	given	the	title	or	term	as	diplomacy	without	any	prerequisites,	then	perhaps	the	use	of	this	 term	 ‘diplomacy’	 in	 this	 particular	 situation	 would	 not	 be	 an	 accurate	reflection	 of	 the	 essence	 of	 diplomacy.	 Furthermore,	 based	 upon	 the	 research	report	 by	 the	EUNIC,	which	demonstrates	 a	 slightly	 different	 perspective	 from	Prof.	 Zhang;	 it	 states	 that	 ‘cultural	 diplomacy	 does	 not	 necessarily	 entail	 the	involvement	 of	 the	 government	 but	 implies	 its	 role	 in	 fostering	 a	 specific	strategic	 interest;	and	the	“cultural	relations	approach,”	which	 looks	at	cultural	diplomacy	 as	 a	 practice	 based	 on	 dialogue	 and	 collaboration,	 detached	 from	 a	soft	power	framework’	(EUNIC,	2016).	This	school	considers	the	use	of	cultural	diplomacy	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 state	 policy	 and	with	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 limited	private	participation.	 	
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Another	 school	 regards	 the	 use	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 as	 a	 tool	 to	work	 at	 the	exclusion	 of	 state	 policies.	 For	 instance,	 Aniko	 Macher	 considers	 that	 ‘while	officials	used	the	terms	“cultural	diplomacy”	and	“propaganda”	interchangeably,	the	 origins	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	were	 nonetheless	 neither	 propagandistic	 nor	new:	 instead,	 it	 represented	a	means	 to	establish	 ties	with	countries	 that	were	politically	unpalatable’	(Macher,	2010,	p.75).	 		The	third	school	defines	cultural	diplomacy	as	beyond	the	realm	of	the	state.	For	example,	Maki	Aoki-Okabe	and	other	two	Japanese	scholars	argue	that	 ‘cultural	diplomacy	matters	with	the	promotion	abroad	“national	culture”	and	interactive	cultural	 exchange.	Additionally,	 the	 structure	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 agency	 can	be	extremely	heterogeneous’	(Maki;	Toich;	Kawamura,	2010,	p.212).	 		In	accordance	with	the	elaboration	on	the	concept	of	diplomacy	in	the	previous	section,	cultural	diplomacy	is	a	matter	of	emphasis	on	the	role	of	sovereign	state	or	government	when	these	official	bodies	engage	 in	 foreign	cultural	exchanges.	States	 are	 perceived	 as	 the	main	 actors	 carrying	 out	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 even	though	they	might	 lose	some	of	 their	monopolies	as	other	actors	become	more	active.	 It	 should	 not	 and	 cannot	 disappear	 from	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs,	and	the	necessity	of	state	activities	cannot	be	dismissed.	Instead,	they	could	fill	a	significant	role	by	ensuring	that	the	private	agendas	or	related	groups	from	civil	society	 could	 work	 in	 tandem	 with	 the	 priorities	 and	 challenges	 of	 national	policy.	 Additionally,	 they	 utilise	 culture	 as	 a	 means	 to	 achieve	 the	 specific	political	 purpose	 or	 strategic	 intent	 outside	 the	 usual	 or	 formal	 diplomatic	activities;	 while	 other	 sectors	 could	 conduct	 the	 process	 of	 implementation	towards	 cultural	 communication	 programs	 under	 the	 guidance	 of	 the	 national	government.	As	Mark	argues,	‘cultural	diplomacy	is	managed	both	by	diplomats	working	 for	 a	 state’s	 foreign	 ministry	 and	 by	 those	 working	 for	 stand-alone	entities	 with	 varying	 degrees	 of	 governance	 and	 funding	 links	 to	 foreign	ministries.	Activities	are	undertaken	within	cultural	diplomacy’s	scope	manifest	an	 aspect	 of	 the	 culture	 of	 the	 state	 which	 the	 government	 represents,	 and	involve	a	wide	range	of	participants	such	as	artists,	singers,	and	the	exchange	of	people,	 such	as	academics.	The	practice	 incorporates	a	wide	 range	of	activities	
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and	now	more	often	 includes	cultural	activity	 targeted	at	 the	wider	population	rather	 than	 elites,	 as	well	 as	 sport	 ’	 (Mark,	 2008,	 p.10).	Mark’s	 perspective	 is	mostly	agreed	in	this	thesis.	 		When	 discussing	 the	 purposes	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	research	 by	 the	 EUNIC,	 ‘cultural	 diplomacy	 preferred	 by	 most	 scholars	 and	diplomats	that	it	should	be	based	on	dialogue,	collaboration,	and	co-production,	whose	main	 purpose	 is	 not	 to	 influence	 decision	makers	 but	 rather	 to	 change	attitudes	and	behaviours’	(EUNIC,	2016,	p.3).	This	perspective	is	partly	agreed	in	this	 thesis.	 Cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 undertaken	 for	 a	 range	 of	 purposes.	 In	 this	thesis,	 firstly,	 one	 of	 the	 purposes	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 to	 influence	 the	decision	 makers	 of	 other	 states,	 especially	 policy	 decision	 makers.	 Secondly,	enriching	 and	 developing	 the	 culture	 to	 strengthen	mutual	 understanding	 and	cooperation	 is	 quite	 important,	 but	 not	 the	 fundamental	 purpose	 of	 cultural	diplomacy;	 however,	 employing	 cultural	 diplomacy	 as	 an	 intermediary	 to	safeguard	 and	 promote	 national	 cultural	 interests	 to	 thereafter	 achieve	 the	external	 cultural	 strategy	 of	 a	 state	 is	 the	main	purpose	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	Therefore,	in	order	to	achieve	this	aim,	it	cannot	avoid	the	considerable	attention	from	 decision	 makers.	 Thirdly,	 this	 research	 agrees	 with	 another	 purpose	 of	cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 changing	 attitudes	 and	 behaviours	 domestically	 and	externally.	Fourthly,	utilising	the	efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy	might	assist	a	state	to	 establish	 friendly	 relationships	 with	 other	 states	 is	 a	 purpose	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	as	well.	Non-essential	frictions	or	minor	but	irritating	conflicts	might	be	 skirted	 around	 or	 even	 avoided	 due	 to	 the	 resultant	 effects	 of	 cultural	diplomacy.	 		
2.5	Differentiation	of	Similar	Concepts	Jessica	C.E.	and	Mark	Donfried	argue	that	‘the	concept	of	cultural	diplomacy	has	become	an	increasingly	perplexing	and	controversial	term,	one	that	is	often	used	interchangeably	 with	 other	 similar	 terms’	 (Gienow-Hecht	 and	 Donfried,	 2010,	p.13).	 The	 similar	 terms	 are	 listed	 as	 follows:	 cultural	 soft	 power,	 public	diplomacy,	foreign	cultural	relations	and	intercultural	communication.	Therefore,	there	 is	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 confusion	 when	 discussing	 those	 concepts.	 The	
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confusion	arises	from	the	reality	that	the	concept	of	cultural	diplomacy	is	quite	distinct	when	compared	with	other	diplomatic	 interactions	among	state	actors.	In	order	to	have	a	better	understanding	of	cultural	diplomacy	to	thereafter	avoid	the	 semantic	 confusion	 with	 other	 similar	 terms,	 it	 is	 therefore	 essential	 to	briefly	 distinguish	 it	 from	 these	 concepts.	 Through	 the	 comparison	 of	 these	apparently	 similar	 but	 in	 actual	 fact,	 categorically	 and	 significantly	 different	concepts,	the	meaning	of	cultural	diplomacy	will	become	much	clearer.	 		
What	is	Cultural	Soft	Power?	 	The	concept	of	soft	power	was	coined	by	Joseph	Nye,	who	is	the	first	person	to	divide	 national	 power	 into	 two	 parts:	 soft	 power	 and	 hard	 power.	 Nye	 stated	that	hard	power	has	its	limitations,	while	the	real	unlimited	power	is	soft	power	(Nye,	1990,	p.160).	To	Nye,	hard	power	 refers	 to	 ‘the	ability	 to	use	 the	carrots	and	sticks	of	economic	and	military	might	to	make	others	follow	your	will’	(Nye,	2003).	As	it	is	well	known	to	the	general	public	on	the	concept	of	hard	power,	it	refers	 to	 coercive	 force,	 exercised	 through	 for	 acquiring	 natural	 resources,	economy,	 military,	 science,	 and	 technology.	 Soft	 power	 derives	 from	 anything	else	and	diametrically	opposed	to	the	use	of	hard	power.	It	is	a	general	concept	with	 the	emphasis	on	 the	ability	of	 a	 country	 to	persuade	others	 to	do	what	 it	wants	without	the	use	of	force	or	other	forms	of	coercion.		Nye	 further	 points	 out	 that	 if	 a	 country	 can	 set	 up	 the	 leading	 international	norms	and	the	international	system,	it	can	then	affect	the	preferences	of	people	and	the	understanding	of	national	interests,	leading	the	state	to	have	soft	power	(Nye,	 1990,	 p.160).	 In	 2004,	 Nye	 expounded	 the	 concept	 of	 soft	 power	 in	 his	book	Soft	Power:	The	Means	to	Success	in	World	Politics,	 in	the	preface	of	which	he	argued	that	soft	power	could	only	be	used	if	others	acknowledge	this	power,	and	 those	 who	 wish	 to	 see	 it	 as	 a	 means	 to	 achieve	 their	 goals.	 Usually,	 soft	power	 stems	 from	 the	 attractiveness	 of	 a	 country's	 culture,	 political	 ideas	 and	policies	(Nye,	2004,	p.22).	He	attributed	the	state's	soft	power	to	three	primary	sources:	 the	 first	 one	 is	 culture,	which	 can	have	 appeal	 to	other	 countries;	 the	second	 is	 political	 values,	 which	 can	 be	 practised	 in	 reality;	 the	 third	 is	
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considered	 to	 be	 the	 foreign	 affairs	 policy,	 which	 has	 legitimacy	 and	 moral	authority.	 		Cultural	soft	power	is	thus	a	term	derived	from	the	concept	of	soft	power.	In	fact,	it	 serves	 as	 one	 of	 the	 significant	 components	 of	 soft	 power.	 It	 is	 also	 an	important	 part	 of	 the	 overall	 strength	 of	 a	 nation	 and	 its	 international	competitiveness.	More	specifically,	cultural	soft	power	means	the	attractiveness	of	a	state	and	the	influences	produced	by	its	culture,	which	is	the	consequence	of	ideology,	such	as	cultural	values,	ideological	norms,	policies,	etc.	Among	all	these,	cultural	 values	 are	 a	 reference	 to	 the	mainstream	 culture	 recognised	 by	most	states	and	that	it	is	the	core	element	of	cultural	soft	power.	 		Cultural	 soft	 power	 itself	 includes	 two	 parts,	 cultural	 attraction	 and	 cultural	influence.	Cultural	attraction	usually	means	the	internal	cohesion	of	the	culture	and	 the	 external	 appeal	 of	 the	 culture	 of	 a	 country;	 it	 generates	 a	 positive	impression	on	foreign	audiences	and	deepens	their	understanding	of	the	culture	of	 another	 state	 through	 spiritual	 or	 cultural	 values	 and	 cultural	 expressions	(Zhang,	2013,	p.12).	For	example,	in	the	Tang	Dynasty	of	China,	especially	in	the	period	of	“Zhen	Guan	Zhi	Zhi”1	 (627-649),	the	neighbouring	countries	had	been	attracted	 progressively	 and	 successfully	 by	 Chinese	 culture;	 they	 respected	Chinese	cultural	values.	Therefore,	they	started	to	send	envoys	to	Chang'an,	the	capital	of	China,	during	 that	period	 to	 thereafter	 learn	 the	culture,	 etiquette	as	well	 as	 the	 laws	 and	 institutions	 of	 Tang	 Dynasty.	 After	 that,	 an	 increasing	number	 of	 foreigners	 gradually	 chose	 to	 reside	 permanently	 in	 Chang'an	 and	other	cities	in	China.	Zhang	argues	that	‘cultural	attraction	is	with	the	process	of	cohesion	 from	 the	 outside	 of	 the	 state	 to	 the	 inside	 of	 the	 state	 (Zhang,	 2013,	p.13).	 	 Additionally,	 the	 concept	 of	 cultural	 influence	 refers	 to	 the	 cultural	power	of	radiation	among	foreigners	and	foreign	societies;	the	influential	effect	of	 which	 is	 mainly	 produced	 by	 the	 cultural	 values	 and	 spiritual	 cultural	products	 of	 a	 state(Zhao,	 2013,	 p.12).	 For	 example,	 since	 the	 period	 of	 Ming	
                                                1	 The	 Tang	 Dynasty	 (618—907)	 witnessed	 the	 first	 period	 of	 florescence	 in	 the	 reign	 (627—649)	 of	Emperor	Taizong,	which	was	called	the	Prosperity	of	Zhenguan,	an	era	of	peace	and	prosperity.		
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Dynasty	 of	 China,	 more	 and	 more	 Christian	 preachers	 travelled	 to	 China	 to	thereafter	advocate	the	teachings	of	the	Bible	and	other	ideology	of	Christianity.	Their	 sermons	 had	 a	 great	 influence	 on	 Chinese	 people	 and	 the	whole	 society	which	appeared	to	 form	a	 focus	 from	the	church	as	the	centre	with	the	related	religious	influences	radiating	outward	to	the	surrounding	areas.	Therefore,	a	lot	of	 churches	 were	 built	 all	 over	 the	 cities	 and	 towns.	 With	 numerous	 and	persistent	 efforts,	 the	 Christian	 ideology	 had	 been	 accepted	 by	 a	 considerable	proportion	 of	 the	 Chinese	 people	 across	 a	 large	 part	 of	 China.	 It	 is	 the	phenomenon	regarding	cultural	radiation	and	cultural	 influential	process--from	inside	to	outside.	 		When	comparing	cultural	diplomacy	and	cultural	soft	power,	cultural	soft	power	mainly	refers	to	the	power	of	delivering	the	cultural	values	and	from	a	state	to	another	 state	 to	 thereafter	 gain	 the	 cultural	 attraction	 from	 foreign	 audiences,	while	 cultural	 diplomacy	 always	 means	 the	 cultural	 activities	 and	 programs	mainly	undertaken	by	state	actors.	To	put	it	in	another	way,	cultural	diplomacy	is	 one	 of	 the	 several	 different	 parts	 of	 cultural	 soft	 power,	 which	 provides	cultural	 values	 and	 other	 cultural	 norms	 for	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 Zhao	 also	considers	that	cultural	diplomacy	is	the	practice	of	cultural	soft	power,	it	offers	a	path	or	a	route	to	the	dissemination	of	the	cultural	values	of	a	state	(Zhao,	2013,	p.16).		
What	is	Public	Diplomacy?	 	There	 has	 been	 an	 increasing	 recognition	 in	 recent	 years	 of	 the	 importance	influencing	 foreign	citizens,	as	well	as	 their	state	 leaders.	Public	diplomacy	 is	a	kind	of	way	to	reach	the	masses.	Public	diplomacy,	as	a	diplomatic	practice,	has	been	in	existence	since	the	ancient	times.	This	concept	has	enjoyed	a	long	history	dating	back	to	the	middle	of	the	20th	century.	Most	scholars	date	the	first	usage	of	“public	diplomacy”	to	1965	when	Edmund	Gullion,	a	career	diplomat	used	the	term	in	connection	with	the	foundation	of	the	Edward	R.	Murrow	Centre	at	Tuft’s	University	 Fletcher	 School	 of	 Law	 and	 Diplomacy	 (Institution	 of	 Public	Diplomacy,	2012).	Then	the	first	Murrow	Centre	pamphlet	described	the	practice	of	public	diplomacy	as:	 “the	 influence	of	public	 attitudes	on	 the	 formation	and	
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execution	 of	 foreign	 policies.	 It	 encompasses	 dimensions	 of	 international	relations	 beyond	 traditional	 diplomacy…[including]	 the	 cultivation	 by	governments	 of	 public	 opinion	 in	 other	 countries;	 the	 interaction	 of	 private	groups	 and	 interests	 in	 one	 country	 with	 those	 of	 another…(and)	 the	transnational	 flow	 of	 information	 and	 ideas”	 (Institution	 of	 Public	 Diplomacy,	2012).	 		Public	diplomacy	primarily	 concentrates	on	 those	 activities	held	 in	 the	 field	of	external	 information	 dissemination	 and	 public	 relations.	 To	 Schneider,	 public	diplomacy	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 a	 government’s	 communication	 with	 foreign	audiences	 in	order	 to	provide	 the	positive	national	 image	 for	 them	(Schneider,	2005,	p.150).	It	should	be	noted	that	contacts	between	individuals	from	different	foreign	communities	cannot,	therefore,	be	regarded	as	a	part	of	public	diplomacy.	For	 instance,	 trade	 links	 between	 cross-continental	 enterprises,	 recreational	activities	and	friendly	exchanges	between	universities,	tourism,	and	activities	of	the	public	are	classified	as	non-governmental	exchanges	and	cannot	be	counted	as	the	practice	of	public	diplomacy.	When	public	diplomacy	is	initiated,	practised	and	implemented,	it	does	not	necessarily	mean	the	direct	contacts	from	one	state	government	to	the	other	state	government.	It	can	be	from	one	state	government	to	the	citizens	of	another	state.	It	is	the	same	case	with	cultural	diplomacy.	 		However,	 it	 should	 be	 of	 note	 that	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 reliance	 has	 to	 be	placed	on	the	shoulders	of	other	information	providers	to	provide	the	platform	as	well	 as	 the	 stage	 in	 order	 to	 have	 an	 influence	 on	 the	 public	 opinion	 in	 an	indirect	way.	The	information	providers	might	well	be	government	institutions,	state	 media	 and	 other	 organisations	 authorised	 by	 the	 government	 or	 civil	communities.	 Additionally,	 public	 diplomacy	 focuses	 on	 a	 much	 wider	 field,	while	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 the	 initiation,	 practices,	 and	implementation	of	exchange	activities	and	projects	with	a	foreign	country	in	the	area	of	culture	by	sovereign	state	or	other	organisations	authorised	by	the	state.	In	this	thesis,	‘cultural	diplomacy’	is	taken	to	be	distinct	from	‘public	diplomacy’	in	the	following	manners:		
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Firstly,	 cultural	 diplomacy	 mainly	 focuses	 on	 the	 cultural	 field	 of	 soft	 power,	while	public	diplomacy	has	operations	in	a	much	wider	area.		Secondly,	both	 types	of	diplomacy	aim	to	 implement	 foreign	policies	of	a	state,	protection	of	national	interests,	projection	of	the	national	“brand”	with	positive	national	 image	 and	 enhancement	 on	 many	 aspects	 of	 national	 influence.	However,	public	diplomacy	has	a	definitive	target	aiming	clearly	and	explicitly	at	influencing	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 public	 among	 foreign	 countries.	 Cultural	diplomacy	is	not	considered,	simply,	as	another	name	for	public	diplomacy;	it	is	a	practice	in	relation	to	the	implementation	of	cultural	strategies.		Thirdly,	 cultural	diplomacy	 focuses	on	 the	 reciprocity	of	 cultural	 exchanges.	 In	contrast,	 public	 diplomacy	 favours	 unilateral	 communication	 and	 is	 primarily	addressed	to	the	masses.			
What	is	International	Cultural	Relations?	 	For	 the	 definition	 of	 international	 cultural	 relations,	 Robin	 Higham	 notes	 that	‘international	 cultural	 relations,	 as	 funded	 and	 encouraged	 by	 national	governments	 at	 least,	 generally	 have	 a	 different	 objective,	 cultural	development…	that	of	building	a	country’s	competence	and	capacity	for	its	own	artistic	 expression	 through	 international	 exposure	 and	 collaborations	 abroad	with	other	artistic	or	 cultural	professionals.	The	Alliance	Française,	 the	Goethe	Institute,	 the	 British	 Council	 were	 founded	 in	 varying	 degrees	 on	 the	 cultural	development/international	cultural	relations	rationale	and	less	as	tools	designed	exclusively	for	cultural	diplomacy’	(Higham,	2001,	p.136).		 	The	concept	of	international	cultural	relations	is	frequently	used	synonymously	with	cultural	diplomacy.	However,	not	all	international	cultural	relations	involve	the	participation	of	 government,	nor	do	 they	 contribute	 to	 foreign	policy	goals	and	diplomacy.	For	example,	every	day,	everywhere	in	the	world,	many	groups	or	 individuals	providing	a	number	of	 foreign	cultural	activities	with	or	without	government	 involvement	 could	 also	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 manifestation	 of	international	 cultural	 relations.	 Prof	Kejin	 Zhao	 of	 Tsinghua	University,	 argues	
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that	 ‘cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 different	 from	 international	 cultural	 relations	while	the	 latter	 has	 extensive	 contents.	 Despite	 the	 relations	 among	 different	 social	values,	 international	 cultural	 relations	also	 include	human	resources	exchange,	education	exchange	programs,	science	and	technology,	literature,	arts,	language	teaching,	books,	information	services,	the	relationship	among	the	various	social	groups	 and	 institutes,	 different	 mutual	 communication	 and	 contact	 between	enterprises	and	states,	etc.	 International	cultural	relations	can	be	conducted	by	either	 private	 organisation,	 such	 as	 foundations,	 academic	 groups,	 religious	institutions,	 commercial	 agencies	and	government	official	organisations’	 (Zhao,	2013,	 p.26).	 Additionally,	 Mitchell	 considers	 that	 ‘government	 carries	 out	diplomacy,	 independent	 entities	 carry	 out	 international	 cultural	 relations,	 and	the	objectives	 for	each	differ’	 (Mitchell,	1986,	p.24).	To	Mitchell,	 the	concept	of	cultural	diplomacy	has	 two	 significant	 levels:	 the	 cultural	 agreements	between	states	and	the	execution	of	these	agreements.	The	execution	of	these	agreements	is	 carried	 out	 by	 diplomats	 seeking	 to	 achieve	 political	 and	 economic	 goals,	which	 are	 closely	 connected	 to	 national	 policy	 and	 national	 interest	 (Mitchell,	1986,	 p.28).	 Furthermore,	 Mitchell	 also	 argues	 that	 international	 cultural	relations	go	beyond	 the	actions	of	governments	and	 their	agencies,	 and	can	be	conducted	 on	 the	 initiative	 of	 public	 and	 private	 institutions	 (Mitchell,	 1986,	p.29).	 		In	 this	 thesis,	 therefore,	 ‘cultural	 diplomacy’	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 distinct	 from	‘international	cultural	relations’	in	the	following	manners:		Firstly,	 international	 cultural	 relations	 are	 not	 necessarily	 subject	 to	 political	goals.	Thus,	 it	 can	be	 conducted	by	both	government	 and	public	 sectors,	while	cultural	diplomacy	can	only	be	carried	out	by	the	government	or	some	particular	organisations	authorised	by	the	government.		Secondly,	 cultural	 diplomacy	 acknowledges	 that	 the	 objectives	 of	 a	 state’s	foreign	policy	and	its	programs	were	undertaken	in	support	of	these	objectives,	such	 as	 the	 achievement	 of	 understanding	 and	 cooperation	 between	 national	societies	 for	 their	 mutual	 benefits.	 However,	 with	 respect	 to	 international	
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cultural	 relations,	 the	 actions	 and	 behaviour	 of	 the	 actors	 could	 be	 casual	 or	informal	and	usually	has	no	specific	purposes.		Thirdly,	it	would	be	much	easier	to	establish	the	international	cultural	relations	with	other	states	than	to	conduct	the	numerous	measures	of	cultural	diplomacy.	Cultural	diplomacy	needs	a	relatively	long-term	to	win	the	hearts	and	minds	of	the	people	in	other	states.	 		
What	is	Intercultural	Communication?	 	Intercultural	 communication	 is	 ‘a	 form	 of	 communication	 that	 aims	 to	 share	information	across	different	cultures	and	social	groups.	It	is	used	to	describe	the	broad	 range	 of	 communication	 processes	 and	 problems	 that	 naturally	 appear	within	 an	 organisation	 or	 social	 context	made	 up	 of	 individuals	 from	different	religious,	 social,	 ethnic,	 and	 educational	 backgrounds’	 (Allwood,	 1985,	 p.1).	Globalised	 culture	 itself	 is	 multicultural	 or	 intercultural,	 and	 intercultural	communication	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 contracts	 between	 people	 and	 nations	 go	 back	thousands	 of	 years,	 but	 are	 now	 taking	 on	 added	 importance	 because	 of	revolutionary	changes	in	human’s	life	(Fox,	2014,	p.489).	Due	to	the	emergence	of	 an	 unprecedented	 amount	 of	 new	 developments	 in	 science	 and	 technology,	particularly	with	the	extensive	and	widespread	use	of	smartphones,	the	internet,	and	social	media	sites,	these	types	of	modern	technology	allow	human	beings	to	have	greater	and	easier	access	to	different	cultures.		The	 World	 Bank	 has	 suggested	 that	 ‘intercultural	 communication	 takes	 place	when	individuals	influenced	by	different	cultural	communities	negotiate	shared	meanings	in	interaction.	What	counts	as	intercultural	communication	depends	in	part	on	what	one	considers	a	culture,	and	the	definition	of	culture	itself	is	quite	contestable.	 Interactions	 are	most	 highly	 intercultural	when	 individuals’	 group	identities	 are	 most	 salient	 in	 determining	 the	 values,	 prejudices,	 language,	nonverbal	behaviours,	and	relational	styles	upon	which	those	individuals	draw’	(The	World	Bank,	2010,	p.1).	 		
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As	for	the	differences	between	cultural	diplomacy	and	international	relations,	Dr.	Marta	Ryniejska-Kiełdanowicz	has	argued	that	cultural	diplomacy	probably	can	be	conducted	by	the	state	within	a	specified	country,	abroad	or	utilising	media.	It	is	not	only	a	case	of	promoting	a	country’s	image	to	foreigners	but	also	to	its	own	citizens	(Kiełdanowicz,	2012,	p.7).	This	highlights	two	important	points:	firstly,	it	shows	that	principal	body	of	cultural	diplomacy	is	the	sovereign	state;	secondly,	it	illustrates	the	problem	with	current	practices	of	cultural	diplomacy,	which	has	its	primary	focus	on	the	national	image	while	ignoring	other	relevant	aspects.		Either	intercultural	communication	or	cultural	diplomacy	could	be	used	to	assist	state	 actors	 in	 resolving	 certain	 kinds	 of	 misunderstandings	 and	 negative	feelings,	 which	 are	 generated,	 mostly,	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 appropriate	 and	 timely	cultural	communication.	 		In	 this	 thesis,	 ‘cultural	 diplomacy’	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 distinct	 from	 ‘intercultural	communication’	in	the	following	manner:		Firstly,	 intercultural	 communication	 could	 have	 involvement	 with	 the	 public	sectors,	 while	 cultural	 diplomacy	 can	 only	 be	 conducted	 by	 the	 government,	governmental	agencies	or	other	organisations	authorised	by	the	state.	 	 	 	 		Secondly,	where	 both	 these	 concepts	 have	 a	 definitive	 link	 aims	 to	 strengthen	cultural	 communication	 to	 thereafter	 reduce	 misunderstanding.	 Intercultural	communication	 primarily	 seeks	 to	 understand	 how	 people	 from	 different	countries	and	cultures	act	and	communicate,	while	it	 is	not	the	most	important	aspect	of	cultural	diplomacy.	 	 		The	major	 perspectives	 on	 the	 relationship	 among	 cultural	 soft	 power,	 public	diplomacy,	cultural	diplomacy,	 international	cultural	relations	and	intercultural	communication	show	that	cultural	soft	power	is	a	‘macro’	notion	while	the	other	four	 concepts	 are	 labelled	 as	 ‘micro’.	 Public	 diplomacy,	 cultural	 diplomacy,	international	 cultural	 relations	 and	 intercultural	 communications	 are	 the	 four	components	of	cultural	soft	power.	However,	the	agent	of	public	diplomacy	and	
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cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 the	 state	 or	 organisations	 authorised	 by	 the	 state,	 while	intercultural	 communication	 and	 international	 foreign	 relations	 could	 be	 a	matter	for	the	states	or	other	non-governmental	sectors.	 		 	In	general,	 in	line	with	the	consideration	of	Mark	that	cultural	diplomacy	is	not	defined	simply	as	the	foreign	cultural	policy	of	a	state,	cultural	diplomacy	is	the	practice	 of	 governments,	 rather	 than	 a	 statement	 of	 how	 they	 approach	international	 relations.	Additionally,	 cultural	diplomacy	has	 a	wider	 focus	 than	the	 simple	 objectives	 of	 foreign	 policy	 associated	 with	 culture.	 Moreover,	cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 international	 cultural	 relations	of	 a	government,	but	not	all	such	relations	are	regarded	as	falling	within	the	remits	of	cultural	diplomacy.	Because	some	governmental	entities	undertake	international	cultural	 relations	of	a	 type	which	are	not	 intended	as	a	contribution	 to	 foreign	policy	goals	or	diplomacy	(Mark,	2008,	p.14).	 		
2.6	General	Background	of	Cultural	Diplomatic	Practice	In	the	contemporary	era,	cultural	diplomacy	has	attracted	considerable	attention	from	both	academic	and	political	fields.	Jacques	Barzun	mentioned	that	‘cultural	diplomacy,	it	is	not	to	see	ourselves	as	others	see	us,	but	to	see	others	as	they	see	themselves’	(Barzun	and	Lewis,	2001).	The	former	Secretary	of	the	UK,	the	Hon.	Charles	 Clark	 considered	 that	 ‘the	 core	 point	 about	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 the	need	for	different	groups	of	people,	whether	religions,	faiths,	political	groups,	or	ethnic	groups,	 to	understand	others	and	to	understand	what	 they	are	 trying	 to	achieve,	 and	what	 they’re	preoccupied	with.	 I	 think	 it	 is	 the	way	we	should	be	looking	 at	 the	world	much	more	 these	 days’	 (Clark,	 2012).	 Besides	 that,	 some	scholars	argue	that	cultural	diplomacy	is	a	latecomer	in	the	relations	of	Western	countries	 with	 China	 (Sandchneider,	 2012,	 p.29).	 However,	 in	 China,	 the	evidence	 of	 culture	 is	 used	 to	 extend	 the	 political	 influence	 of	 the	 state	 dates	back	 to	 the	 second	 century	 B.C.	 or	 even	 earlier	 (Lin,	 2003).	 Briefly	 speaking,	prior	 to	 the	 Mao	 era	 (before	 1949),	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	matters	 much	more	with	 showing	 the	 national	 strength	 of	 China	 so	 as	 to	 against	 the	 attacks	from	enemy	states	or	demonstrate	distinct	attractions	to	the	neighbouring	states	in	 various	 aspects.	 In	 the	Mao	 era	 (1949-1976),	 culture	 was	 taken	 to	 be	 as	 a	
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political	 tool	 to	 influence	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 public,	 while	 the	 activities	 of	cultural	diplomacy	 in	other	states	had	 largely	reduced.	 In	 this	period,	 “Cultural	Revolution”	 is	 the	 typical	manifestation.	 In	 the	 post-Mao	 era	 (after	 1976),	 the	diplomatic	efforts	of	Chinese	government	mainly	focus	on	the	national	branding,	particularly	in	the	aspect	of	reshaping	positive	national	image	on	the	world	stage.	Currently,	 the	practical	application	of	China’s	 cultural	diplomacy	 is	more	 like	a	political	tool	to	exert	desirable	behaviour	of	other	countries	to	thereafter	attain	an	expected	result	and	strengthen	the	identity	of	the	state.	 		During	the	period	of	the	First	World	War	and	the	Second	World	War,	people	had	suffered	a	lot	of	mental	and	physical	miseries.	Therefore,	“living	in	peace”	tends	to	be	a	dream	for	almost	everyone	in	the	world.	It	can	also	be	seen	clearly	in	the	period	 of	 the	Cold	War.	Hellyer	 argued	 that	 ‘there	 are	 considerable	 amount	 of	significant	 differences	 and	 conflicting	 issues	 between	 the	 USA	 and	 the	 USSR,	cultural	 differences	 had,	 ostensibly,	 been	 taken	 to	 the	 back-stage	 having	 to	vacate	the	 frontline	position	to	the	greater	 issue	of	global	geopolitical	struggle;	however,	both	states	were	still	trying	to	avoid	confrontation	which	could	lead	to	massive	 worldwide	 outbreak	 of	 war’	 (Hellyer,	 1951,	 p.12).	 There	 is	 increased	awareness	of	 the	significance	of	 cultural	 identity	after	 the	end	of	 the	Cold	War	because,	 in	 the	 global	 arena,	 there	 are	 very	 few	 states	 that	 would	 show	 a	preference	 to	 provoke	 a	war	 unless	 there	 are	 serious	 political	 issues	 or	major	military	movements	having	been	shifted	into	place.	When	a	situation	filled	with	conflicts	is	encountered,	the	states	at	the	centre	of	these	conflicts	need	to	explore	a	path	to	solve	the	disputes	and	conflicts	peacefully	to	thereafter	avoid	wars	if	at	all	 possible.	 Moreover,	 globalisation	 also	 fosters	 a	 harmonious	 multicultural	landscape	across	the	world.	In	this	aspect,	the	application	of	cultural	diplomacy	into	solving	international	conflicts	has	gradually	become	a	relatively	interesting	and	hotly	debated	subject;	for	instance,	the	possibility	of	communicating	via	the	conduit	or	venue	of	culture,	values,	and	ideas,	which	are	in	stark	contrast	to	the	traditional	concept	and	application	of	hard	power.		Furthermore,	 the	 European	Union	 is	 one	 of	 the	 pioneers	 to	 discover	 the	 great	power	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 The	 European	 Union	 has	 always	 been	 proud	 of	
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being	a	place	of	cultural	diversity	characterised	by	the	value	of	the	community.	The	 common	 cultural	 heritage	 of	 EU	 countries	 has	 gradually	 inspired	 many	countries	in	the	world	to	reconsider	their	cultural	policy.	In	2008,	the	Council	of	the	European	Union	emphasised	 the	 importance	of	 culture	 in	 the	 international	society:	
 1. Intercultural	 dialogue	 can	 help	 to	 bring	 individuals	 and	 peoples	 closer	together,	 and	 help	 towards	 conflict	 prevention	 and	 the	 process	 of	reconciliation,	 especially	 in	 regions	 which	 are	 facing	 politically	 precarious	situations;	 	2. Cultural	 exchanges	 and	 cultural	 cooperation,	 including	 in	 the	 audio-visual	sphere,	can	help	 to	establish	relations	based	on	partnership,	strengthen	the	place	 and	 the	 role	 of	 civil	 society,	 foster	 processes	 of	 democratisation	 and	good	governance	and	promote	human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms;	 	3. Culture,	 an	 essential	 component	of	 the	knowledge-based	economy,	 is	 also	 a	sector	with	strong	economic	potential,	 in	particular	with	respect	 to	cultural	and	creative	industries	and	sustainable	cultural	tourism;	 	4. Europe's	place	in	the	world,	from	an	artistic,	 intellectual	and	scientific	point	of	 view,	 depends	 on	 a	 considerable	 extent	 on	 the	 dynamism	 of	 its	 cultural	creative	work	and	on	its	cultural	exchanges	with	third	countries;	 	5. Cultural	 ties	 between	 Europe	 and	 the	 other	 regions	 of	 the	 world	 can	 be	important	for	the	development	of	intercultural	dialogue	and	the	setting	up	of	common	cultural	projects;	moreover,	the	Union	has	to	ensure	the	promotion	of	its	cultural	and	linguistic	diversity.	(The	Council	of	the	European	Union,	2008,	p.2)	 	
 Although	the	Council	of	European	Union	did	not	point	out	the	concept	of	cultural	diplomacy	 specifically	 in	 this	 document,	 however,	 five	 points	 listed	 above	 not	only	 demonstrate	 the	 importance	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 but	 also	 provides	 the	inspiration	for	other	states	to	explore	the	way	of	cultural	diplomacy.	In	the	past	years,	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	 European	 Union,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 is	 a	 classic	example	 in	 promoting	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 In	 western	 countries,	 UK	 is	 a	latecomer	in	the	area	of	cultural	diplomacy.	However,	its	unique	mode	of	cultural	
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diplomacy	has	made	it	a	pioneer	in	advancing	its	strategy	of	cultural	diplomacy.	Additionally,	 the	 inventive	 combination	 of	 efforts	 by	 official	 and	 unofficial	agencies	of	the	UK	working	and	acting	for	cultural	diplomacy	has	fermented	into	a	 model	 mechanism	 for	 many	 countries.	 The	 typical	 example	 is	 the	 British	Council,	which	keeps	 its	 day-to-day	operational	 independence	on	 a	 continuous	basis	but	nevertheless	supports	the	goals	and	objectives	of	the	UK	government.	 		In	 order	 to	 help	 the	 general	 public	 in	 foreign	 countries	 to	 have	 a	 better	recognition	of	the	UK	within	the	international	community,	the	government	of	the	UK	 initiated	a	program	called	 “New	Britain”	 in	1997,	which	helped	 the	Labour	party	 led	by	Tony	Blair	 to	win	 the	general	election.	 In	 the	autumn	of	 the	same	year,	 the	 government	 introduced	 a	 new	 way	 to	 promote	 the	 UK	 through	 the	promotional	 film	 "New	 Britain"	 and	 the	 rock	 version	 of	 the	 British	 national	anthem	 “God	 Save	 the	 Queen”.	 Thus,	 a	 new	 campaign	 promoting	 a	 young	 and	trendy	image	of	Britain	began	to	operate.	In	April	1998,	"Power	to	the	British",	a	major	exhibition	 took	place	during	 the	second	ASEM	summit	 in	London,	which	showed	a	 "creative	 and	 innovative"	 image	of	 the	United	Kingdom.	A	 few	years	later,	at	 the	beginning	of	2004,	 the	British	 launched	several	 large-scale	cultural	activities	in	China,	South	Korea,	Canada	and	other	countries,	the	theme	of	which	was	called	“Creative	Britain”.	It	expressed	the	attitude	that	Britain	was	creative,	diversified,	 free	 and	 open	 to	 the	 world.	 Besides	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 other	countries	 are	 also	 taking	 an	 active	 part	 to	 explore	 the	 power	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	as	well,	such	as	the	USA,	Germany,	New	Zealand,	Japan,	Canada,	China,	etc.	 Among	 these	 countries,	 the	 USA	 has	 realised	 the	 importance	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	 earlier	 than	 others.	 In	 2005,	 the	 Department	 of	 State	 of	 the	 USA	placed	emphasis	on	this	concept	in	a	report,	 ‘cultural	diplomacy	helps	create	“a	foundation	 of	 trust”	 with	 other	 people;	 encourages	 other	 people	 to	 give	 the	United	 States	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 doubt	 on	 specific	 policy	 issues	 or	 requests	 for	collaboration;	demonstrates	our	values,	and	our	interest	in	values,	and	combats	the	 popular	 notion;	 affirms	 that	 we	 have	 such	 values	 as	 family,	 faith,	 and	 the	desire	for	education	in	common	with	others;	creates	relationships	with	peoples;	can	 reach	 influential	 members	 of	 foreign	 societies,	 who	 cannot	 be	 reached	through	 traditional	 embassy	 functions;	 provides	 a	 positive	 agenda	 for	
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fan	 rong	 (cultural	 prosperity).	 Those	 states	 consider	 that	 once	 their	 positive	images	 established,	 trusting	 attitude	 from	 other	 states	 would	 be	 formed	relatively	 easily.	 Therefore,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 most	 of	 them	 keep	 devoting	cultural	diplomatic	efforts	with	various	methods	across	the	world.	 		
2.7	Limits	of	Cultural	Diplomacy	 	As	discussed	in	previous	parts,	cultural	diplomacy	can	be	a	lubricant	in	various	areas	 in	 international	 society.	 However,	 considering	 the	 characteristics	 of	 this	concept,	 just	 like	Goff	argues	that	 ‘cultural	diplomacy	is	neither	unambiguously	effective	nor	necessarily	a	force	for	good.	It	has	limits’	(Goff,	2013,	p.420).	 		Firstly,	 cultural	 diplomacy	 needs	 a	 relatively	 long	 period	 of	 time	 to	 display	 its	effectiveness.	 This	 feature	 might	 push	 state	 actors	 to	 give	 up	 support	 for	programs	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 They	 would	 tend	 to	 see	 more	 tangible	achievement	 in	the	economic	area	rather	than	wasting	a	 lot	of	 time	in	order	to	wait	 for	 the	 outcomes	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 when	 it	 can	 be	 measured.	 Arndt	notes	that	 ‘the	dividends	of	cultural	diplomacy	may	not	be	paid	for	a	decade	or	two’	(Arndt,	2005,	p.14).	Goff	also	suggests	that	‘cultural	diplomacy	plants	a	seed;	as	such,	it	may	take	root	over	time.	It	is	possible	that	cultural	diplomacy	efforts	will	 yield	 no	 fruit	 whatsoever’	 (Goff,	 2013,	 p.421).	 Unlike	 other	 simple	 and	straightforward	methods,	some	states	care	more	about	the	proportional	amount	of	effort	put	in	on	the	side	of	inputs	concerning	the	expectant	harvesting	on	the	side	of	outputs	in	economic	and	political	terms.	If	the	inputs	and	outputs	are	not	directly	 proportional	 when	 foreign	 culture	 collides	 greatly	 with	 local	 culture,	some	 states	 will	 reduce	 their	 input	 in	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs	 or	 even	abandon	the	cultural	diplomatic	programs.		
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Secondly,	evaluating	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	is	quite	challenging.	Many	scholars	are	 in	agreement	with	this	argument,	for	example,	Goff	considers	that	 ‘it	 would	 encounter	 great	 difficulties	 when	 assessing	 whether	 cultural	diplomacy	has	had	any	sort	of	effect	or	not’	(Goff,	2013,	p.421).	Milton	Cummings	notes	that	‘a	certain	degree	of	faith	is	involved	in	cultural	diplomacy’	(Cummings,	2003,	 p.3).	 It	 is	 certainly	 possible	 to	 track	 the	number	 of	 programs	of	 cultural	diplomacy	 of	 a	 state	 and	 the	 number	 of	 participants	 involved;	 however,	 it	 is	extremely	hard	to	determine	and	evaluate	the	effects	on	those	participants.	 		Thirdly,	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 not	 a	 panacea.	 Cultural	 diplomacy	 might	 not	change	the	outcomes	of	policies.	It	needs	a	long	period	of	time	to	foster	mutual	understanding.	 A	 state	 could	 not	 completely	 rely	 on	 the	 functions	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	 in	 order	 to	 solve	 serious	 conflicts	 and	 frictions	 across	 nations.	 For	example,	 territorial	 disputes,	 political	 intervention，	 and	military	 friction	make	cultural	diplomacy	more	challenging	of	certain	moments	in	time.		
2.8	Merits	of	Cultural	Diplomacy	 	As	 an	 old	 proverb	 going	 ‘every	 coin	 has	 two	 sides’,	 the	 emergent	 power	 of	cultural	diplomacy	cannot	exist	if	without	any	merits.	As	elaborated	previously,	the	 European	 Union	 has	 placed	 much	 emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 of	 culture	 in	international	 relations,	 and	 the	 USA	 has	 also	 confirmed	 the	 importance	 of	cultural	 diplomacy.	 Therefore,	 this	 section	 outlines	 four	 advantageous	 points	concerning	the	effective	efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy	as	followed:		Firstly,	 effective	 cultural	 diplomacy	 can	 generate	 more	 cooperative	opportunities,	and	enhance	the	inter-state	cooperation	in	various	fields.	Cultural	diplomacy	 cannot	 solely	 exist	 if	 without	 any	 other	 cooperation,	 which	 is	 not	merely	 limited	 in	 the	area	of	 cultural	diplomacy	but	may	be	extended	 to	other	sectors.	 For	 instance,	 various	 forms	 of	 culture	 might	 be	 able	 to	 develop	 and	promote	a	series	of	related	development	in	the	cultural	 industries,	which	could	be	regarded	as	the	supplement	during	the	implementation	of	cultural	diplomacy,	such	 as	 customised	 cultural	 products	 and	 other	 necessary	 consumables	particularly	 designed	 for	 the	 programs	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 In	 addition,	
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programs	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 not	 only	 serve	 to	 increase	 the	 cooperative	interaction	 among	 states	 but	 can	 also	 contribute	 to	 the	 intensification	 of	international	 civic	 cooperation.	 This	 is	 similar	 to	 what	 Johnsons	 argue,	‘cooperation	creates	conflict,	cooperation	ends	conflict	and	cooperation	provide	the	 context	 in	 which	 conflicts	 can	 be	 resolved	 constructively’	 (Johnson	 and	Johnson,	2008)		Secondly,	 effective	cultural	diplomacy	can	reduce	conflicts	and	collision	among	states.	 It	 is	widely	agreed	by	 the	majority	of	 scholars	who	conduct	 research	 in	the	area	of	cultural	diplomacy	that	culture	has	the	power	to	solve	conflicts	and	mistrust.	However,	how	these	conflicts	and	mistrust	could	be	resolved	by	means	of	 cultural	diplomacy,	 they	seldom	provide	 the	specific	explanation	about	 it.	 In	order	to	gain	a	clearer	insight	into	this	question,	it	might	be	useful	to	explore	the	nature	of	the	conflict.	As	a	specific	saying	in	the	book	The	Art	of	War	by	Sun	Tzu	stated	 ‘knowing	yourself	 as	well	 as	 the	 enemy,	 you'll	 never	 lose	 a	battle’	 (Sun,	2002).	For	example,	Martin	Davidson,	the	chief	executive	of	the	British	Council,	argues	that	 ‘in	a	nutshell,	 the	people	who	know	us	like	us--and	the	people	who	like	 us,	 trust	 us.	 Nothing	 about	 this	 is	 complicated.	 Cultural	 diplomacy	 can	remove	[the]	mystery	and	debunk	mythology	about	a	country	and	its	people,	and	by	 doing	 so,	 it	 can	 allow	 that	 country's	 policies	 to	 receive	 attention	 without	distractions’	(British	Concil,	2012).	 	 		Cultural	 diplomacy	 could	 be	 reflected	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 forms	 (such	 as	 cuisine,	entertainment,	 arts,	 etc.),	which	 can	be	used	 to	promote	 the	 culture	of	 a	 state.	Cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 not	 the	 way	 to	 force	 one	 state	 to	 accept	 the	 culture	 of	another	state;	it	places	a	lot	of	emphasis	on	the	mutual	exchange	rather	than	just	a	 single	 transaction.	Without	 bilateral	 or	multilateral	 support	 from	 states,	 the	misunderstanding	issues	and	other	side	effects	might	continue	to	exist	in	among	individuals,	groups,	communities,	etc.	Furthermore,	sometimes	even	a	tiny	issue	of	 misunderstanding	 might	 lead	 to	 a	 serious	 conflict.	 However,	 with	 the	assistance	regarding	the	continuous	and	persistent	efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy,	which	 could	 shape	 the	 fixed	 lifestyle	 of	 people	 and	 the	 way	 of	 their	understanding	 towards	 various	 cultures	 of	 other	 states.	 If	 things	 go	 on	 as	
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smoothly	 as	 expected,	 states	 might	 be	 able	 to	 communicate	 in	 a	 much	 more	favourable	way	and	find	a	short	path	to	overcome	existing	conflicts	and	potential	collisions	with	the	result	that	the	soft	power	of	their	state	might	be	significantly	enhanced	as	well.	 	 		Thirdly,	 effective	 cultural	 diplomacy	 can	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 global	cultural	diversity	to	thereafter	improve	awareness	concerning	the	protection	of	cultural	 heritage	 and	 the	 accelerating	 pace	 of	 human	 civilisation.	 Civilisation	means	wearing	shoes	while	culture	means	wearing	different	kinds	of	shoes.	The	role	of	cultural	diplomacy	plays	in	the	cultural	communication	and	transmission	is	clear	without	any	doubt.	Programs	of	cultural	diplomacy	might	have	the	effect	of	 the	 stimulation	 of	 people’s	 interests	 in	 various	 cultures	 of	 other	 states,	especially	in	the	aspect	of	improvement	on	the	awareness	of	protecting	cultural	heritage	and	the	issue	of	respecting	cultural	diversity.	When	there	is	an	increase	in	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 cultural	 program,	 then	 this	 public	 awareness	would	almost	certainly	be	on	the	ascending	path	as	well.	Such	awareness	might	lead	to	a	 virtues	 circle	 for	 further	development	of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 and	will	 inspire	states	to	share	knowledge,	information	and	to	make	special	efforts	to	improve	or	perfect	 the	 means	 of	 cultural	 protection.	 Otherwise,	 if	 the	 public	 awareness	towards	cultural	protection	might	not	be	formed	as	solidly	as	expected	through	cultural	diplomacy,	a	 significant	amount	of	 cultural	heritage	will	be	 threatened	with	extinction.	 		Lastly	but	 significantly,	 effective	 cultural	diplomacy	can	maintain,	 enhance	and	even	create	 state	 trust.	Grincheva	 considers	 that	 interactions	among	 states	are	usually	implemented	through	the	organisation	of	various	cultural	events,	which	employ	the	instrument	of	culture	in	promoting	a	country’s	interests	in	economic,	political,	and	strategic	fields	(Grincheva,	2013,	p.40).	However,	as	for	the	cultural	diplomatic	 practices	 between	 two	 or	 among	multiple	 state	 actors,	 if	 the	 states	merely	 rely	 on	 the	 programs	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 while	 ignoring	 placing	emphasis	on	the	essential	elements	concerning	trust	building,	then	this	effort	of	cultural	diplomacy	cannot	be	considered	as	effective.	As	for	its	role	in	state	trust	building,	it	will	be	further	discussed	in	Chapter	Three.	 	 	
  
	 49	
2.9	Conclusion	 	As	the	heated	debate	regarding	cultural	diplomacy	has	reached	a	feverish	level	in	the	international	society,	this	chapter	has	defined	cultural	diplomacy	as:	cultural	diplomacy	 is	 principally	 conducted	 by	 state	 actors	 and	 supported	 by	 other	non-governmental	organisations	and	individuals	as	well;	cultural	diplomacy	not	only	 aims	 to	 influence	 the	 decision	 makers,	 to	 enrich	 and	 develop	 culture	 to	other	states	so	as	to	strengthen	mutual	understanding	and	cooperation,	but	also	to	safeguard	and	promote	national	cultural	interests	so	as	to	achieve	the	external	cultural	strategy	of	a	state.	 		Additionally,	 this	 chapter	 has	 also	 differentiated	 it	 from	 another	 four	 relevant	concepts:	 cultural	 soft	 power,	 public	 diplomacy,	 international	 cultural	communication	 and	 intercultural	 relations.	 Cultural	 soft	 power	 and	 public	diplomacy	 have	 a	 wider	 focus	 in	 various	 areas,	 while	 culture	 diplomacy	 pays	more	attention	in	the	cultural	area	and	can	be	perceived	as	a	part	of	the	cultural	soft	 power	 and	 public	 diplomacy.	 International	 cultural	 communication	 and	intercultural	 relations	 do	 not	 necessarily	 have	 the	 government	 involvement,	while	the	implementation	of	cultural	diplomacy	should	be	an	issue	for	the	state	or	those	non-state	sectors	with	the	authorisation	of	the	state.		In	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 clear	 framework	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 the	 following	chapters,	 it	 is	quite	necessary	 to	clarify	 the	main	body	of	cultural	diplomacy	at	this	 stage.	 For	 example,	 in	Chapter	Three,	 the	 concept	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	applied	to	analyse	the	relationship	with	state	trust;	if	without	precise	definition,	it	 cannot	 prove	 the	 key	 argument	 of	 this	 thesis	 that	 cultural	 diplomacy	 can	maintain,	enhance	and	even	create	state	trust.	 In	Chapter	Five,	Chapter	Six	and	Chapter	Seven,	the	application	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	both	China	and	the	UK	is	analysed	with	practical	examples	and	case	study;	in	accordance	with	the	defined	concept	in	this	chapter,	it	is	beneficial	to	examining	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	 in	 state	 trust	 building	 between	 China	 and	 the	UK.	 This	 chapter	 has	also	 taken	 the	 EU,	 the	 UK,	 China	 and	 the	 USA	 as	 examples	 to	 summarise	 the	development	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 particularly	 in	 the	 contemporary	 era.	Moreover,	this	chapter	has	listed	some	limits	of	cultural	diplomacy,	which	can	be	
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Each	term	can	sometimes	carry	a	plethora	of	meanings	and	that	the	concept	of	trust	 is	 not	 an	 exception.	 Trust	 is	 a	 term,	 which	 has	 the	 connotation	 as	 to	 be	variable,	vague	and	ambiguous	in	most	of	the	definitions.	It	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	word	trust	is	complicated	by	its	association	to	economic,	political,	 legal	and	moral	contexts;	 it	even	enters	into	everyday	life	within	social	and	interpersonal	relationships.	 		To	Fu,	‘trust	involves	risk	taking;	that	is,	both	parties	know	that	the	actions	of	one	party	 can	materially	 affect	 the	 other,	 but	 both	 share	 ideas,	 concerns	 or	 issues	candidly	 notwithstanding’	 (Fu,	 2004,	 p.16).	 In	 simple	 terms,	 trust	 is	 a	 major	component	in	the	foundation	of	interpersonal	relations.	When	a	married	couple	is	 being	 asked,	 they	might	 say	 trust	 is	 the	 basic	 foundation	 of	marriage;	when	friends	are	being	asked,	they	might	say	trust	is	the	nutrition	of	friendship;	when	businessmen	are	being	asked,	they	might	say	trust	is	the	premise	of	cooperation;	when	diplomats	 or	 government	 officers	 are	 being	 asked,	 they	might	 say	 that	 a	relationship	 of	 trust	 is	what	 they	 seek.	Whether	 it	 exists	 between	 parents	 and	children,	husbands	and	wives,	lovers	and	foes,	creditors	and	debtors,	in	a	general	sense,	the	important	issue	of	trust	is	an	essential	element	of	the	foundation	upon	which	further	relations	are	built.	Trust	can	sometimes	be	perceived	as	a	kind	of	feeling	of	trustworthiness	that	is	in	existence	among	interpersonal	relationships.	In	 this	 thesis,	 trust	 is	 a	major	 factor	 that	 could	be	 reflected	 in	 the	 relationship	among	states	during	the	process	of	interaction.		Studies	 regarding	 trust	 did	 not	 achieve	 outstanding	 progress	 until	 the	 1950s	when	 a	 group	 of	 psychologists	 began	 to	 re-examine	 the	 issue	 of	 trust.	 Their	research	 mainly	 focused	 on	 the	 aspect	 of	 interpersonal	 trust.	 In1958,	 Morton	Deutsch,	 an	 American	 psychologist,	 conducted	 a	 famous	 experiment	 called	‘Prisoner's	 Dilemma’.	 In	 this	 experiment,	 Deutsch	 discusses	 how	 to	 resolve	conflict	 from	the	point	of	view	concerning	 interpersonal	 trust.	 In	 interpersonal	relationships,	 trust	 is	 reflected	 in	 reactions	 to	 situations	 and	 is	 determined	 by	that	situation.	Trust	may	change	as	situations	change.	Deutsch	argues	that	in	this	experiment,	 trust	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 a	 dependent	 variable	 decided	 by	 external	stimuli	 (Deutsch,	 1977,	 p.38).	 Therefore,	 it	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 a	 simplistic	
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manner	that	A	trusts	B	due	to	the	reason	that	A	presumes	it	is	in	the	interest	of	B	to	 act	 in	 a	 way,	 which	 would	 be	 largely	 consistent	 with	 the	 interest	 of	 A.	Additionally,	 the	 existential	 form	of	 trust	 is	 relational;	 the	 initial	 grant	of	 trust	relies	on	 the	evaluation	of	A	 that	B	would	be	 trustworthy.	The	maintenance	of	this	trusting	relationship	between	A	and	B	requires	the	reciprocal	confirmation	of	 trustworthiness;	otherwise,	 trust	would	be	withdrawn	(Levi,	1998,	p.77).	To	the	experiment	of	Prisoner’s	Dilemma,	this	experimental	model	will	be	adopted	and	further	explained	in	Chapter	Four	to	exhibit	a	fundamental	model	of	trust	in	the	aspect	of	cooperation	between	states.	 	 	 		After	the	1970s,	a	growing	number	of	studies	began	to	focus	on	trust,	mostly	in	the	 areas	 of	 sociology	 and	 psychology.	 Besides	 that,	 the	 focus	was	 also	 shifted	into	 the	 following	 fields,	 such	 as	 economics,	 management,	 public	 relations,	organisational	 behaviour,	 culture	 and	 political	 science.	 However,	 most	 studies	pay	 little	 attention	 towards	 the	nature	and	 limits	of	 trust	 itself.	Therefore,	 it	 is	not	 easy	 to	 judge	 which	 definition	 is	 correct	 or	 tentatively	 agreed	 upon	 and	authorised	by	researchers.	However,	two	important	points	need	full	attention	in	this	 chapter.	 One	 is	 the	 differentiation	 of	 trust	 and	 confidence.	 These	 two	concepts	are	similar	but	different.	Another	point	is	the	function	and	effectiveness	of	 trust.	On	 this	 respect,	 this	chapter	elaborates	how	trust	works	and	what	 the	criterion	or	standard	of	state	trust	is.	 	 		Firstly,	the	semantic	analysis	of	trust	and	confidence	should	be	illustrated	clearly.	The	concept	of	confidence	and	the	concept	of	trust	are	similar	but	different.	For	Levi,	‘trust	implies	a	risk	to	the	truster.	In	some	instances,	the	risk	may	be	so	low	that	we	tend	to	use	the	label	confidence	instead	of	trust.	In	other	 instances,	the	risk	 is	 so	 high	 that	 we	 consider	 the	 truster	 gullible’	 (Levi,	 1998,	 p.78).	 	Additionally,	 sociologists	 tend	 to	 portray	 trust	 as	 a	 pervasive	 concept,	 ‘trust	 is	inherent	 in	 and	 formative	 of	 many	 social	 situations,	 including	 face-to-face	encounters	 and	 the	 relationships	 between	 individuals	 and	 organisations,	institutions,	 and	 the	 state’	 (Jackson	 and	 Bradford,	 2010,	 p.242).	 Moreover,	according	 to	 Hoffman’s	 definition	 of	 trust,	 he	 argues	 that	 ‘trust	 implies	 a	willingness	 to	 take	 risks	 on	 the	 behaviour	 of	 others	 based	 on	 the	 belief	 that	
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potential	 trustees	 will	 do	 what	 is	 right’	 (Hoffman,	 2002,	 p.380).	 Moreover,	Barbalet	 argues	 that	 ‘trust	 is	 a	means	 of	 overcoming	 the	 absence	 of	 evidence,	without	the	benefit	of	the	standard	of	rational	proof,	which	is	required	to	sustain	relationships	 between	 persons	 or	 between	 a	 person	 and	 a	 social	 artefact’	(Barbalet,	2006,	p.3).	As	for	the	perspective	of	Fukuyama,	he	considers	that	‘trust	is	defined	as,	 the	expectation	that	arises	within	a	community	of	regular,	honest	and	cooperative	behaviour,	based	on	commonly	shared	norms’	(Fukuyama,	1995,	p.3).	Luhmann	also	argues	that	‘trust	is	a	means	of	mediating	the	risks	of	social	interactions’	(Luhmann,	1979,	p.208).		In	general	terms,	trust	can	be	emotional	as	well	as	logical.	On	the	emotional	side,	trust	 means	 that	 you	 can	 expose	 your	 vulnerabilities	 and	 weakness	 to	 your	counterpart	 and	 hold	 the	 belief	 that	 they	 might	 not	 take	 advantage	 of	 your	openness	 so	 as	 to	 hurt	 you.	 On	 the	 logical	 side,	 this	 means	 you	 have	 already	assessed	 or	 predicted	 the	 probabilities	 of	 gain	 and	 loss,	 calculated	 expected	usefulness	or	otherwise	based	on	hard	performance	data	and	concluded	that	the	person	 in	 question	 would,	 more	 than	 likely,	 behave	 in	 a	 predictable	 and	reasonable	manner.	 	
The	 concept	 of	 confidence	 has	 a	 certain	 inclination	 to	 be	 a	 kind	 of	 feeling	established	on	privacy	issues.	Tonkiss	argues	that	it	‘tends	to	be	based	on	clearly	defined	 social	 roles,	 formal	 contract	 or	 well-established	 obligations’	 (Tonkiss,	2014b).	 Furthermore,	 in	 the	 majority	 of	 cases,	 the	 term	 confidence	 in	 the	international	political	 field	 is	primarily	 linked	with	 ‘confidence	building’,	which	could	 be	 broadly	 defined	 as	 mentioned	 by	 Higgins	 that	 ‘any	 set	 of	 unilateral,	bilateral,	 or	 multilateral	 actions	 or	 procedures	 that	 act	 to	 reduce	 military	tensions	 between	 a	 set	 or	 sets	 of	 states,	 before,	 during	 or	 after	 actual	 conflict’	(Higgins	and	Security,	1991,	p.110).	 		As	George	Simmel	says,	‘without	the	general	trust	that	people	have	in	each	other,	society	 itself	 would	 disintegrate,	 for	 very	 few	 relationships	 are	 based	 entirely	upon	 what	 is	 known	 with	 certainty	 about	 another	 person,	 and	 very	 few	relationships	 would	 endure	 if	 trust	 were	 not	 as	 strong	 as,	 or	 stronger	 than,	
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rational	proof	or	personal	observation’	(Simmel,	1978,	p.23).	Overall,	confidence	can	be	considered	as	the	foundation	upon	which	trust	can	be	built,	but	it	cannot	take	the	position	of	trust.	The	essence	of	this	chapter	 is	 to	apply	the	term	trust	into	further	studies.	It	adopts	the	theory	of	Fukuyama	with	respect	to	the	concept	of	trust,	rather	than	using	the	concept	of	confidence,	as	the	analytical	concept.		Many	 scholars	 argue	 that	 trust	 is	 rather	 difficult	 to	 generate	 on	 purpose.	 For	example,	 Coleman	 argues	 that	 as	 a	 rational	 account	 of	 human	 behaviour,	 trust	could	 only	 be	 generated	 in	 informal,	 small,	 closed	 and	 homogeneous	communities,	which	are	 in	a	position	to	be	able	 to	enforce	normative	sanctions	(Coleman,	1988,	p.95).	However,	he	does	not	offer	a	further	explanation	of	how	to	 generate	 trust	 within	 communities,	 especially	 in	 diverse	 or	 heterogeneous	societies.	Moreover,	Coleman	suggests	that	the	environment	for	generating	trust	is	limited.	In	most	cases,	this	argument	is	correct;	however,	this	perspective	is	not	always	 right	 in	 absolute	 terms.	 Trust	 might	 also	 be	 generated	 among	 large	communities,	 for	 example,	 between	 states.	 Currently,	 a	 number	 of	 scholars	 are	trying	 to	 identify	conditions	 that	might	be	beneficial	 to	cultivating	 trust	among	states.	Trust	is	a	social	mechanism	that	is	embodied	in	structures	of	social	relations.	An	American	sociologist,	Mark	Granovetter	stresses	that	‘social	relations	are	mainly	responsible	 for	 the	 production	 of	 trust	 in	 economic	 life’	 (Granovetter,	 1985,	p.483).	 He	 believes	 that	 trust	 is	 generated	 when	 agreements	 are	 “embedded”	within	a	larger	structure	of	personal	relations	and	social	networks	(Granovetter,	1985,	 p.484).	 Social	 structure	 is	 significant	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 not	 only	 a	matter	of	the	formation	of	social	capital,	but	also	for	the	production	of	trust	itself.	Coleman	considers	that	it	allows	for	the	increasingly	expeditious	proliferation	of	obligations	and	expectations,	imposes	sanctions	on	defection	from	an	obligation	and	helps	to	generate	reputation	(Coleman,	1988,	p.99).	Fu	also	puts	forward	the	argument	 that	 familiar	 and	 stable	 relationships	 with	 friends,	 relatives,	 and	workmates	 can	 relieve	 the	 mood	 of	 participants,	 particularly	 when	 they	 are	trapped	in	a	social	structure	of	the	uncertainty	about	motivations	of	other	people	and	concern	that	of	others’	actions	may	not	meeting	their	expectations	(Fu,	2004,	
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In	 summary,	 there	 are	 four	 main	 sources	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 trust:	 1)	 social	relations,	 2)	 shared	 norms,	 3)	 social	 obligations	 and	 4)	 organisations.	 Trust	cannot	 exist	 alone	 without	 these	 social	 factors.	 In	 order	 to	 form	 the	conceptualisation	of	state	trust,	another	concept	of	social	trust	will	need	further	exploration	and	elaboration.	 	






family, friends, relatives, etc. 
 
social obligations: 
rules, laws, common sense, etc. 
 
Organisations: 




reciprocity, belief, performance, etc. 
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Further	contributing	to	this	preoccupation	with	trust	is	the	attractiveness	of	the	idea	 of	 social	 capital.	When	 compared	 the	 concept	 of	 social	 capital	with	 other	concepts	within	the	political	and	social	theories,	scholars	and	the	general	public	rarely	 notice	 the	 notion	 of	 social	 capital	 until	 Robert	 Putnam’s	 significant	research	is	published,	which	puts	the	concept	of	social	capital	forward	and	allows	it	to	be	back	to	the	area	of	research.	In	general,	the	concept	of	social	capital	has	been	a	subject	of	studies	for	decades	primarily	from	the	perspectives	of	sociology	and	political	science.	Since	it	has	been	regarded	as	an	important	and	constructive	element	 so	 as	 to	maintain	 the	 economic	 prosperity,	 regional	 development,	 and	national	 governance.	 It	 has	 achieved	 considerable	 recognition,	 even	worldwide	prominence.	 However,	 different	 standpoints	 still	 exist	 among	 related	 scholars,	such	 as	 Pierre	 Bourdieu	 (Bourdieu,	 1986),	 Coleman	 (Coleman,	 1988,	 p.25),	Francis	 Fukuyama	 (Fukuyama,	 1995,	 p.3),	 Robert	 Putnam	 (Putnam,	 1995)	 and	Nan	Lin	 (Lin,	1999),	 the	 conceptualisation	of	 social	 capital	has	already	evolved	rapidly	 into	a	 sophisticated	account	of	various	relationships	among	people	and	their	 values.	 Despite	 these	 differences,	 most	 scholars	 hold	 the	 argument	 that	social	capital	is	inherent	in	personal	connections	and	interpersonal	interactions,	together	with	the	shared	set	of	values	that	are	associated	with	these	contacts	and	relationships.	 They	 also	 consider	 social	 capital	 to	 be	 ‘a	 feature	 of	 the	 internal	linkages	 that	 characterise	 the	 structures	 of	 collective	 actors	 and	 give	 them	cohesiveness	and	its	associated	benefits	(Adler	and	Kwon,	2002,	p.18).		Many	scholars	are	of	the	opinion	that	networks	can	be	regarded	as	an	important	source	of	social	capital.	As	Eric	Lesser	argues	that	‘an	individual’s	social	capital	is	characterised	by	her	direct	relationships	with	others	and	by	the	other	people	and	relationships	 that	 she	 can	 reach	 through	 those	 to	 whom	 she	 is	 directly	 tied’	(Lesser,	 2000,	 p.30).	 Bourdieu	 and	 Coleman	 argue	 that	 a	 network	 tends	 to	reproduce	 an	 inherited	 pattern	 of	 relationships	 via	 individual's	 efforts	 to	preserve	 social	 capital.	 Coleman,	 in	 particular,	 argues	 that	 a	 closed	 social	network--the	 existence	 of	 strongly	 interconnected	 and	 mutually	 reinforcing	relations	 between	different	 actors	 and	 institutions—maintains	 the	 existence	 of	effective	 norms	 and	 the	 trustworthiness	 of	 others,	 hence	 strengthening	 social	capital	(Coleman,	1988,	p.30).	These	arguments	demonstrate	that	social	capital	is	
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created	by	a	network	to	a	certain	extent	in	which	people	can	bring	connections	between	otherwise	disconnected	segments	(Burt,	1992,	p.78).	That	structure	 is	permanent	but	might	be	mediated	by	human	activities.		Another	source	of	social	capital	 is	social	 trust,	which	 is	quite	significant	 for	the	generation	of	state	trust.	Fukuyama	comes	up	with	a	conclusion	that	social	trust	plays	 a	 critical	 but	 variable	 role.	 Fukuyama	 argues	 that	 ‘trust	 is	 both	 the	condition	for,	and	the	effect	of,	the	norms	of	social	capital-collective	values,	social	networks	and	cultural	mores-that	underpin	social	cohesion	and	shape	economic	growth’	 (Fukuyama,	 1995,	 p.26).	 Among	 current	 trends	 in	 the	 study	 of	 social	capital	with	associated	circular	arguments,	which	have	been	further	divided	into	two	main	schools,	one	follows	that	‘social	capital	is	a	capability	that	arises	from	the	prevalence	of	trust	in	a	society	or	in	a	certain	part	of	it’,	and	whether	social	trust	 is	 an	 integral	 category	 of	 social	 capital	 as	 represented	 by	 scholars	 like	Fukuyama	 (Fukuyama,	 1995)	 Coleman	 (Coleman,	 1988)	 and	 Putnam	 (Putnam,	2001).	Another	school	is	trying	to	prove	that,	alternatively,	social	trust	is	one	of	social	 capital’s	 products	 and	 consequences	 as	 represented	 by	 scholars	 like	Woolcock	(Woolcock,	1998)	and	Field	(Field,	2003).	 		In	 the	 earlier	 research	 stage,	 Putnam	 regards	 social	 trust	 as	 an	 element	 of	 the	norms	 that	arise	 from	social	networks.	For	him,	 social	 capital	has	 two	primary	sources:	networks	and	norms;	rather	than	three	sources:	networks,	norms,	and	trust.	However,	after	studying	American	civil	society,	he	modifies	his	definition	of	social	capital	to	‘features	of	social	life—networks,	norms,	and	trust—that	enable	participants	 to	 act	 together	 more	 effectively	 to	 pursue	 shared	 objectives’	(Putnam,	2001,	p.31).	He	also	confirmed	the	non-negligible	 importance	of	trust	to	social	capital.	Coleman	contends	that	a	system	of	mutual	trust	is	an	important	form	of	social	capital	on	which	future	obligations	and	expectations	may	be	based.	Putnam	 regards	 trust	 as	 a	 source	 of	 social	 capital	 that	 sustains	 economic	dynamism	and	governmental	performance.	According	to	the	research	of	Fu,	she	finds	 that	Nahapiet	and	Ghoshal	also	 treat	 the	concept	of	social	 trust	as	a	 focal	facet	in	the	relational	dimension	of	social	capital	(Fu,	2004).	 		
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The	 thoughts	 of	 both	 schools	 concerning	 the	 relationship	 between	 trust	 and	social	capital	essentially	focus	on	the	coherence	of	trust	and	social	capital.	Based	upon	these	arguments,	 it	does	appear	that	in	each	definition	of	social	trust	that	an	 academic	 or	 non-academic	 interest	 has	 become	 a	 part	 of	 the	 current	engagement	 with	 the	 collective	 or	 cooperative	 problems,	 which	 has	 confused	scholars	 in	 politics	 and	 sociology	 for	 a	 long	 time.	 Tonkiss	 considers	 that	 ‘the	concept	 of	 social	 trust	 also	 offers	 somewhat	 answers	 to	 the	 question	 of	 how	individuals	manage	 to	 get	 their	 collective	 acts	 together	 for	 common	or	 at	 least	mutual	 ends’	 (Tonkiss,	 2014).	 However,	 the	 relationship	 of	 trust	 and	 social	capital	is	still	trapped	in	a	situation	like	the	chicken	or	the	egg	dilemma,	which	is	a	commonly	asked	question	"which	came	first,	the	chicken	or	the	egg?”	Whether	trust	 is	 a	 precondition	 of	 social	 capital	 or	 trust	 is	 a	 resultant	 product	 or	 a	beneficiary	of	social	capital?	This	chapter	keeps	the	notion	of	the	argument	that	social	trust	is	both	the	cause	and	the	result	of	social	capital.		The	third	source	of	social	capital	is	social	norms,	and	its	major	manifestation	of	is	generalised	reciprocity.	Tudor	Rickards	considers	that	‘trust	is	studied	as	a	social	exchange	 process,	 social	 exchanges	 deal	 with	 individual	 willingness	 to	reciprocate	 care	 and	 consideration	 expressed	 within	 a	 relationship’	 (Rickards,	2012,	p.123).	Generalised	reciprocity	is,	in	line	with	the	argument	put	forward	by	Fu,	‘based	on	the	assumption	that	today’s	good	turns	will	be	repaid	sometime	in	the	future	and	is	directly	contrary	to	rational-choice	theory’	(Fu,	2004	,	 p.20).	 For	example,	 Putnam	 argues	 that	 each	 individual	 act	 in	 a	 system	 of	 reciprocity	 is	usually	 characterised	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 “short-term	 altruism	 (benefiting	others	 at	 a	 cost	 to	 the	 altruist)”	 and	 “long-term	 self-interest	 (making	 every	participant	better	 off)”	 (Putnam,	1995,	 p.667).	He	believes	 that	 reciprocity	 can	resolve	 problems	 of	 collective	 action	 and	 reconcile	 self-interest	 and	 solidarity.	Portes	also	considers	social	capital	as	‘primarily	the	accumulation	of	obligations	from	 others	 according	 to	 the	 norms	 of	 reciprocity’	 (Portes,	 1998).	 He	 divides	reciprocity	 into	 consummatory	 motivation	 that	 is	 bounded	 by	 the	 limits	 of	specific	 community	 and	 instrumental	 motivations	 that	 emphasise	 reciprocal	exchanges.	Newton	considers	that	reciprocity	can	bind	the	community	via	shared	interests,	create	the	environment	that	encourages	voluntary	collective	behaviour	
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and	generate	the	goodwill	necessary	for	peaceful	resolution	of	conflict	(Newton,	1997).	As	it	has	been	discussed	above,	the	importance	of	reciprocity	in	both	trust	and	 social	 capital	 is	 without	 any	 doubts.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 reciprocity	 is	 a	 quite	necessary	category	of	state	trust,	and	it	will	be	analysed	in	detail	in	the	following	sections.	 	 	 		Finally,	the	fourth	source	of	social	capital	is	the	institution.	Adler	and	Kwon	state	that	 formal	 institutions	 and	 rules	 could	 be	 beneficial	 to	 shape	 the	 structure	 of	network	 and	 influence	 norms	 and	 beliefs	 as	 well	 as	 having	 a	 strong	 effect	 on	social	capital.	Transparent	governments	that	are	responsive	to	people’s	needs	are	a	 key	 factor	 in	 establishing	 formal	 community	 rules	 and	 institutions	 in	government	 (Paul	 S.	 Adler,	 2000).	 Fu	 also	mentions	 that	 governments	 provide	more	 than	 the	backdrop	 for	 facilitating	 trust	 among	citizens;	 governments	also	influence	 civic	 behaviour	 to	 the	 extent	 they	 elicit	 trust	 or	 distrust	 towards	themselves	(Fu,	2004).	 		In	 summary,	 in	 the	 commonly	 recognised	 definition	 of	 social	 capital,	 which	contains	 four	 main	 sources:	 social	 network,	 social	 trust,	 social	 norms,	 and	institutions.	Among	these	 four	categories,	scholars	are	 increasingly	paying	a	 lot	more	 attention	 to	 one	 particular	 category—social	 trust.	 They	 prefer	 using	 the	notion	 of	 trust	 to	 explain	 different	 levels	 of	 cooperation	 evidenced	 in	 various	social	situations	and	political	environments.	The	inspiration	of	state	trust	in	this	thesis	comes	from	this	concept.	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Table	2.	Categories	of	social	capital	 	
 













When	 the	 important	 issue	 of	 trust	 becomes	 an	 outstanding	 theoretical	consideration	 as	 well	 as	 a	 practical	 matter	 on	 every	 sphere	 of	 human	 society,	each	 state	 has	 to	 choose	 its	 own	 divergent	 paths	 to	maintain	 and	 promote	 its	economic	 growth	 and	 political	 stability.	 Vladimir	 Putin	 once	 addressed,	 ‘trust	between	nations	is	the	key	to	tackling	global	problems’	(Vladimir	Putin,	2009).	In	relation	 to	 the	 studies	 of	 trust	 among	 states,	 research	 concerning	 trust	 has	 its	primary	 focus	 on	 the	 areas	 of	 sociology,	 psychology,	 economics	 and	organisational	behaviours.	Fewer	studies	are	conducted	on	the	subject	of	trust	in	politics,	and	the	concept	of	state	trust	advanced	here	has	seldom	been	mentioned	in	previous	studies.	There	are	numerous	reasons	for	this	seeming	lack	of	interest	in	 this	 concept.	 For	 one,	 the	 immaterial	 and	 intangible	 nature	 of	 trust,	particularly	 the	 trust	 between	 states	 or	nations,	makes	 it	 extremely	difficult	 to	measure	 for	scholars	wary	of	not	having	enough	empirical	evidence	 to	support	their	argumentation.	In	the	academic	area,	there	are	two	distinguished	scholars	in	 the	subject	matter	of	social	 trust,	one	of	 them	 is	Fukuyama,	and	 the	other	 is	Putnam.	 Although	 there	 are	 some	 divergent	 views	 in	 their	 arguments	 about	social	trust,	Fukuyama	seems	to	consider	the	state	in	a	deeper	and	more	serious	way	within	his	analysis	and	tends	to	explore	the	relationship	between	state	and	economy	(Fukuyama,	1995);	while	Putnam	is	good	at	tracing	a	national	malaise	in	trust	and	civic	participation	(Putnam,	2001).	However,	none	of	them	continues	to	further	the	concept	of	social	trust	up	to	the	state	level.		When	 looking	at	 the	developing	process	of	state	trust,	 the	 first	person	who	did	research	about	trust	among	states	could	be	Immanuel	Kant,	who	addressed	the	importance	 of	 trust	 among	 states	 in	 his	 famous	work	Toward	 Perpetual	 Peace	(1795)	 and	 he	 agreed	 that	 trust	would	 be	 an	 essential	 prerequisite	 to	 achieve	peace	 among	 states	 (Kant,	 2016,	 p.88).	 However,	 Kant	 did	 not	 continue	 his	research	to	explore	a	deeper	analysis	about	this	relationship.	After	the	research	effort	 of	 Kant,	 there	were	 almost	 no	 further	 in-depth	 analyses	 regarding	 trust	among	 states	 until	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 20th	 century.	 Mansur	 mentions	 the	similar	 concept	 in	 his	 thesis,	Mansur	 considers	 that	 ‘trust	 at	 the	 national	 level	means	 the	 relationship	 of	 integrity,	 commitment	 and	 confidence	 between	 two	countries	 or	 more	 starts	 doing	 business	 and	 keeping	 each	 other	 in	 a	 good	
  
	 64	
relationship	with	 the	mutual	benefits	between	each	other.	Alternatively,	 if	 their	interests	 are	 conflicting,	 then	 they	 will	 not	 want	 to	 develop	 any	 kind	 of	cooperation’	 (Mansur,	2015).	Mansur’s	argument	provides	a	kind	of	 inspiration	for	 developing	 the	 concept	 of	 state	 trust	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Benjamin	 Barton	 also	discusses	the	concept	‘political	trust’.	Barton	argues	that	trust	can	also	be	studied	across	other	scholarly	 field	such	as	 law	and	finance,	where	trust	pertains	to	 its	own	 applicable	 definition	 that	 does	 not	 relate	 to	 the	 concept	 that	 is	 being	discussed	throughout	his	thesis	so	as	to	examine	the	bilateral	relations	between	China	and	the	EU	and	their	engagement	in	the	Africa	(Barton,	2016,	p.13).	 	Therefore,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 literature	 resources	 and	 theoretical	 analysis	with	 respect	 to	 trust	 among	 states	 are	 relatively	 insufficient.	 Although	 some	scholars	 are	 still	 continuing	 to	explore	 the	 trusting	 relationships	among	 states,	such	as	Hoffman	and	Andrew	Kydd,	there	is	still	no	mature	theory	with	a	focus	on	the	trust	issues	among	states.	Therefore,	one	of	the	purposes	of	this	research	is	a	clear	attempt	to	set	up	a	conceptualised	framework	for	state	trust.		Unlike	 individuals	with	a	substantial	amount	of	mixed	emotions,	 the	state	 is	an	organisation	 that	 it	 could	 not	 be	 operational	 relying	 solely	 on	 subjective	judgments.	Trust	among	states	also	has	significantly	more	issues	with	uncertain	and	 uncontrolled	 factors.	 Therefore,	 in	 the	 academic	 field,	 scholars	would	 face	more	 challenges	 and	 difficulties	 for	 analysis	 or	 set	 up	 a	 model	 to	 explore	 the	trusting	relationships	among	states.	However,	as	mentioned	previously	that	trust	is	 treated	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 social	 fact,	 a	 feature	 of	 effective	 and	 collective	 acts	 of	individuals	 and	 institutions.	 Therefore,	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 suggests	that	there	are	five	key	sources	of	state	trust:	1)	people,	2)	cooperation,	3)	shared	norms,	4)	shared	obligations,	and	5)	interstate	network.	 		
People	and	Institutions	In	international	society	now,	trust	is	one	of	the	important	variables	not	only	for	interactions	 among	 individuals	 but	 also	 for	 interaction	 among	 states.	 Since	individuals	 and	 institutions	 constitute	 the	 main	 body	 of	 a	 state,	 figuratively	speaking,	 the	 trust	 issues	 of	 a	 state	 are	 similar	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 trusting	
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relationship	 among	 persons.	 Without	 the	 twin	 effects	 of	 individuals	 and	institutions	in	a	state,	 there	would	be	no	trust	 issue	in	a	practical	way	with	the	interaction	 among	 states.	 If	 a	 state	 could	 participate	 actively	 in	 prominent	international	institutions,	this	state	would	have	a	greater	possibility	to	establish	reasonable	 and	 acceptable	 connections	 with	 other	 states.	 Additionally,	 and	importantly,	 although	 individuals	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 one	 of	 the	 crucial	constituents	of	states,	they	could	be	considered	as	an	indispensable	supplement	with	 respect	 to	 state	 trust.	 Among	 them,	 heads	 of	 state,	 diplomats	 and	policymakers	 should	 be	 regarded	 as	 the	main	 agents	 of	 state	 trust.	 In	 the	 real	political	environment,	this	group	represents	the	position	and	policy	of	their	state	whenever	 they	 proceed	 to	 conduct	 any	 forms	 of	 diplomatic	 negotiations.	Therefore,	 individuals	 and	 institutions	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 building	 or	maintaining	trust	among	states.		
Cooperation	To	Feger,	cooperation,	in	this	context,	is	defined	as	‘interactional	behaviour	or	a	relationship	between	at	least	two	parties,	be	they	persons,	groups	or	institutions.	Their	 behaviour	 is	 coordinated	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 some	 actions	 of	 one	 side	facilitate	 the	 goal	 attainment	 of	 the	 other	 side.	 Usually,	 this	 behaviour	 is	conceived	to	be	voluntary	and	not	the	result	of	yielding	to	power.	 It	 is	 the	rule	that	both	sides	support	each	other	in	a	balanced	or	symmetrical	fashion,	at	least	in	 the	 long	 run.	 The	 cooperative	 partners	work	 towards	 the	 same	 or	 towards	different	but	mutually	compatible	goals’	(Feger,	1991,	p.284).	Levi	considers	that	trust,	 by	 its	 definition,	 is	 not	 a	 concept	 with	 equivalent	 meaning	 towards	cooperation,	although	it	might	facilitate	cooperation	(Levi,	1998,	p.79).	Without	the	 essential	 elements	 of	 trust,	 cooperation	 to	 address	 international	 problems	will	 become	 impossible.	 Founder	 and	 executive	 chairman	 of	 Davos	 World	Economic	 Forum,	 Klaus	 Schwab	 suggests	 a	 problem	 that	 ‘the	 world	 is	 lack	 of	trust,	although	cooperation	could	avoid	confusion	and	conflicts.	Rebuilding	trust	and	improving	effective	global	 leadership	should	be	put	on	the	agenda’	(2011).	Peng	 Chen	 also	 argues	 that	 ‘trust	 is	 the	 prerequisite	 for	 cooperation,	 without	trust	the	cooperation	will	not	be	going	well.	Cooperation	between	people	is	not	
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merely	tools	and	instruments,	but	also	the	nutrient	for	stable	social	relations	and	international	relations’	(Chen,	2014,	p.27).		In	 the	 international	 arena,	 the	world	 community	 is	 an	 anarchic	 society.	 Under	anarchy,	states	can	do	anything	they	are	physically	capable	of	doing,	in	this	kind	of	situation,	trust	is	one	of	the	important	variables	interaction	between	countries.	National	interest,	as	the	centre	of	modern	international	relations,	is	still	fraught	with	 suspicion,	 conflict,	 and	 lack	 of	 cooperation.	 This	 could	 ‘not	 only	 lead	 to	 a	fragile	trust	between	countries	but	also	demonstrate	the	lack	of	trust’	(Zhu,	2013,	p.34).	 Zhu	also	 argues	 that	 ‘when	 the	 state	 faces	 confrontation	or	 cooperation,	trust	is	a	necessary	condition	for	the	construction	of	international	relations’	(Zhu,	2003,	p.35).	 		Another	 example	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 psychology,	 Deborah	 Welch	 Larson	compares	the	three	explanations	of	trust	among	states:	rational	choice,	domestic	structure	 and	 social	 psychology.	 Larson	 believes	 that	 a	 prudent	 policy	 maker	would	not	assess	his	country's	 interests	and	reputation	only	by	agreement,	 the	domestic	 political	 structures	 often	 encourage	 leaders	 not	 to	 take	 a	 trusting	attitude	toward	any	external	enemy	so	as	to	legitimise	the	domestic	governance	with	its	associated	foreign	policy	(Larson,	1997,	p.710).	Even	if	the	preferences	of	two	 countries	 is	 fully	 in	 line	with	 the	wish	 to	 cooperate	with	 each	 other,	 they	often	 face	 many	 difficulties	 in	 reaching	 an	 acceptable	 result	 cooperatively.	Mistrust	between	states	may,	therefore,	misled	the	leaders	to	ignore	each	other's	cooperation	 signals	 (Larson,	 1997,	 p.713).	 Cooperation	 could	 potentially	generate	 trust	 while	 maintaining	 any	 trust	 already	 in	 existence.	 Almost	instantaneously,	trust	could	facilitate	cooperation.	Therefore,	there	is	a	mutually	influential	 relationship	between	cooperation	and	 trust,	 and	 cooperation	 can	be	considered	as	one	of	the	key	elements	of	state	trust.		
Shared	Norms	 	In	 the	 international	 community,	 shared	 social	 norms	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 an	essential	element	for	the	stability	of	the	global	environment.	Without	a	general,	shared	understanding	of	the	rules	and	expectations	of	 international	society,	 the	
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chaos	 that	 may	 inevitably	 follow	 can	 erupt	 with	 great	 destructive	 power.	However,	 a	 diverse	 world	 makes	 consensus	 that	 shared	 norms	 are	 difficult	 to	achieve.	As	 the	main	 element	of	 shared	norms,	 reciprocity,	 and	 its	 relationship	with	trust	has	already	been	discussed.	Elinor	Ostrom	argues	with	regard	to	the	trusting	relationship	that	‘the	more	benefits	they	have	received	in	the	past	from	other	reciprocators,	the	higher	their	own	initial	inclinations.	The	more	often	they	have	 faced	 retribution,	 the	 less	 likely	 will	 they	 be	 to	 see	 free	 riding	 as	 an	attractive	option’	(Ostrom,	2003,	p.23).	In	the	aspect	of	interaction	among	states,	reciprocal	 behaviours	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 signal	 of	 trust;	 Moreover,	reciprocity,	cooperation,	and	trust	are	mutually	reinforcing	norms.		
	
Table	3.	 	 The	relationship	among	reciprocity,	cooperation	and	trust.	 		This	 table	 demonstrates	 a	 complete	 circle	 of	 their	 mutually	 reinforcing	interaction.	 If	 a	 state	 acts	 in	 reciprocal	 and	 mutually	 beneficial	 ways	 towards	another	state,	then	it	is	likely	that	more	cooperative	opportunities	will	emerge.	If	a	state	has	a	 large	number	of	cooperative	opportunities	with	other	states,	 then	trust	between	them	will	likely	be	established.	If	a	state	has	a	trusting	relationship	towards	 another	 state,	 then	 the	 reciprocal	 behaviour	 might	 be	 repeated	 on	 a	continuous	 basis.	 As	 for	 the	 interaction	 among	 states,	 ideally,	 this	 type	 of	mutually	 beneficial	 cycle	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 virtuous	 event.	 Almost	 all	reciprocal	 behaviours	 share	 the	 common	 ingredients	 that	 a	 state	 attempts	 to	offer	positive	reactions	towards	the	positive	actions	of	others	and	vice	versa.	 	 	 	







Additionally,	under	the	framework	of	shared	obligations,	the	behaviours	of	state	actors	would	be	fundamentally	influenced	by	transferring	trust	and	ensuring	that	it	is	widespread	throughout	the	process	of	interactions	among	states.	In	a	sense,	any	 forms	of	 shared	obligations	would	be	able	 to	 solve	 the	 collective	problems	and	 provide	 credible	 assurances	 that	 each	 state	 could	 follow	 through	 the	obligations.	Due	 to	 that	 trusting	 relationship	among	states	 requires	 continuous	efforts	within	a	relatively	 long	period,	shared	obligation	could	help	state	actors	need	 to	 ensure	 that	 concrete	 steps	 are	 in	 place	 so	 as	 to	 obtain	 an	 agreed	procedure	for	making	and	implementing	the	policy	which	could	meet	prevailing	standards	of	fairness	on	a	continuous	basis.	 		
Interstate	Network	 	Among	the	different	factors	that	might	have	an	influence	on	the	communication	and	interaction	among	states,	the	notion	of	network	tends	to	play	a	pivotal	role	to	help	 state	 build	 trust	 with	 others.	 State	 trust	 could	 be	 considered	 as	 the	consequences	 of	 tightly	 knitted	 networks	 among	 sovereign	 states,	 which	 are	independent	of	internal	politics	but	dependent	on	each	other	when	they	engage	in	the	repeated	interactions.	This	kind	of	 inter-state	network	can	have	an	effect	on	 promoting	 trust	 building	 even	 though	 there	 might	 be	 other	 alternative	options.	 The	 network	 among	 states	 could	 be	 both	 visible	 and	 invisible.	 On	 the	visible	side,	the	border	of	each	state	makes	up	a	vast	area	of	the	net	to	connect	states	 together	 in	 the	 international	 community.	While	on	 the	 invisible	 side,	 the	network	 among	 states	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 way	 of	 connecting	 through	 the	 use	 of	routers	 of	 the	 internet.	 To	 states,	 the	 power	 of	 invisible	 network	 would	 be	greater	than	the	visible	one.	This	invisible	inter-state	network	could	be	reflected	in	 various	 aspects,	 such	 as	 political	 issues,	 economic	 cooperation	 and	 shared	cultural	 norms.	 Trust	 among	 states	 could	 not	 exist	 in	 isolation	 without	 the	network	 among	 any	 sovereign	 states.	 The	 networks	 of	 states	 that	 share	substantial	 interests	 in	 common.	 Therefore,	 the	 strong	 inter-state	 network	 is	clearly	 critical	 to	 the	 smooth	 functioning	 of	 interactions	 among	 states,	 and	 it	constitutes	 a	 base	 of	 trust	 that	 can	 reduce	 resistance	 and	 provide	 better	solutions	 in	 the	 face	 of	 uncertainty.	 In	 particular,	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 strong	
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inter-state	network	could	become	the	pillar	for	the	perfect	development	that	can	produce	significant	benefit	for	the	state	actors.	 	 		In	accordance	with	those	arguments	and	analysis	mentioned	above,	the	sources	of	 state	 trust	 could	 thus	 be	 summarised	 as	 follows:	 1)	 people/institution,	 2)	cooperation,	3)	shared	norms,	4)	shared	obligation,	and	5)	 inter-state	network.	Generally	speaking,	the	concept	of	state	trust	as	stated	and	promoted	within	this	chapter	 primarily	 refers	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 phenomena	 that	 enable	 the	 actors	 of	states	to	take	risks	in	dealing	with	other	states,	solving	problems	with	collective	actions,	or	acting	 in	other	ways	which	might	appear	to	be	contrary	to	standard	definitions	of	national	interest.		
3.5	The	Relationship	of	State	Trust	and	Cultural	Diplomacy	As	 two	 burgeoning	 concepts	 in	 political	 research,	 increasing	 and	 persistent	attention	 is	 now	 directed	 towards	 the	 notions	 of	 state	 trust	 and	 cultural	diplomacy.	 The	 connection	 between	 them	 is	 now	 in	 need	 of	 exploration	 with	logic.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	 due	 to	 the	 shortage	 of	 both	 theoretical	support	and	practical	experience,	even	though	 in	 the	academic	 field,	 it	 is	still	a	small	 niche	 area	 with	 just	 a	 handful	 of	 scholars	 who	 argue	 that	 cultural	diplomacy	could	improve	a	certain	level	of	trust,	it	is	still	not	persuasive	enough	if	 without	 clear	 and	 detailed	 elaboration.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 explore	how	these	two	concepts	connect	with	each	other	and	how	they	can	have	mutual	influence	 with	 reinforcement	 upon	 each	 other.	 However,	 there	 are	 a	 certain	amount	 of	 debates	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 these	 concepts	 due	 to	 some	interdependent	 factors,	 which	 are	 difficult	 to	 disentangle,	 can	 also	 play	 a	 role	here.	 For	 example,	 the	 fierce	 competition	 concerning	 national	 strength	 among	states,	 the	 integration	 of	 different	 cultures,	 the	 availability	 of	 advanced	technologies	 and	 systems,	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 organisations.	All	these	 factors	could,	directly	or	 indirectly,	have	an	 influence	on	the	relationship	between	 state	 trust	 and	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 Moreover,	 the	 advent	 of	 these	factors	has	 transformed	 the	 international	community	 in	 the	world	 today	 into	a	rather	different	form	from	what	it	used	to	be	decades	ago.	 		
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When	exploring	 the	relationship	of	state	 trust	and	cultural	diplomacy,	 it	would	then	discover	obviously	 that	both	notions	 involve	a	 lot	more	subjective	 factors	than	objective	 ones.	As	 the	 concept	 of	 state	 trust	 allows	 states	 to	 expose	 their	vulnerabilities	in	front	of	other	states,	which	could	be	quite	difficult	to	be	certain	if	they	belong	to	the	friendly	group	or	the	hostile	group.	Furthermore,	trust	will	also	 need	 regular	 nurturing,	 and	 it	 might	 become	 depleted	 otherwise.	Additionally,	as	the	important	role	of	culture	in	society	today	has	been	noted,	as	Lane	 and	Wagschal	 argue	 that	 ‘culture,	 it	 must	 be	 remembered,	 is	 one	 of	 the	several	factors	that	explain	society	and	politics’	(Lane	and	Wagschal,	2005,	p.4).	However,	due	to	the	fact	that	there	are	a	variety	of	different	forms	of	cultures	in	the	society,	visible	forms,	intangible	forms,	implicit	types,	at	a	subconscious	level	as	well	as	a	more	explicit	type	of	culture	some	of	these	include	obvious	elements	of	mental	representations.	All	these	subjective	factors	on	the	two	concepts	make	an	 interesting	 yet	 challenging	 research	 study.	 Therefore,	 this	 section	 aims	 to	show	a	clear	understanding	towards	the	relationship	of	state	trust	and	cultural	diplomacy.		This	chapter	sets	up	 three	propositions	 to	examine	 the	argument	of	 this	 thesis	that	cultural	diplomacy	can	maintain,	enhance	and	even	create	state	trust.	As	two	necessary	 linked	 concepts	 with	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 cultural	 relations,	 cultural	identity	 and	 reciprocal	 behaviour	 in	 the	 cultural	 diplomacy	 cannot	be	 ignored.	Additionally,	for	these	propositions,	the	term	state	trust	is	defined	as	a	variable	concept,	which	may	change	as	other	factors	change.		
Proposition	 1:	 Assuming	 that	 everything	 else	 being	 equal,	 when	 there	 are	gradual	 improvement	 and	 enhancement	 of	 cultural	 relations	 between	 states,	then	cultural	diplomacy	is	considered	to	have	the	capacity	to	create	or	maintain	state	trust.		The	 definition	 of	 cultural	 relations	 has	 been	 highlightly	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	Two.	It	can	be	found	that	cultural	diplomacy	is	able	to	 improve	and	strengthen	the	cultural	relations	between	states.	Additionally,	it	is	visible	that	in	the	modern	society,	 strengthening	 and	 maintaining	 of	 cultural	 relations	 with	 other	 states	
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have	 become	 the	 central	 issue	 of	 state	 policy.	 Bennett	 considers	 that	 ‘the	relations	 of	 state	 governance	 and	 culture	 are	 currently	 undergoing	 significant	change’	 (Bennett,	 1998).	 This	 perspective	 of	 Bennet	 also	 suggests	 the	significance	concerning	the	position	of	culture	on	the	state	agenda.	For	example,	in	Hu	Jingtao’s	period,	the	project	of	Confucius	Institute	had	been	launched.	Hu	also	 put	 emphasis	 on	 the	 aspect	 of	 China’s	 soft	 power	 and	 he	 introduced	 the	concept	 of	 “Harmonious	 Society”,	 which	 indicated	 a	 relatively	 strong	 focus	 on	Chinese	 cultural	 elements.	 It	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 way	 to	 impress	 foreign	audiences	 and	 develop	 the	 philosophy	 Chinese	 culture.	 Another	 example	 is,	 in	order	 to	 strengthen	 the	 cultural	 and	 economic	 relations	 with	 the	 states	 along	with	 the	 Belt	 and	 Road	 Initiative,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 had	 proposed	 an	
Action	 plan	 on	 the	 One	 Belt	 One	 Road	 (OBOR)	 in	 March	 2015.	 Under	 this	framework,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 claims	 that	 ‘the	 initiative	 is	 proposed	 to	build	the	Belt	and	Road	jointly;	to	embrace	the	trend	toward	a	multipolar	world,	economic	 globalisation,	 and	 cultural	 diversity	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 open	 regional	cooperation’	(State	Council	of	China,	2015).	In	consideration	of	this,	if	one	might	say	 so,	 a	 new	 or	 even	 a	 pioneering	 initiative,	 these	 actions	 of	 the	 Chinese	government	 are	 rather	 different	 from	what	 it	 had	 done	 previously.	 Before	 the	period	 of	 Hu	 Jingtao’s	 governance,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 usually	 waded	 in	with	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 economic	 relations	 with	 other	 states	 while	 paid	nothing	more	than	lip	service	on	the	cultural	issues.	However,	at	this	time,	it	is	a	clear	signal	that	the	Chinese	government	has	started	to	realise	the	importance	of	strengthening	 cultural	 relations	 with	 neighbouring	 states	 even	 though	 the	primary	 purpose	 of	 such	 initiative	 is	 still	 in	 line	 with	 the	 promotion	 and	 the	development	of	economic	benefits.		Culture	has	its	own	magical	attraction	with	just	the	right	amount	of	chemistry	to	allow	 states	 to	 relax	 their	watchful	 vigilance	 to	 some	 extent.	With	 this	 type	 of	breakthrough	 on	 the	 “defensive	 shield”	 of	 any	 neighbouring	 states,	 the	 magic	wand	of	 culture,	 as	 a	 tool	of	 regional	 cooperation,	will	 forge	an	opportunity	 to	plant	 a	 short-cut	 to	 thereafter	 gain	 a	 definitive	 kind	 of	 trust	 from	 the	neighbouring	states.	This	strategic	plan	of	the	Chinese	government	will	improve	the	cultural	and	economic	relations	among	those	states	that	have	participated	in	
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this	Initiative.	While	at	the	same	time,	its	cultural	diplomatic	efforts	that	may	be	well	developed	to	create	or	maintain	state	trust	with	others.	 		In	this	proposition,	cultural	relation	includes	two	aspects:	a	 favourable	relation	and	 an	 unfavourable	 relation,	 both	 of	 which	 might	 have	 an	 influence	 on	 the	formation	of	state	trust.	As	for	the	aspect	of	unfavourable	cultural	relations,	the	formation	 of	 state	 trust	 might	 encounter	 numerous	 barriers.	 The	 evidence	 of	unfavourable	 cultural	 relations	 can	be	 seen	 in	 a	 lot	 of	 states	 across	 the	world.	The	 primary	 cause	 is	 attributable	 to	 cultural	 differences,	 the	 forms	 of	 which	could	be	reflected	as	the	differences	among	cultural	norms,	cultural	values,	and	cultural	system.	In	addition,	unfavourable	cultural	relations	often	result	in	those	potential	 thistles	 and	 thorns,	 such	 as	 communicative	 difficulties,	misunderstandings,	conflicts	of	interests,	historical	reasons,	cultural	differences	and	 even	hatred	 emotions.	 These	 obstacles	might	 lower	 the	 quality	 of	 cultural	relations	among	states.	Therefore,	state	 trust	might	not	be	 formed	as	smoothly	as	expected.	 		The	current	practical	example	is	the	deterioration	of	cultural	relations	between	China	 and	 the	 ROK	 principally	 due	 to	 the	 conflict	 of	 interests,	 which	 will	 be	discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Five.	 Another	 example	 is	 the	 cultural	 relations	 between	China	and	Japan.	Both	states	have	a	lot	in	common	with	similarities	in	terms	of	the	 oriental	 cultures.	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 reasons	 of	 historical	 armed	 conflict	and	 the	 current	 social,	 political	 and	 territorial	 disputes	 between	 them,	 the	relationship	between	China	and	Japan	could	be	considered	as	a	hard	nut	to	crack.	Under	 this	 circumstance,	 the	 situation	 of	 state	 trust	 between	 China	 and	 Japan	cannot	 be	 more	 pessimistic	 than	 any	 other	 time	 and	 place.	 As	 the	 important	states	 of	 Asia,	 China,	 Japan	 and	 South	 Korea	 have	 many	 things	 in	 common	regarding	 the	 origins	 of	 oriental	 cultures	 for	 many	 centuries.	 Their	 cultural	relations	should	have	been	considered	as	solid	as	rocks.	However,	 the	negative	cultural	 factors	 mentioned	 above	 play	 a	 very	 influential	 role	 in	 state	 trust	building	among	them.	 	 		
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As	 for	 improving	 the	 favourable	 cultural	 relations,	 states	 may	 refer	 to	 the	following	 six	 methods:	 1.	 Seek	 to	 understand;	 2.	 Get	 involved	 and	 respect;	 3.	Keep	 an	 open	 attitude;	 4.	 Keep	 promises;	 5.	 Establish	 cultural	 network;	 6.	Assume	 positive	 intent.	 These	 methods	 can	 promote	 the	 cultural	 relations,	overcome	the	obstacles	mentioned	previously,	and	then	proceed	further	to	help	cultural	 diplomacy	 to	 create	 and	 maintain	 state	 trust.	 It	 is	 because	 that	 the	continued	effective	and	efficient	cultural	dialogue	among	states	might	eliminate	the	negative	image	of	certain	states	due	to	historical	reasons.	Cultural	relations	might	stimulate	the	international	community	to	give	a	certain	amount	of	impetus	so	 as	 to	 resolve	 international	 conflicts	 as	 well.	 Moreover,	 according	 to	 the	argument	 of	 Zheng	 that	 ‘states	 with	 strengthened	 cultural	 relations	 will	 also	improve	political	recognition	and	state	trust	among	states’	(Zheng,	2001,	p.60)		According	 to	 the	 survey	Trust	 Pays,	 which	was	 conducted	 by	 Ipsos	MORI	 and	YouGov	 for	 the	 British	 Council,	 and	 specifically	 designed	 for	 evaluating	 the	cultural	programs	of	British	Council	 in	 the	aspect	of	 trust	building.	This	survey	particularly	aims	to	provide	ample	pieces	of	evidence	regarding	the	influence	of	cultural	relations	on	trust	building,	interpersonally	as	well	as	between	states.	It	offers	 adequate	 examples	 and	 real	 case	 studies	 concerning	 how	 international	cultural	 relationships	 and	 efforts	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 that	 could	 build	 trust	between	 the	 UK	 and	 other	 states	 of	 the	 world,	 with	 specific	 emphasis	 on	 the	success	of	the	UK	economy.	Additionally,	this	survey	involves	more	than	10,000	respondents	 aged	 18-34	 from	 ten	 countries--Brazil,	 China,	 India,	 Pakistan,	Poland,	Russia,	Saudi	Arabia,	Spain,	Thailand,	and	Turkey	(	British	Council,	2012,	p.7).	 It	 demonstrates	 that	 those	 who	 have	 had	 involvement	 in	 the	 programs	aiming	 to	 improve	 cultural	 relations,	 especially	 in	 the	 following	 areas:	 arts,	education	and	English	language	activities,	etc.,	might	effectively	hold	a	relatively	high	level	of	trust	towards	the	UK.	 		
Proposition	2:	Assuming	that	when	everything	else	being	equal,	when	cultural	identity	 issues	 could	 be	 understood	 and	 well-recognised	 between	 the	 states,	then	cultural	diplomacy	is	considered	to	have	the	capacity	to	create	or	maintain	state	trust.	
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Cultural	identity	is	a	kind	of	identity	or	feeling	of	belonging	to	a	group.	It	is	part	of	 a	 person’s	 self-concept	 and	 self-perception.	 Additionally,	 it	 is	 also	 closely	related	to	nationality,	ethnicity,	religion,	 tradition,	social	class,	 the	generational	issue,	 locality	 and	 any	 types	 of	 social	 grouping	 that	 have	 their	 own	 distinct	culture.	 These	 factors	 can	 largely	 influence	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	diplomatic	efforts	in	state	trust	building.	 		With	 respect	 to	 this	 issue	 of	 cultural	 identity,	 Lane	 and	 Wagschal	 argue	 that	‘culture	offers	people	cultural	identities	appear	around	the	world	in	the	form	of	ethnicity,	 religion	 or	 universal	 values.	 Nations	 or	 ethnic	 groups,	 as	 well	 as	civilisations	or	religions,	make	up	two	types	of	culture,	characteristic	of	specific	areas’	 (Lane	and	Wagschal,	2005).	Furthermore,	Ennaji	 considers	 that	 ‘cultural	identity	 is	 both	 characteristics	 of	 the	 individual	 but	 also	 to	 the	 culturally	identical	 group	 of	 members	 sharing	 the	 same	 cultural	 identity,	 it	 can	 foster	better	understanding	between	them’	(Ennaji,	2005).	Culture	 is	not	solely	about	the	 national	 dish	 on	 the	 table.	 The	 fashionable	 clothing	 people	wear,	 the	 gods	they	worship,	or	even	the	places	they	live;	culture	is	an	abstract	concept	that	is	mostly	invisible.	It	also	needs	a	long	time	for	both	parties	to	recognise	and	accept	the	 cultural	 identity	 of	 each	 other.	 Just	 like	 Lane	 and	 Wagschal	 agrees	 that	‘cultural	 compactness	 may	 increase	 over	 time,	 as,	 for	 instance,	 when	 a	 group	becomes	 increasingly	 conscious	 of	 its	 cultural	 identity.	 Such	 a	 process	 may	involve	 several	 generations’	 (Lane	 and	 Wagschal,	 2005).	 Based	 upon	 the	arguments	 from	 Ennaji,	 Lane,	 and	 Wagschal,	 cultural	 identity	 is	 of	 great	significance	 in	 promoting	mutual	 understanding.	 For	 those	 states	with	 similar	cultural	 characteristics	 and	 mutually	 recognised	 cultural	 identity,	 it	 might	 be	much	 easier	 to	 create	 and	 maintain	 state	 trust	 through	 the	 ways	 of	 cultural	diplomacy,	even	though	it	will	take	an	extended	period	of	time.		However,	 some	particular	 challenges	 toward	cultural	 identity	might	hinder	 the	pace	of	state	trust	building,	for	example,	differences	of	political	system,	religious	differences,	traditions	and	language	barrier.	 		
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For	instance,	differences	in	political	system	could	be	regarded	as	the	main	factor	that	might	have	an	influence	on	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building.	Zheng	argues	 that	 international	 relations	 have	 some	 common	 characteristics	 with	interpersonal	 relationship	 (Zheng,	 2006).	 This	 argument	 is	 considered	 to	 be	essential	 in	this	thesis.	In	the	interpersonal	relations,	a	rational	trusting	person	would	 observe	 the	moral	 quality	 and	 characteristics	 of	 the	 trustee	 in	 the	 first	instance	and	then	proceed	to	make	a	decision	whether	one	can	or	cannot	trust	him/her.	While	in	the	international	relations,	Zheng	argues	that	‘states	with	the	same	political	 system,	 their	similarities	will	 facilitate	 their	communication,	and	relative	uncertainties	and	potential	problems	will	be	less	than	those	states	with	different	political	systems’	(Zheng,	2006).	For	example,	the	notable	difference	of	political	 system	 between	 China	 and	 the	 UK;	 both	 states	 have	 their	 distinct	political	 systems	 ranging	 from	 the	 state	 level	 to	 the	 county	 level,	 from	 the	election	 of	 governing	 party	 to	 the	 selection	 of	 public	 officers.	 This	 difference	could	well	lead	to	mutual	misunderstanding	towards	each	state.	Additionally,	the	difference	in	the	political	system	might	increase	the	potential	risks	of	emergent	conflict	 if	 the	 intention	and	 strategy	of	 them	have	been	misinterpreted.	 In	 this	case,	 if	both	states	could	have	the	mutually	recognised	cultural	 identity,	 then	 it	would	be	easier	for	cultural	diplomacy	to	create	and	maintain	state	trust.	 	 	 		Another	 challenge	 concerning	 the	 role	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 creating	 and	maintain	 state	 trust	 is	 religion.	 As	 an	 indivisible	 part	 of	 the	 culture,	 Walser	considers	that	‘religion	defines	how	the	community	members	interpret	their	role	in	 the	 universe,	 with	 this	 teaching	 based	 on	 the	 local	 culture,	 so	 different	religions	 arise	 out	 of	 different	 cultures’	 (Walser,	 2015,	 p.4).	 In	 the	 modern	society,	there	are	various	religions	throughout	the	world,	such	as	Hinduism,	New	Age,	 Buddhism,	 Islam,	 Christianity,	 etc.	 Each	 of	 them	 has	 its	 unique	 features.	However,	 it	 is	 also	 the	 sad	 case	when	 religion	 is	 used	 as	 an	 excuse	 in	 time	 of	conflict	when	most	conflicts	in	international	society	today	are,	ostensibly,	caused	by	religious	differences.	Although	in	reality,	 it	 is	not	necessarily	so	at	all.	There	are	some	aspects	of	religion	which	make	it	susceptible	to	become	a	latent	source	of	conflict.	If	a	state	has	existing	or	potential	disputes	of	religious	differences,	it	might	pose	some	kinds	of	 threat	 towards	other	 states,	 and	 then	 the	state	 trust	
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might	 not	 be	 formed	 easily.	 Therefore,	 how	 to	 use	 cultural	 diplomacy	 to	 deal	with	 the	 issues	of	religious	difference	and	promote	cultural	dialogues	correctly	and	more	 efficiently	 is	 a	 crucial	 question.	Then,	 it	would	be	 easier	 for	 cultural	diplomacy	to	create	and	maintain	state	trust.	 		Additionally,	in	comparison	with	the	other	two	challenges,	the	language	barrier	is	 not	 a	 difficult	 issue	 to	 deal	 with.	 However,	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 people,	mastering	 the	 language	 of	 other	 states	 would	 be	 beneficial	 for	 them	 to	understand	the	culture	of	that	state.	If	this	problem	cannot	be	solved	well,	it	will	directly	 influence	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building.	According	to	the	questionnaire	of	this	research,	when	the	question	was	asked	‘do	you	think	 that	mastering	another	 language	could	help	you	to	understand	other	state’s	culture’,	the	result	of	responses	is	illustrated	clearly	as	follows	(see	Figure	X),	 around	 79%	 of	 the	 respondents	 considers	 that	 mastering	 the	 language	 of	other	states	could	help	them	to	understand	more	aspects	regarding	the	culture	of	that	state.	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	



























	For	the	perspective	of	Chinese	people,	some	personal	interviews	are	specifically	designed	for	them;	the	majority	of	them	agree	that	understanding	the	language	of	 another	 state	might	 stimulate	 their	 interest	 in	 the	 culture	 of	 that	 state.	 The	brief	information	regarding	the	interview	towards	this	topic	has	been	concluded	in	 Table	 4.	 50	 individuals	 who	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 this	 interview,	 and	 the	summarised	conclusion	 is	 listed	as	an	appendix.	Among	 these	50	 interviewees,	seven	of	them,	the	specific	details	of	which	are	listed	as	follows,	have	started	to	learn	another	 language	due	to	the	cultural	attraction	and	 interest.	Additionally,	some	of	them	have	given	up	learning	another	kind	of	culture	due	to	the	difficulty	in	understanding	of	another	foreign	language	as	well.	 	 	
 
Name	 Gender	 Occupation	 Response	
Sheng Zhuo Male Engineer  Interested in the county culture of America, then started to 
learn English. 
Boyuan Lin Female Manager Interested in the culture of France, then started to learn 
French. 












Sherry Wang Female Salesperson Interested in the culture of Spain, then started to learn 
Spanish. 
Bo Chen Male Journalist He would like to get the first-hand news, then started to 
learn English. 
Ziyun Zhao Female Lecturer Mastering a language is beneficial for communication. 
Shenjie Wei Male Auditor  Mastering a language will stimulate him to explore more 
cultural issues of that state. 
Jiehua Zhou Female Artist Mastering the language of another state is quite important 
for working with other foreign artists and knowing their 
culture. 
Song Yang Male  Property 
Agent 
Mastering another language is good to understand the 
requirements of foreign customers. 
Harris White Female Dancer Started to learn Chinese because she would like to learn 
Chinese Peking Opera. 





Language barrier brought her difficulties in her overseas 
study career. 
Jaden Cheung Male  Undergraduate 
student 
Interested in the South Korean culture, then started to learn 
the Korean language. 
	
Table	 4.	 Brief	 Summary	 of	 interviews	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 question	 “do	 you	 think	 the	
language	barrier	could	be	one	of	the	obstacles	when	you	would	like	to	explore	other	




Proposition	 3:	 Assuming	 that	 when	 everything	 else	 being	 equal,	 when	 the	reciprocal	 behaviours	 increase	 during	 the	 implementation	 process	 of	 cultural	diplomatic	 activities,	 then	 cultural	 diplomacy can	 maintain,	 enhance	 and	 even	create	state	trust.	 		As	discussed	in	Chapter	Three,	one	of	the	principal	sources	of	trust	is	reciprocity.	In	the	context	of	reciprocal	behaviour,	Rathbun	considers	that	‘trust	is	the	belief	that	others	will	cooperate	when	one	cooperates,	that	they	will	not	exploit	one’s	vulnerability	 but	 rather	 respond	 in	 kind’	 (Rathbun,	 2012,	 p.10).	 Besides,	 Kydd	also	argues	that	 ‘whether	to	trust	 involves	an	assessment	of	 the	 likelihood	that	another	has	cooperative	 intentions’	(Kydd,	2005,	p.23).	 It	 is	noticeable	that	 the	significance	 of	 cooperation	 in	 the	 aspect	 of	 state	 trust	 building.	 However,	cooperation	 cannot	 represent	 the	 whole	 aspects	 of	 reciprocity;	 it	 is	 only	 a	manifestation	 of	 reciprocity.	 For	 example,	 if	 State	 A	 carries	 out	 its	 cultural	diplomatic	programs	to	State	B,	then	State	B	implements	its	cultural	diplomatic	programs	 to	State	A.	Even	 though	both	of	State	A	and	State	B	do	not	have	any	joint	cooperative	programs,	this	kind	of	 interaction	could	also	be	considered	as	reciprocal	behaviour.	Just	like	an	old	Chinese	proverb	“li	shang	wang	lai2”,	which	means	 courtesy	 calls	 for	 reciprocity.	 It	 is	 a	 virtuous	 cycle	 if	 the	 reciprocal	behaviour	 could	 be	 assured	 within	 the	 interaction	 among	 states.	 If	 their	reciprocal	 behaviour	 shows	 an	 uptrend,	 then	 cultural	 diplomatic	 efforts	 can	create	and	maintain	state	trust.	This	reciprocity	may	take	place	over	a	relatively	long	period	of	time,	and	one	cannot	just	follow	every	single	successful	reciprocal	transaction	 or	 activity.	 Furthermore,	 when	 such	 successful	 experience	 of	reciprocal	 actions	 is	 being	 considered	 as	 cumulative,	 it	 will	 facilitate	 cultural	diplomacy	in	creating	and	maintaining	state	trust	better.	
 
                                                2	 礼尚往来	 (English	translation:	courtesy	demands	reciprocity)	
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The	notion	of	state	trust	may	appear	to	be	a	transitory	quality.	However,	it	is	at	the	heart	of	relations	between	states;	it	can	also	be	considered	as	one	of	the	aims	of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 For	 example,	 according	 to	 the	 survey	 of	 the	 British	Council,	 which	 finds	 that	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 reciprocal	 behaviour	 of	cultural	 interaction	 and	 increased	 trust	 was	 especially	 significant	 in	 Pakistan,	Russia	 and	 Turkey,	 those	 of	 which	 sometimes	 have	 problematic	 relationships	with	 the	 UK	 (British	 Concil,	 2012).	 Under	 the	 continuous	 efforts	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	 by	 the	 British	 Council,	 people	 of	 those	 countries	 start	 to	 hold	increasingly	 trusting	attitude	 towards	 the	government	of	 the	UK,	 the	people	of	UK	 and	 holds	 a	 positive	 impression	 of	 the	 UK.	 Additionally,	 the	 results	 of	 this	survey	also	indicate	that	the	people	of	the	UK	are	more	trusted	than	Americans,	often	by	a	significant	margin.	In	addition,	the	linkage	between	trust	and	interest	in	doing	business	and	other	cooperation	illustrates	the	economic	payoffs	that	can	be	a	byproduct	of	 cultural	diplomacy	 (British	Concil,	2012).	From	the	practical	experience	of	the	British	Council,	it	is	obvious	that	reciprocal	behaviour	is	quite	significant	in	the	efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy.	 	 		
3.6	The	Game	of	State	Trust	 	Six	 sources	 of	 state	 trust	 and	 the	 relationship	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 state	trust	have	been	mentioned	and	discussed	in	the	previous	sectors.	It	can	be	seen	from	 the	 detailed	 analysis	 that	 cooperation	 is	 considered	 with	 an	 enormous	importance	to	these	two	concepts.	Therefore,	 in	order	to	simulate	the	potential	situation	 regarding	 the	 cooperative	 outcomes,	 this	 part	 establishes	 a	 game	model–the	 Game	 of	 State	 Trust.	 Theoretically,	 the	 relationship	 between	cooperation	 and	 state	 trust	 can	be	demonstrated	 in	 this	 game.	The	 inspiration	for	this	model	comes	from	the	typical	game	and	a	standard	example--“Prisoner’s	Dilemma”,	which	 shows	 the	 reasons	why	 two	completely	 “rational”	 individuals	might	not	cooperate,	even	though	it	appears	that	it	is	in	their	best	interests	to	do	so.	It	was	originally	framed	by	Merrill	Flood	and	Melvin	Dresher	who	worked	at	RAND3	 in	 1950	 (Milovsky,	 2014,	 p.12).	 Albert	W.	 Tucker	 then	 formalised	 the	game	 with	 prison	 sentence	 rewards	 and	 named	 it	 as	 ‘prisoner's	 dilemma’.	
                                                3	 The	RAND	Corporation	is	a	nonprofit	institution	that	helps	improve	policy	and	decision	making	through	research	and	analysis.			
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However,	 this	 game	 is	 primarily	 used	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 economics.	 In	 this	chapter,	 it	 is	 a	 valiant	 attempt	 to	 take	 this	 game	 into	 the	 political	 arena	 to	thereafter	explain	the	potential	outcomes	regarding	cooperation	and	state	trust.	As	its	name	suggests,	the	game	of	state	trust	creates	a	situation	where	one	player	must	decide	whether	 to	 trust	 the	other	or	not;	and	 the	other	player	must	 then	decide	whether	to	honour	or	abuse	this	trust.	 		In	 this	 game,	 two	 state	 actors	 who	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 of	 the	 same	 “cultural	norms”	 will	 only	 obtain	 the	 trust	 needed	 to	 cooperate	 if	 they	 enter	 into	 a	reciprocal	 relationship	 and	 not	 one	 devised	 around	 a	 form	 of	 cognitive	agreement	 (Gambetta,	 1988,	 p.233;	 Huntington,	 1996,	 p.850;	 Hoffman,	 2002,	p.384;	Glaser,	 2010,	p.128).	 For	Riker	 and	Feger,	 the	 concept	of	 trust	 could	be	conceived	as	equating	to	risk-taking	(Riker,	1974,	p.65;	Feger,	1991,	p.295).	For	the	Game	of	 State	Trust,	 it	 is	 especially	 so	 to	 a	 certain	 extent,	 firstly,	 as	 far	 as	Bachmann	and	Zaheer	are	concerned,	‘trust	neither	exists	nor	has	any	utility	as	long	as	 there	 is	no	risk’	 (Bachmann	and	Zaheer,	2013).	 Indeed,	whenever	both	states	are	 in	a	 situation	 to	 trust	another	means	 they	have	 to	shoulder	 the	risk,	because	 they	 should	 determine	 to	 expose	 its	 vulnerability	 to	 another.	 In	 this	scenario,	the	concept	of	trust	will	thus	make	little	sense	if	either	of	them	refuses	to	render	 itself	vulnerable	 to	another	 (Baier,	1986,	p.235;	Heimer,	2005,	p.43).	Secondly,	at	the	initial	stage,	both	states	not	only	have	to	decide	whether	or	not	they	will	be	better	off	when	placing	their	trust	in	another,	but	the	key	question	they	have	to	ask	themselves	whether	it	is	worth	placing	such	trust	or	not.	 		Under	the	framework	of	this	game	tailored	in	this	thesis,	one	player	is	identified	as	 State	 A,	while	 another	 player	 is	 identified	 as	 State	 B.	 State	 A	 is	 given	 some	initial	investment	in	the	form	of	wealth	allocation.	At	this	time,	both	states	need	to	calculate	carefully	about	the	potential	risk.	State	A	must	decide	how	much	it	can	 ‘trust’	 State	 B.	 In	 addition,	 State	 B	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 potential	investment	and	cooperative	target	of	State	A.	State	B	also	has	the	ability	to	help	State	A	to	turn	its	investment	amount	into	a	greater	sum.	Therefore,	the	amount	received	by	State	B	is	some	multiple	of	the	amount	trusted	to	State	B	by	State	A.	
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Then,	after	receiving	this	amount,	State	B	must	make	a	decision	as	to	how	much	amount	of	money	that	needs	to	be	returned	to	State	A.		This	game	simulates	several	situations	in	which	the	attractiveness	to	one	party	of	a	wealth-enriching	investment	hinges	on	the	trustworthiness	of	another.	For	example,	 assuming	 a	 situation	where	 State	 A	 has	 to	 decide	 how	much	money	should	 be	 invested	 to	 State	 B.	 In	 the	 ideal	 situation,	 if	 both	 states	 trust	 each	other,	it	can	potentially	yield	greater	rewards	reaping	not	only	economic	benefits	but	also	enhancing	trust	for	Both	State	A	and	State	B.	 		Additionally,	assuming	that	State	B	would	like	to	terminate	the	cooperation	with	State	 A	when	 State	 B	 gains	 greater	 benefit	 from	 the	 cooperation;	 then	 State	 B	would	use	the	benefit	to	cooperate	with	another	state.	It	will	the	push	State	A	to	a	quite	embarrassing	situation	because	State	A	has	already	devoted	a	lot	of	effort	and	 money	 to	 cooperate	 with	 State	 B.	 This	 situation	 is	 exactly	 the	 dilemma	simulated	 by	 the	 game	 of	 state	 trust.	 State	 A	 should	 decide	 how	much	money	could	 be	 allocated	 to	 State	 B	 so	 as	 to	 hedge	 the	 potential	 risks	 of	 State	 B’s	untrustworthy	intentions	or	behaviours.	Then	State	B	needs	to	make	a	decision	whether	 to	 honour	 this	 trust	 (for	 example,	 State	 B	 still	 continues	 to	 conduct	cooperation)	 or	 abuse	 this	 trust	 (for	 example,	 State	 B	 agrees	 with	 State	 A	 to	conduct	related	activities	first,	but	once	the	money	or	resources	are	received	as	offered	 by	 State	 A,	 State	 B	 then	 uses	 the	 money	 to	 do	 other	 business	 or	terminates	the	cooperation,	yielding	the	highest	payoff	to	State	B	itself	but	leaves	the	lowest	reward	to	State	A).		This	 state	 trust	 game	 can	 also	 be	 discussed	 with	 the	 mathematical	 manner.	Provided	State	A	 is	given	some	amount	of	money	(M>0)	 to	be	used	by	cultural	diplomacy	activities.	This	part	of	money	State	A	can	divide	between	one	part	of	amount	State	A	keeps	for	itself	and	one	part	of	amount	State	A	gives	to	State	B.	Labels	the	money	State	A	gives	to	State	B	as	x,	x∈|x|0≤x≤M|,	the	amount	X	is	then	multiplied	by	a	constant	c>1,	therefore	State	B	will	receive	the	greater	amount,	that	could	be	cx.	State	B	must	make	a	decision	what	proportion,	 labels	as	t,	 t	 is	the	percentage	 of	 cx,	 should	be	 returned	 to	 State	A,	 and	 then	keeping	 the	 rest	
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l No	 trust	 level=distrust	 level:	 T=0%;	 Low	 trust	 level:	 0%<T<50%;	Medium	trust	 level:	 T=50%;	 High	 trust	 level:	 50%<T<100%;	 Absolute	 trust	 level:	T=100%		
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These	conditions	are	settled	based	on	the	previous	model.	Then,	M=£100,	x∈{£0,	£50,	£100},	c≥1,	f=0,	t∈{0,1/2}.	Therefore,	the	payoffs	for	State	A	and	State	B	will	be	shown	as	follows:		 Payoff	to	State	A:	P1=	100+(ct-1)	*	x		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Payoff	to	State	B:	P2=	(1-t)	*	cx		The	 first	 situation,	 if	 State	 A	 holds	 lower	 trust	 level	 or	 distrust	 level	(0%≤T<50%)	 towards	State	B	and	does	not	want	 to	 cooperate	with	State	B	 to	fulfil	the	investment,	then	State	A	might	decide	to	keep	the	amount	by	itself	and	give	nothing	to	State	B.	At	this	time,	x=£0,	then	P1=£100,	P2=0.		 	The	second	situation,	if	State	A	holds	the	medium	level	of	trust	(T=50%)	towards	State	 B,	 so	 State	 A	 gives	 £50	 to	 State	 B,	 then	 State	 B	 will	 return	 50%	 of	 the	received	amount	 to	 State	A.	At	 this	 time,	 x=£50,	 t=50%=0.5.	Then	P1=	50+25c,	P2=	25c		 	The	third	situation,	if	State	A	holds	medium	trust	level	(T=50%)	towards	State	B,	therefore	State	A	will	give	£50	to	State	B,	but	State	B	chooses	to	return	0%	of	the	received	amount	to	State	A.	At	this	time,	x=£50,	t=0%.	Then	P1=50,	P2=50c		 	The	 forth	 Situation,	 if	 State	A	 holds	 high	 trust	 level	 (T>50%)	 towards	 State	B,	therefore	 State	 A	 will	 give	 £100	 to	 State	 B,	 State	 B	 will	 return	 50%	 of	 the	received	amount	to	State	A.	At	this	time,	x=£100,	t=50%=0.5.	Then	P1=	50c,	P2=	50c		 	The	 fifth	 Situation,	 if	 State	 A	 holds	 high	 trust	 level	 (T>50%)	 towards	 State	 B,	therefore	 State	 A	 will	 give	 £100	 to	 State	 B.	 However,	 State	 B	 decides	 not	 to	return	any	amount	to	State	A.	At	this	time,	x=£100,	t=0%.	Then	P1=0,	P2=100c		Therefore,	 from	the	 five	situations	outlined	above,	 it	 is	not	difficult	 to	see	both	payoffs	when	State	A	holds	the	kind	of	trust	level	towards	State	B	and	what	State	B	will	do	as	reciprocity	in	return.	One	point	should	be	mentioned	that	both	State	
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A	 and	 State	 B	 are	 just	 simply	 determined	 by	 a	 rough	 guess	 about	 something	which	is	related	to	the	game.	In	the	real	world,	there	must	be	a	lot	of	factors	in	existence	between	State	A	and	State	B.	From	the	five	hypothetical	situations,	it	is	not	difficult	to	find	that	only	the	fourth	situation	could	achieve	the	ideal	win-win	situation,	which	will,	 in	 essence,	 generates	 or	 improves	 state	 trust	 and	will	 be	beneficial	for	any	future	cooperation.	But	the	rest	four	situations	will	not	be	the	satisfactory	outcomes	for	both	State	A	and	State	B.		In	general,	this	game	model	has	some	familiarities	with	the	model	of	‘Prisoners’	Dilemma’.	But	in	that	game,	there	is	no	communication	and	interaction	between	two	prisoners.	Their	decisions	are	mainly	in	reliant	on	the	trusting	or	distrusting	attitudes	 towards	 each	 other.	 Additionally,	 two	prisoners	might	 prefer	making	decisions	from	the	aspect	of	 their	own	self-interest.	 It	 is	also	the	 issue	for	each	sovereign	state	to	care	about.	For	the	state,	national	interest	is	the	core	issue	of	state	 policies	 and	 guidelines	 for	 actions.	 In	 the	 real	 political	 arena,	 unlike	 the	experimental	 game	 theory,	 states	 could	 have	 a	 much	 deeper	 communication	channel	and	a	lot	more	pro-active	interactions	to	strengthen	the	understanding	of	 each	 other	 so	 as	 to	 protect	 their	 own	national	 interest.	 Sometimes,	 it	might	even	be	able	to	maximise	the	achievements	with	varies	methods	and	means,	and	then	the	win-win	situation	could	be	achieved	with	a	greater	degree	of	certainty.	In	 comparison	with	 other	methods	 to	 solve	 the	 dilemma	 between	 State	 A	 and	State	B,	this	game	of	state	trust	ignores	the	cultural	factors	and	emotional	factors	between	 two	 states,	 while	 cultural	 diplomacy	 could	 act	 as	 a	 relatively	 stable	method.	It	is	because	cultural	diplomacy	could	make	up	the	hole	concerning	the	ignored	cultural	and	social	factors	during	the	cooperative	process.	 		In	 this	game,	 theoretically,	cooperation	and	state	 trust	are	mutually	reinforced,	and	the	benefit	of	both	states	can	gain	the	expected	outcomes.	Furthermore,	on	the	 one	hand,	 the	 game	of	 state	 trust	 demonstrates	 that	 the	win-win	 situation	can	be	achieved	 if	both	state	actors	 trust	each	other.	On	the	other	hand,	 it	also	further	 illustrates	 that	 if	 both	 states	 could	 explore	 the	 potential	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	 to	 generate	 more	 cooperative	 opportunities	 and	 foster	 mutual	
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recognition	 or	 understanding,	 they	 will	 harvest	 not	 only	 about	 the	 economic	benefit	but	also	the	improvement	of	state	trust.		
3.7	Conclusion	In	 the	world	 today,	 the	 fast-developing	 globalisation	 process	 has	 hastened	 the	speed	of	 cooperation	between	states,	which	highlights	 the	 significance	of	 trust.	Many	 different	 views	 have	 been	 aired	when	 exploring	 the	 notion	 of	 trust	 and	definitions	 abound.	 The	 vast	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 the	 need	 for	 flexibility	that	 characterises	 relationships	 within	 and	 between	 states	 is	 unprecedented.	With	 the	 increasingly	 rapid	 pace	 of	 globalisation	 and	 frequent	 communication	among	states,	how	to	resolve	conflicts	and	how	to	build	trust	between	states	has	increasingly	become	 the	 crucial	 issues	 to	 all	 sovereignty	 states.	 In	 this	 respect,	state	trust	is	one	of	the	most	valuable	assets	that	a	state	can	possess;	it	is	because	that	state	 trust	represents	a	key	 indicator	of	how	closely	and	how	friendly	 that	the	states	are	in	connection	and	tune	with	each	other.	The	presence	of	state	trust	might	 help	 state	 actors	 to	 achieve	 a	 much	 more	 favourable	 diplomatic	environment,	 efficient	 international	 services,	 and	 mutual	 understanding.	Conversely,	the	absence	of	state	trust	might	trigger	conflicts	among	state	actors.	 		This	chapter	has	defined	state	 trust	as	 ‘a	variety	of	phenomena	that	enable	 the	actors	of	states	to	take	risks	in	dealing	with	other	states,	solving	problems	with	collective	actions,	or	acting	in	other	ways	which	might	appear	to	be	contrary	to	standard	definitions	of	national	 interest’.	 This	 concept	 shows	how	 the	 invisible	chemistry	or	an	abstract	concept	of	 trust	could	have	such	significant	 influences	on	the	behaviours	of	states.	Additionally,	 this	chapter	has	argued	that	there	are	five	 key	 sources	 of	 such	 state	 trust:	 1)	 people/institution,	 2)	 cooperation,	 3)	shared	norms,	4)	shared	obligation,	and	5)	inter-state	network.	 		With	 the	 efforts	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 this	 concept,	 this	 will	 be	 used	 in	 the	subsequent	chapters	to	explore	the	relationship	between	state	trust	and	cultural	diplomacy.	When	all	are	said	and	done,	trust	among	states	is	not	the	same	as	the	trust	 that	 a	 toddler	 could	 put	 in	 its	 parents;	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 scholars	 and	politician	would	dearly	 love	to	return	to	such	form	of	the	unconditional	type	of	
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4.1	Introduction	As	for	the	two	key	concepts	in	this	thesis,	there	have	been	very	few	attempts	to	measure	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 state	 trust.	 Measuring	effectiveness	 is	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 explaining	 the	 behaviour	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	 and	 its	 role	 in	 state	 trust	 building	 process.	 However,	 the	 lack	 of	standardised	methods	of	measurement	presents	a	great	challenge.	For	example,	due	 to	 the	 wide	 variety	 of	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	measure	 all	 outputs	 with	 the	 same	 tools.	 Furthermore,	 due	 to	 the	 significant	variation	 in	 goals,	 approaches,	 methodologies	 of	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs	and	their	evaluations;	much	of	the	evaluative	data	generated	is	not	comparable.		At	 the	 moment,	 there	 are	 almost	 no	 obvious	 methods	 measuring	 the	effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 state	 trust	 building,	 other	 relevant	intangible	 effects	 that	 could	 be	measured	 through	 some	 indicators	 and	 factors	which	may	potentially	be	used	to	demonstrate	the	trusting	relationship	created	by	 cultural	 diplomacy	 among	 states.	 Trust	 is	 based	 on	 perceptions,	 and	 its	measurement	 is	 frequently	 fraught	 with	 many	 challenges;	 this	 is	 also	 a	 valid	point	for	cultural	diplomacy.	This	chapter	first	presents	five	indicators	of	existing	state	 trust	 created	 by	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 Second,	 it	 suggests	 five	 factors	 that	may	 influence	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 Finally,	 it	 proceeds	 to	broadly	examine	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building	in	the	China-UK	relationship.		 	
4.2	The	Indicators	of	Existing	State	Trust	With	 respect	 to	 the	 measurement	 of	 trust,	 sociologists	 have	 set	 up	 some	standards	of	measurement	to	evaluate	trust.	For	example,	Arron	Hoffman	comes	up	with	three	rules	for	measurement	of	trust：1)	Discretion-granting	policies	and	decision-making	data,	2)	Oversight	indicators,	and	3)	Rule	indicators.	However,	Hoffman	does	not	agree	that	cooperation	could	be	used	as	one	of	the	indicators	to	 measure	 trust.	 He	 argues	 that	 ‘the	 mere	 presence	 of	 cooperation	 is	 an	
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unreliable	 indicator	 of	 trust’	 (Hoffman,	 2002,	 p.376).	 Other	 scholars	 (e.g.,	Coleman,	 1990;	 Deutsch,	 1958;	 Gambetta,	 1988;	 Larson,	 1998)	 argue	 that	measurement	 strategies	 based	 on	 predictive	 definitions	 of	 trust	 assume	 that	trust	is	a	precondition	for	cooperation.	 	 	However,	 although	 Hoffman	 is	 talking	 about	 trust	 among	 states,	 it	 is	 not	 the	same	 as	 the	 concept	 of	 state	 trust.	 This	 thesis	 adopts	 the	 essence	 of	 two	measurement	rules	in	Hoffman’s	methodology:	firstly,	this	research	agrees	with	the	 importance	 of	 discretion	with	 the	 aspect	 of	 policy;	 secondly,	 this	 research	takes	on	the	rule	indicators	to	examine	the	existence	of	state	trust.	What’s	more,	with	 respect	 to	 the	 relations	 between	 cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 state	 trust,	 this	research	 also	 develops	 three	 further	 indicators:	 1)	 the	 reciprocal	 benevolent	policies,	2)	advantageous	orientation	of	policies,	and	3)	cooperation.		This	 chapter	 proposes	multiple	 levels	 of	 state	 trust	 from	 low	 to	 high:	minimal	level	 of	 trust—cooperation	 among	 states;	 lower	medium	 level	 of	 state	 trust—	reciprocal	 benevolent	 policies;	 medium	 level	 of	 state	 trust—favourable	orientation	of	policy;	upper	medium	level	of	state	trust—rules	with	leeway;	high	level	of	state	trust—discretionary	power	in	the	policies.		
The	 first	 indicator,	 cooperation	 among	 states	 indicates	 the	 minimal	 level	 of	state	trust.	As	 argued	 above,	 cultural	 diplomacy	 can	 create	 opportunities	 for	 cooperation.	However,	how	to	turn	these	opportunities	into	specific	practical	acts	rather	than	remaining	stagnant	as	an	oral	promise	is	quite	crucial.	Many	scholars	agree	that	trust	 is	 a	 pre-requisite	 for	 cooperation	 (e.g.,	 Coleman,	 1990;	 Deutsch,	 1958;	Gambetta,	1988;	Larson,	1998).	A	sovereign	state	is	not	an	exception.	States	that	transfer	 some	 control	 of	 their	 interests	 to	 other	 states	 run	 the	 risk	 that	 those	interests	might	 be	 betrayed.	 All	 cooperation	 requires	 some	 degree	 of	 trust.	 In	this	 circumstance,	 when	 states	 have	 increasing	 cooperative	 achievements,	 it	could	be	said	that	there	is	some	degree	of	state	trust	in	existence	between	them,	even	though	the	state	trust	may	be	at	the	minimal	level.	 	
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While	 Hoffman	 does	 not	 agree	 with	 this	 perspective,	 he	 argues	 that	 ‘trust	involves	 risk,	 but	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 risk—trust	 and	 risk	 are	 separable	constructs.	 The	 implication	 is	 that	 the	 necessary	 link	 between	 trust	 and	cooperation	 cannot	 be	 sustained	 because	 of	 some	 efforts	 to	 cooperate	 emerge	for	 no	 other	 reason	 that	 the	willingness	 of	 actors	 to	 gamble	 on	 favourable	 or	even	 poor	 odds’	 (Hoffman,	 2002,	 p.400).	 He	 also	 offers	 the	 US-Soviet	 nuclear	relationship	 as	 an	 example	 to	 explain	 cooperative	 risk-taking	without	 trust.	 In	this	 case,	 their	 cooperation	 was	 mainly	 because	 of	 other	 urgent	 military	 and	security	 issues.	 He	 argues	 that	 the	 superpowers’	 use	 of	 highly	 invasive	 and	regular	checks	of	each	other’s	nuclear	weapons	stockpiles	to	monitor	compliance	hardly	seems	like	the	kind	of	behaviour	in	which	trusting	partners	engage.	 	Hoffman’s	argument	is	reasonable	to	some	extent,	but	in	the	first	instance,	there	is	no	absolute	100%	trust	in	the	real	political	world.	Therefore,	 it	 is	 impossible	or	 virtually	 impossible	 to	 ask	 for	 100%	 trust	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 cooperation	between	states.	More	specifically,	Barton	further	argues	that	‘cooperation	is	not	only	relevant	as	a	path	of	bridging	the	political	divide	to	avoid	the	unfavourable	ramifications	 of	 competitive	 behaviour	 but	 it	 is	 also	 relevant	 since	 it	 is	 in	 the	shared	interest	of	both	sides	to	help	each	other	help	themselves’	(Barton,	2016,	p.41).	To	some	degree,	both	states	are	equally	vulnerable	to	the	collateral	effects	of	instability	across	the	continent	even	if	these	effects	may	transpire	differently	in	practice	for	both	sides.	What’s	more,	monitoring	behaviour	is	not	necessarily	a	representation	 of	 mistrust.	 Actually,	 it	 could	 also	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 way	 to	maintain	 trust	mutually.	Monitoring	behaviour	could	avoid	 identifiable	risks	as	well	 as	 predict	 new	potential	 hazards,	 especially	when	both	 state	 actors	 agree	with	these	monitoring	efforts.	Hence,	this	is	not	evidence	of	mistrust,	as	it	could	enable	state	actors	to	have	a	better	cooperation	between	them.	 	As	 discussed	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 some	 scholars	 use	 Prisoner’s	 Dilemma	 to	explain	the	international	cooperation	among	states.	It	could	be	seen	clearly	that	cooperation	between	states	within	the	structure	of	prisoners’	dilemma	requires	both	 parties	 to	 trust	 each	 other	 to	 thereafter	 implement	 the	 cooperative	procedure	and	maximise	the	benefit,	both	economically	and	politically.	Moreover,	the	concept	of	state	trust	is	a	derivative	from	the	concept	of	social	trust,	and	the	
  
	 91	
two	concepts	place	emphasis	on	the	notion	of	reciprocity.	Cooperation	is	one	of	the	several	ways	to	make	reciprocity	come	true.	 	For	 example,	 if	 State	 A	 chooses	 to	 cooperate	 with	 State	 B	 based	 on	 the	cooperative	 opportunities	 created	 by	 cultural	 diplomacy;	 in	 this	 circumstance,	State	A	has	to	treat	State	B	as	a	trustworthy	partner.	If	both	states	maintain	trust	without	 betrayal	 of	 the	 partnership,	 State	 A	 and	 State	 B	 could	 have	 a	 great	opportunity	 to	 realise	 the	 reciprocal	 benefit.	 If	 both	 states	 do	 not	 betray	 each	other,	 but	 still	 could	 not	 obtain	 any	 benefit	 from	 the	 cooperation,	 this	 is	 not	necessarily	a	problem	of	 trust	but	might	be	due	 to	some	mistakes	of	decisions.	Additionally,	greater	cooperative	achievements	do	not	necessarily	represent	the	higher	 level	 of	 state	 trust,	 because	 cooperative	 issues	may	 be	 related	 to	 other	factors	which	can	be	an	 issue	of	benefit	or	 interest.	On	 the	other	hand,	greater	cooperative	 results	 can	 maintain	 the	 current	 level	 of	 trust	 and	 provide	opportunities	for	both	states	to	have	a	better	developmental	opportunity	in	the	future.	Both	states	may	further	strengthen	and	deepen	mutual	understanding	on	the	 platform	 of	 cooperation.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 the	 reason	 that	 cooperation	 could	 be	regarded	as	one	of	the	indicators	of	existing	state	trust,	although	it	is	only	at	the	minimal	level.	 	
The	 second	 indicator,	 reciprocal	 benevolent	 policies	 between	 states	 could	indicate	the	lower	medium	level	of	state	trust.	 	By	 definition,	 reciprocal	 benevolent	 policies	 are	 those	 governmental	 policies	with	 favourable	 and	 beneficial	 content.	 For	 example,	 since	 the	 UK	 initiated	 its	plan	to	exit	the	European	Union,	the	UK	government	has	already	put	forward	a	series	 of	 benevolent	 policies	 towards	 the	 Chinese	 government	 to	 thereafter	strengthen	 the	 economic	 and	 cultural	 relationship	 between	 China	 and	 the	 UK	(Department	 of	 International	 Trade,	 2016).	 In	 return,	 the	 Chinese	 government	has	actively	responded	to	the	proposals	of	the	UK	government	and	has	started	to	encourage	 Chinese	 domestic	 enterprises	 to	 invest	 in	 the	 UK.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	conceivable	that	both	governments	have	realised	the	benefit	that	could	be	gained	through	 advancing	 a	 win-win	 situation,	 which	 is	 fully	 in	 line	 with	 maximal	national	interest.	Secondly,	the	efforts	of	the	2015	UK-China	cultural	year	and	its	
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cultural	 diplomatic	 efforts	 arguably	 gave	 both	 states	 a	 better	 opportunity	 to	communicate	and	strengthen	mutual	understanding.	The	UK	government	could	have	 chosen	 to	 focus	 on	 other	 states	 with	 significant	 potential	 investment	capacity,	but	the	UK	government	chose	China.	The	aforementioned	is	not	only	an	indicator	 of	 national	 interest	 but	 arguably	 also	 a	matter	 of	 state	 trust.	 The	UK	government	 firmly	 believes	 that	 the	 investment	 from	 China	 could	 achieve	 its	expectation	 and	 that	 the	 forthcoming	 investment	 results	 could	 be	 predicted.	Hence	 the	 UK	 government	 would	 proceed	 to	 enact	 and	 carry	 out	 benevolent	policies	towards	China.	 	However,	 the	 benevolent	 policy	 of	 interest	 here	 is	 a	 reciprocal	 arrangement,	which	needs	the	efforts	of	both	states’	actors	for	the	making	and	implementation	of	 these	 benevolent	 policies.	 If	 one	 of	 the	 state	 actors	 refuses	 to	 carry	 out	benevolent	policies	as	reciprocity	to	its	counterpart,	it	does	not	prove	that	there	is	no	state	trust	between	them,	but	one	could	assume	that	their	state	trust	level	is	relatively	lower.	For	example,	if	State	A	trusts	State	B,	then	State	A	would	carry	out	 and	 implement	 benevolent	 policies	 towards	 State	 B,	 but	 this	 would	 not	indicate	a	medium	level	of	state	trust	unless	State	B	also	does	the	similar	job	to	State	A,	or	at	the	very	least	positively	responds	to	State	A’s	proposals.	State	trust	does	emphasise	the	reciprocity	between	states,	therefore	with	both	states	having	put	 efforts	 into	 cultural	 diplomacy	 with	 the	 enacting	 and	 implementation	 of	benevolent	policies,	and	then	state	trust	can	be	thoroughly	examined.	In	Chapter	7,	it	will	examine	the	reciprocal	behaviours	between	China	and	the	UK.	
The	third	indicator,	the	favourable	orientation	of	policy	indicates	the	medium	level	of	state	trust.	Unlike	the	second	indicator,	which	mainly	focuses	on	the	benevolent	content	of	policies.	The	word	orientation	here	 refers	 to	 favourable	 trend	or	unfavourable	trend.	 The	 orientation	 of	 policies,	 for	 which	 it	 means	 within	 a	 relatively	 long	period,	 state	 actors	 carry	 out	 a	 collection	 of	 government	 strategies,	 policy	statements	 and	 committee	 reports	 that	 express	 the	 will	 of	 the	 respective	governments.	 A	 favourable	 trend	 can	 also	 be	 called	 a	 promising	 trend,	 which	means	a	trend	of	increasingly	benevolent	policies	over	a	long	period	of	time.	In	
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an	unfavourable	 trend,	 contrary	 to	 the	 favourable	 trend,	 state	 actors	 carry	out	increasingly	hostile	policies	towards	each	other	over	a	long	period	of	time.	With	an	unfavourable	trend,	it	cannot	be	said	that	there	is	no	state	trust	between	two	states,	but	it	is	highly	likely	to	be	harmful	to	their	trusting	relationship.	 	Another	 perspective	 might	 suggest	 that	 the	 favourable	 orientation	 of	 policies	could	also	be	 interpreted	as	a	way	of	creating	 trust	rather	 than	an	 indicator	of	existing	trust.	Without	a	doubt,	when	State	A	continuously	carries	out	beneficial	policies	towards	State	B,	this	behaviour	can	be	considered	as	an	effort	by	State	A	to	 create	 state	 trust.	 In	 this	 situation,	 State	 A’s	 beneficial	 policies	 can	 be	considered	 as	 a	way	 to	 demonstrate	 its	 good	will	 or	 friendly	 attitude	 towards	State	B,	in	order	to	create	state	trust.	However,	the	essence	of	the	orientation	of	policy	does	not	equal	one	single	policy	alone.	This	 lower	medium	level	of	state	trust	 cannot	 be	 examined	 simply	 on	 the	 enacting	 and	 implementation	 of	 one	particular	policy,	as	its	existence	or	otherwise	should	need	a	relatively	extended	period	 to	 be	 demonstrated.	 Whenever	 a	 state	 enacts	 and	 carries	 out	disadvantageous	 policy	 its	 counterpart;	 as	 a	 result,	 the	 other	 state	 may	 not	provide	any	reciprocity	in	return.	Hence,	state	trust	will	be	difficult	to	establish.	That	is	why	the	orientation	of	policies	with	favourable	trend	could	be	regarded	as	an	indicator	concerning	the	medium	level	of	state	trust.	 	




and	Northern	 Ireland.	 Another	 example	 that	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 a	 subsequent	chapter	 is	 the	 2015	 China-UK	Cultural	 Year	where	 both	 governments	 agree	 to	promote	bilateral	cultural,	economic	and	other	ties.	Some	scholars	contend	that	written	agreements	are	 thought	 to	be	a	signal	 that	partners	 are	 suspicious	 of	 one	 another	 (e.g.,	 Baier,	 1986;	 Zucker,	 1986).	 They	suggest	that	there	 is	no	need	to	publish	such	a	written	statement	 if	both	states	treat	each	other	as	mutually	trustworthy	partners.	One	further	argument	is	that	the	 reason	 why	 state	 actors	 agree	 beneficial	 or	 reciprocal	 rules	 that	 mainly	depends	 on	 the	 respective	 national	 interests.	 In	 short,	 they	 make	 agreements	because	they	believe	that	the	target	state	could	bring	significant	benefits	to	them	whether	 it	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 economic	 or	 military	 gain.	 Therefore,	 this	 is	 not	 an	indicator	of	sincere	trust	between	states.	 	 	As	it	has	been	emphasised	previously,	there	is	no	absolutely	sincere	trust	among	states	because	various	 factors	could	have	 the	potential	 influential	effect	on	 the	level	 of	 trust:	 for	 example,	 the	 respective	national	 interest,	 unexpected	 foreign	affairs	 occurring	 and	 so	 on.	However,	 the	 existence	 of	 state	 trust	 could	 not	 be	eliminated	with	 the	 production	 or	 otherwise	 of	 a	written	 document.	 Arguably,	this	 rule	 indicator	 is	 akin	 to	 the	 marriage	 certification:	 when	 both	 bride	 and	groom	 have	 already	 announced	 their	 sincere	 oath	 to	 each	 other	 and	 believed	that	they	could	trust	each	other.	In	spite	of	that,	they	still	need	the	certificate	to	protect	their	legal	rights.	Similarly,	states	will	consider	their	respective	national	interests	 carefully	 in	 addition	 to	 other	 relevant	 factors	 prior	 to	 the	 public	delivery	of	the	joint	statement.	 	The	existence	of	a	written	document	could	help	avoid	risk	between	states.	First,	with	statements	being	delivered	publicly,	most	states	are	not	likely	to	place	their	national	 image	 and	 reputation	 at	 risk.	 After	 all,	 states	 cannot	 behave	 like	 a	toddler	with	frequent	changes	of	their	political	and	diplomatic	attitudes	without	any	 specific	 reasons	 and	 notices.	 Second,	 written	 agreements	 provide	 state	actors	 an	 implementation	 tool.	 In	 general,	 those	 who	 are	 in	 charge	 of	implementing	agreements	are	not	usually	the	same	persons	that	negotiated	the	initial	agreements	or	contracts.	In	this	circumstance,	the	written	agreements	and	
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records	 are	 essential	 tools	 to	 enable	 the	 communication	 of	 rights	 and	responsibilities	 to	 those	 persons	who	 are	 required	 to	 implement	 or	 to	 comply	with	the	relevant	agreements.	Third,	written	agreements	could	act	as	a	pillar	of	support	 for	 state	 actors	 when	 there	 are	 unexpected	 changes,	 for	 example,	changes	in	office	holders.	At	the	organisational	level,	in	order	to	be	immune	from	personnel	 changes,	 it	 requires	written	 records	 for	 future	office	holders	 so	 that	they	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 reference	 after	 the	 principal	 negotiators	 have	 left	 their	positions	(Hoffman,	2002,	p.390).	As	 for	 the	 issue	 of	 rule	 breaking	 and	 how	 to	 lower	 the	 possibility	 of	 potential	risks,	 there	 are	 two	 kinds	 of	 agreements	 that	 could	 be	 applied.	 Hoffman	identifies	 two	 types	 of	 agreements:	 1.	 Framework-oriented	 agreements,	which	are	dominated	by	constitutive	rules	that	specify	the	basic	structure,	institutional	forms,	procedures	and	right,	and	these	‘constitutive	rules’	(Dessler,	1989)	create	and	define	legitimate	behaviour	between	parties.	2.	Statute-oriented	agreements,	which	 are	 dominated	 by	 specific	 codes	 that	 regulate	 the	 behaviour	 of	 actors	under	 particular	 circumstances	 (Hoffman,	 2002,	 p.391).	 State	 actors	 could	choose	one	or	two	of	these	after	they	have	evaluated	the	potential	risks	involved.	With	 respect	 to	 the	 discretionary	 option	 and	 possible	 leeway,	framework-oriented	agreements	could	offer	state	actors	some	additional	latitude	compared	to	statute-oriented	agreements	because	the	rules	that	it	is	dependent	on	to	define	the	modes	of	interaction	are	drafted	without	a	specified	time	frame	when	these	modes	must	be	employed.	By	contrast,	statute-oriented	agreements	are	similar	to	regulatory	rules,	which	create	specific	prohibitions	on	behaviour,	governing	 not	 only	 how	 state	 actors	 should	 behave	 but	 also	 when	 particular	behaviour	 ought	 to	 be	 undertaken	 (or	 avoided).	 Framework-oriented	agreements	 do	 tend	 to	 be	 more	 consistent	 with	 trusting	 relationships	 than	statute-oriented	 agreements.	 However,	 if	 state	 actors	 were	 to	 choose	statute-oriented	 agreements,	 this	 choice	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 there	 is	 no	 state	trust	between	them.	An	example	of	 this	 type	of	 framework-oriented	 agreement	with	 leeway	 can	be	seen	in	the	Mutual	Defence	Treaty	between	the	USA	and	the	Republic	of	Korea.	In	the	 first	 quarter	 of	 2017,	 USA	 has	 forged	 ahead	 with	 the	 positioning	 of	 the	
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THAAD	 missile	 defence	 system	 in	 South	 Korea	 in	 response	 to	 North	 Korea's	ballistic	missile	and	nuclear	 tests	 (Stewart	and	Ali,	2017).	Thousands	of	armed	forces	 of	 South	 Korea	 and	 USA	 started	 a	 military	 manoeuvre	 simulating	 an	all-out	 attack	 by	 North	 Korea.	 According	 to	 Article	 IV	 of	 the	 Mutual	 Defence	Treaty	Between	 the	United	 States	 and	 the	Republic	 of	Korea：‘the	Republic	 of	Korea	 grants,	 and	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America	 accepts,	 the	 right	 to	 dispose	United	States	land,	air	and	sea	forces	in	and	about	the	territory	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	as	determined	by	mutual	agreement’	(US	Department	of	State,	1954).	This	is	an	example	of	a	framework-oriented	rule	with	particular	leeway.	As	such,	‘it	is	an	 indication	 that	 in	 the	 current	 situation,	 the	 USA	 has	 a	 relatively	 higher	flexibility	 in	 the	 accommodation	 of	 their	 military	 personnel.	 South	 Korea	 also	allows	the	USA	to	deploy	 two	aircraft	carriers	group	around	Korean	Peninsula’	(Durden,	2017).	Without	discussing	the	merits	or	otherwise	regarding	the	USA’s	military	alliances,	the	action	of	South	Korea	is	a	demonstration	of	the	existence	of	state	trust.	If	South	Korea	does	not	trust	the	USA	and	considers	that	the	USA	may	 cause	 considerable	 damage	 to	 it	when	 their	military	personnel	 step	upon	the	territory	of	South	Korea,	it	could	seek	another	new	protective	solution	rather	than	 merely	 relying	 on	 the	 USA.	 This	 trust	 can	 also	 be	 linked	 to	 cultural	diplomacy.	 Since	 the	 21st	 Century,	 South	 Korea	 has	 started	 to	 explore	 the	potential	of	soft	power,	especially	in	the	area	of	cultural	diplomacy	(Kang,	2015,	p.433).	 In	 the	 past	 decades,	 South	 Korea	 has	 established	 a	 solid	 cultural	connection	with	 the	 USA,	 especially	 in	 the	 field	 of	 education.	With	 continuous	efforts,	the	cultural	relationship	between	these	two	states	has	been	strengthened.	State	trust	between	South	Korea	and	the	USA	cannot	be	completely	explained	by	the	efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy,	but	the	efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy	cannot	be	overlooked.	 		Another	possible	argument	worth	mentioning	here	 is	 that	 ‘does	state	 trust	still	exist	 if	 states	have	not	developed	any	 types	of	 rules	yet’.	This	 is	 rather	 rare	 in	international	 society	 today.	 Most	 states	 have	 political	 and	 diplomatic	connections,	 although	 some	 may	 never	 issue	 joint	 statement	 together.	 The	utilisation	of	just	one	indicator	so	as	to	judge	the	existence	of	state	trust	might	be	considered	 as	 biased	 because	 other	 indicators	 should	 be	 employed	 as	 well.	
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Perhaps	 this	particular	 indicator	 can	prove	 that	 the	 level	of	 state	 trust	has	not	quite	 reached	 the	 upper	 medium	 level,	 but	 other	 indicators	 may	 have	 the	capacity	 to	demonstrate	 the	 existence	of	 state	 trust.	Moreover,	with	 respect	 to	the	 relationship	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 state	 trust,	 it	 is	 not	 difficult	 to	understand	 the	 point:	 once	 a	 state	 initiates	 programs	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	towards	another	state	or	both	states	have	agreed	to	conduct	cultural	diplomacy	activities	 together,	 it	 is	 a	 common	 routine	 that	 they	 will	 publish	 a	 state-level	official	 statement,	 although	 there	 are	 other	 ways	 to	 announce	 agreements	without	a	written	document.	These	rules	thus	serve	as	a	reminder	for	both	states	to	 behave	 as	 they	 are	 laid	 down	 in	 the	 official	 statement.	 For	 instance,	 when	State	A	and	State	B	devote	efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy	to	each	other	and	they	usually	will	publish	a	 joint	statement	or	other	rules	with	 leeway.	Furthermore,	typically,	 the	content	of	 this	statement	primarily	 focuses	on	the	common	goals,	joint	 efforts	 of	 improvement	 as	well	 as	 other	 positive	 information	 rather	 than	merely	 a	 proposal	 of	 requirements	 or	 limitations	 to	 each	 other.	 In	 this	circumstance,	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 the	 upper	medium	 level	 of	 state	 trust	 exists	between	State	A	and	State	B.	 	
The	 fifth	 indicator,	 discretion	 in	 policy-making	 and	 its	 implementation	 is	 the	high-level	indicator	of	state	trust.		In	the	political	arena,	policies	could	be	regarded	as	the	nonverbal	expression	of	the	 will	 of	 a	 state,	 as	 well	 as	 serving	 as	 a	 guide	 to	 decisions	 for	 domestic	governments	 and	 other	 states	 so	 as	 to	 achieve	 some	 desirable	 outcomes.	In	consideration	for	measuring	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building,	cultural	policies	and	related	foreign	policies	could	not	be	neglected;	this	is	 particularly	 important	 in	 the	 process	 of	 policymaking	 and	 policy	implementation.	Due	to	the	fact	that	cultural	policies	and	related	foreign	policies	are	 meant	 to	 be	 the	 essential	 aspects	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 and	 it	 could	 be	regarded	as	the	potential	builder	of	state	trust;	it	can	then	be	known	that	there	is	a	 strong	 connection	 between	 policies	 and	 state	 trust.	Moreover,	 the	ways	 that	policies	 are	 made	 and	 implemented,	 especially	 when	 these	 are	 linked	 to	 the	
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discretionary	power,	is	considered	to	be	an	important	sign	in	the	examination	of	existing	state	trust.	 		Discretion	is	a	term	frequently	used	in	the	field	of	economy,	finance,	and	law;	it	is	seldom	 mentioned	 in	 the	 political	 arena,	 but	 except	 in	 the	 area	 of	 public	administration.	 For	 instance,	 in	macroeconomics,	 the	 discretionary	 policy	is	an	economic	 tool	based	 on	 the	judgment	 of	 policy	 makers	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	policy	 set	 by	 predetermined	 rules.	 For	 example,	 a	central	 banker	could	 make	decisions	on	interest	rates	on	a	case-by-case	basis	instead	of	allowing	a	fixed	rule	to	 determine	 interest	 rates	 or	 money	 supply	 (Dinga,	 Ionescu,	 and	 Padurean,	2010).	 In	 politics,	 the	 term	 discretion	matters	more	 with	 the	 aspect	 of	 public	administration	or	public	management,	grants	them	a	specific	scope	of	decision-	making	margins	 	Hoffman	puts	forward	his	view	towards	discretion	and	trust,	‘trusting	interstate	relationships	 emerge	when	 leaders	 believe	 their	 counterparts	 are	 trustworthy	and,	based	on	this	perception,	enact	policies	that	make	their	states	vulnerable	to	the	 actions	of	 their	 counterparts’	 (Hoffman,	2002,	p.376).	Hoffman	also	 argues	that	‘they	emerge	when	actors	leave	the	fate	of	their	interests	to	the	discretion	of	others	 with	 the	 expectation	 that	 those	 actors	 will	 honour	 their	 obligation	 to	avoid	 using	 their	 discretion	 in	 a	manner	 harmful	 to	 the	 first’	 (Hoffman,	 2002,	p.377).	 In	 accordance	with	Hoffman’s	 perspective,	 this	 definition	 suggests	 that	measuring	 trusting	 relationships	 involves	 two	 important	 parts:	 1)	 identifying	policies	 that	grant	other	 states	discretion	over	outcomes,	which	are	previously	controlled	by	 the	 first	 state,	and	2)	demonstrating	 that	 the	 leaders	 responsible	for	enacting	such	policies,	did	so	at	least	in	part,	because	they	believed	that	their	counterparts	were	trustworthy	(Hoffman,	2002,	p.376-377).	 		It	is	frequently	the	case	that	leaders	of	states	play	a	significant	role	in	this	kind	of	state	 trust	 relationship,	 as	 it	 involves	 connecting	 the	 perceptions	 of	 leaders	 to	their	 choice	 of	 policies.	 The	 relevant	 state	 leaders	 normally	 represent	 the	attitude	and	willingness	of	their	countries.	In	this	study,	however,	discretionary	power	is	not	limited	to	the	privilege	of	state	leaders,	but	it	can	also	be	used	as	a	favour	 between	 trusting	 states.	 While	 discretion	 is	 not	 compulsory,	 it	 is	
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considered	 to	be	necessary.	This	 is	because	 it	does	not	matter	how	precisely	a	policy	 is	 designed,	 there	 will	 always	 be	 the	 potential	 for	 unforeseen	circumstances	 to	 take	 place	 that	 might	 result	 in	 unfair	 outcomes	 requiring	further	 consideration.	 Here,	 I	 analyse	 the	 connection	 of	 policies	 and	discretionary	 power	 from	 two	 viewpoints	 to	 thereafter	 demonstrate	 the	existence	of	state	trust:	1.	discretionary	power	in	policy-making;	2.	discretionary	power	with	non-actions	in	policy-implementation.	 	 		1. Discretionary	power	in	policy-making	 	Discretionary	power	 in	policy-making	refers	 to	 the	power	or	right	 to	decide	or	act	for	a	state	in	policy-making;	it	is	particularly	of	importance	to	have	a	certain	amount	 of	 freedom	 to	 make	 policy.	 In	 the	 policy-making	 process,	 Boul	 and	Vaughan	 consider	 that	 ‘in	 a	 discretionary	 framework,	 policymakers	 have	wide	latitude	to	design	the	best	policy	response	to	the	given	circumstances’	(Boul	and	Vaughan,	 2003).	 Indeed,	 discretion	 in	 policy-making	 contains	 a	 relatively	 high	level	of	risks.	Hence,	most	state	actors	prefer	to	have	set	policy	rules	rather	than	grant	 discretionary	power	 to	 the	 counterpart	 in	 the	 long	 term.	Due	 to	 the	 fact	that	discretion	usually	involves	high	risks,	whenever	a	state	grants	discretionary	power	to	another	state	in	policy-making,	it	is	an	indication	of	their	high	level	of	state	trust.	 		Moreover,	 some	 scholars	 consider	 that	 ‘the	 level	 of	 discretion	 is	 higher	 when	criteria	for	meeting	standards	and	guidelines	are	vague,	and	when	exceptions	to	the	policy	are	tolerated’	(Mccubbins,	1985,	p.721;	Bawn,	1997,	p.101;	Balla,	1998,	p.663;	Torenvlied,	2000).	This	thesis	agrees	with	this	perspective.	Therefore,	the	level	of	state	trust	could	also	be	witnessed	from	the	level	of	discretion.	If	State	A	trusts	 State	 B,	 State	 A	will	 not	 come	 up	with	 any	 requirements	 or	 limitations	when	State	A	transfers	 its	authority	of	policymaking	to	State	B.	Furthermore,	 if	State	A	 and	 State	 B’s	 state	 trust	 level	 is	 high,	 then	 State	A	will	 allow	 State	 B’s	policymakers	 to	 exercise	 a	 lot	 more	 discretion	 in	 defining	 the	 contents	 of	relevant	policy.		
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Another	 potential	 scenario	 is	 that	 if	 State	 A	 grants	 the	 power	 of	 discretion	 in	policy	making	to	state	B,	but	there	is	a	disagreement	between	State	A	and	State	B	in	terms	of	the	policy	made	by	State	B.	In	this	situation,	State	B’s	behaviour	might	not	destroy	the	trusting	relationship	with	State	A	as	other	factors	influence	state	trust,	 such	 as	 military	 resources,	 economic	 cooperation,	 etc.	 However,	 it	 may	bring	 in	 a	 relatively	 negative	 atmosphere	 and	 heavily	 impact	 their	 trusting	relationship.	 		In	summary,	if	State	A	grants	the	discretion	on	foreign	policies	to	State	B	when	it	transfers	the	capacity	to	determine	the	relevant	political	outcomes	to	State	B,	in	this	situation,	 it	can	be	said	that	State	A	trusts	State	B.	 If	 the	discretion	 level	 is	high,	 it	 can	be	 said	 that	 state	 trust	between	State	A	and	State	B	 is	higher	 than	usual	 when	 compared	 with	 other	 states	 without	 discretion-granting	 policies.	State	A	will	not	be	too	worried	about	the	political	outcome	if	State	B	may	carry	out	unfavourable	policies	towards	State	A	in	the	future.	This	is	why	discretionary	power	in	policy-making	could	be	regarded	as	an	indicator	of	a	high	level	existing	state	trust.	2. Discretion	with	non-actions	in	policy-implementation.	 	 	During	 the	 process	 of	 policy-implementation,	 as	 states	 encounter	 unexpected	factors	 which	may	 influence	 the	 pre-determined	 policies,	 discretionary	 power	can	fill	up	the	holes	and	gaps	 in	policies	where	state	trust	exists	between	state	actors.	 Usually,	 discretionary	 aspects	 in	 policy-implementation	 can	 be	 divided	into	two	words:	actions	and	non-actions.	As	Heyman	argues,	‘discretion	involves	not	only	decisions	about	when,	on	whom,	and	on	what	legal	grounds	to	act	but	also	decisions	about	when	and	on	whom	not	to	act’	(Heyman,	2009,	p.370).	The	term	‘non-action’	used	here	means	having	no	intention	of	bringing	punitive	law	enforcement	to	bear	in	a	particular	situation.	That	is,	it	means	there	is	no	specific	action,	but	it	requires	a	definitive	decision	of	some	sort	at	the	organisational	or	official	 level,	 even	 if,	 in	many	 cases,	 the	 reasons	 for	 not	 enforcing	 the	 law	 are	taken	for	granted	(Heyman,	2009,	p.372-373).	 		 	
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For	example,	if	State	A	finds	out	that	some	of	State	B’s	behaviour	seems	to	break	or	has	already	broken	 their	agreement,	 then	State	A	has	 two	choices.	Firstly,	 it	might	choose	non-actions	in	this	case.	State	A	might	turn	a	blind	eye	to	State	B’s	improper	behaviour	and	does	not	require	State	B	to	completely	adhere	to	their	agreed	rules,	as	State	A	believes	that	State	B	would	not	betray	their	relationship	even	though	State	B’s	behaviour	is	considered	to	be	improper.	In	this	situation,	state	trust	is	supposed	to	exist	between	State	A	and	State	B.	Alternatively,	State	A	might	 choose	 actions.	 In	 this	 case,	 State	A	might	 issue	 a	warning	 to	 State	B	or	even	break	the	relationship	with	State	B,	as	State	B	has	the	potential	to	betray	or	has	already	betrayed	State	A.	Withdrawing	discretionary	power	 in	 this	manner	indicates	a	decrease	in	state	trust.	It	might	bring	some	negative	influences	on	the	status	quo,	and	damage	future	state	trust	building.	 	 	 		Discretion	 in	 policy-making	 and	 policy-implementation	 can	 be	 illustrated	 by	China	setting	its	first	naval	base	in	Djibouti	(Panda,	2017).	China	is	not	the	first	country	 to	 establish	 a	 naval	 base	 in	 Djibouti:	 the	 USA	 and	 Japan	 have	 already	built	 naval	 bases	 there	 before	 China.	 Some	 scholars	 and	 journalists	 argue	 that	China	just	wants	to	change	its	role	as	resource	extractor	in	Africa	(Dubé,	2016).	However,	Djibouti	 still	 allows	China	 to	 set	up	 the	naval	base	 in	 its	 territory.	 In	comparison	with	 the	 related	naval	base	 situations	of	 Japan	and	 the	USA,	 Japan	needs	to	pay	$30	million	per	annum	and	has	to	share	the	base	with	the	USA.	In	addition,	both	 Japan	and	 the	USA	are	only	offered	a	 limited	number	of	military	personnel	to	accommodate	within	the	bases.	By	comparison,	China	only	needs	to	pay	 $20	million	 per	 annum	 but	 enjoys	 the	 utilisation	 of	 a	 full	 naval	 base	 (Xi,	2016).	 Furthermore,	 according	 to	 the	 news	 report,	 the	 Foreign	 Minister	 of	Djibouti,	 Mahamoud	 Ali	 Youssouf	 states	 that	 there	 is	 no	 exact	 limit	 to	 the	number	of	Chinese	military	personnel	on	the	base	(Xi,	2016).	 		It	 is	 apparent	 that	 in	 consideration	 of	 this	 particular	 case,	 Djibouti	 offers	 a	privileged	 policy	 to	 China.	 If	 the	 intention	 of	 Djibouti	 is	 mere	 to	 obtain	 a	profitable	 outcome	 from	 the	 naval	 base	 setting,	 Djibouti	 could	 choose	 to	cooperate	with	Japan	and	USA,	because	they	pay	$10	million	more	per	year	each	than	what	is	being	paid	by	China.	Instead,	Djibouti	offers	China	a	very	good	deal,	
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because	China	is	consistently	helping	Djibouti	to	develop	the	construction	of	its	infrastructure	 in	recent	decades.	Additionally,	 there	 is	arguably	positive	 impact	of	cultural	diplomacy.	China	has	increased	its	cultural	export	to	African	countries	and	 also	 helped	 Chinese	 enterprises	 to	 know	more	 about	 African	 culture.	 For	example,	since	1986,	China	started	to	devote	more	cultural	efforts	into	the	aspect	of	 the	 education	 of	 Djibouti.	 China	 has	 continuously	 provided	 scholarships	 for	Djiboutian	 students	 and	 arranged	 cultural	 projects	 there.	 Currently,	 there	 are	about	 70	 Djiboutian	 students	 of	 scholarship	 and	 approximately	 200	 private	students	 studying	 in	 China	 (Embassy	 of	 Djibouti	 in	 China,	 2017).	 As	 a	 result,	Chinese	staffs	have	learned	how	to	respect	 local	culture,	how	to	avoid	common	misunderstanding	and	offer	respect	to	local	people.	Efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy	help	both	 states	 to	 know	each	other	well	 and	 lay	 out	 the	 foundations	 in	 other	aspects.	 		In	 consideration	of	 this	 case,	 state	 trust	 appears	 to	 exist	between	Djibouti	 and	China.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Djibouti	 is	 implicitly	 trusting	 that	 military	 personnel	from	China	would	not	 intervene	 in	 its	domestic	affairs	and	perhaps	could	even	help	 to	 protect	 its	 national	 interest:	 for	 instance,	 monitoring	 the	 merchant	vessels	 passing	 the	 Bab	 el-Mandeb	 Strait,	 for	 naval	 refuelling	 and	 restocking	(Manson,	 2016).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 China	 also	 has	 sufficient	 trust	 in	Djibouti,	relying	on	it	not	to	allow	Japan	and	USA	to	interfere	with	the	Chinese	naval	base.	It	 is	 significant	 that	 Djibouti	 government	 has	 required	 that	 existing	 military	personnel	from	the	USA	to	relocate	from	the	north	to	the	south,	hence,	the	USA	has	to	share	that	area	with	Japan.	As	an	indication	of	mutual	trust	between	states,	Djibouti	offers	China	the	discretionary	power	to	deal	with	its	maritime	issues.	 	 	 	 		It	 is	quite	crucial	that	with	respect	to	the	issues	of	whether	to	act	or	not	to	act,	the	consideration	of	granting	discretionary	power	 to	another	state	 is	supposed	to	be	a	cornerstone	in	the	examination	of	their	state	trust	level.	If	a	State	chooses	the	option	of	non-actions	with	another	state,	then	their	state	trust	is	supposed	to	exist	 at	 a	 high	 level.	 According	 to	 the	 previous	 analysis	 about	 discretionary	power,	this	type	of	state	trust	is	considered	to	be	higher	than	others.	Of	course,	we	cannot	be	absolutely	sure	that	there	is	no	state	trust	between	states	if	they	do	
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not	provide	each	other	discretionary	power	 in	policy-making.	However,	 if	 they	do	 provide	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 discretionary	 power	 in	 policy-making,	 their	 state	trust	should	be	considered	to	be	at	a	high	level.		
4.3	Obstacles	of	Cultural	Diplomacy	in	State	Trust	Building	If	cultural	diplomacy	is	as	important	for	trust	building	among	states	as	so	many	scholars	 and	 politicians	 claim,	 then	 additionally,	 state	 trust	 could	 become	 the	means	to	avoid	some	kinds	of	conflicts	and	misunderstanding;	why	shouldn’t	be	the	case	 for	each	state	 to	put	 cultural	diplomacy	at	 the	 top	of	 the	 state	policy?	The	explanation	proposed	in	this	chapter	is	that	trust	is	difficult	to	be	built	and	then	once	built,	it	is	far	from	straightforward	to	maintain.	Moreover,	a	variety	of	cultures	 in	 existence	 is	 quite	 difficult	 to	 be	 recognised	 and	 to	 be	 respected,	 in	particular	for	those	states	with	long-standing	grudges	between	them.	Therefore,	X	 main	 obstacle	 concerning	 the	 aspect	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 that	 is	 likely	 to	hinder	the	building	process	and	maintenance	of	state	trust	could	be	concluded	as	follows:	Firstly,	 the	 difficulty	 concerning	 the	 existence	 of	 misunderstanding	 and	confusion--what	state	trust	is	and	how	can	it	be	applied	to	the	state	operation	via	cultural	diplomacy.	Currently,	one	of	the	most	difficult	issues	is	that	the	concept	of	state	trust	in	this	thesis	has	not	been	recognised	and	formalised	well	in	both	academic	and	political	fields.	To	put	it	in	another	way,	there	is	almost	no	mature	system	 of	 recognition	 and	 measurable	 practical	 results	 regarding	 this	 kind	 of	state	 trust.	 In	Chapter	Three,	 the	definition	of	 state	 trust	has	been	 formulated,	but	for	the	observation	of	any	expected	result,	there	is	still	a	paucity	of	sufficient	studies.	 Furthermore,	 if	 the	 state	 government	 holds	 the	 opinion	 that	 cultural	diplomacy	is	a	means	of	“brainwashing”,	which	may	have	a	dramatic	impact	and	effective	control	on	the	minds	of	their	people,	then	state	trust	building	could	not	be	 established	 and	 even	 the	 previously	 established	 state	 trust	 level	 might	encounter	terrible	damage	as	a	result.	 		Secondly,	the	difficulty	about	if	one	state	is	not	aware	of	the	importance	of	joint	effort,	then	state	trust	will	not	be	formed	as	expected.	State	trust	building	is	an	
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to	 attain	 certain	 political	 or	 economic	 goals,	 while	 State	 B	 considers	 that	 this	kind	of	 cooperation	 could	not	 conceivably	 attain	 the	 level	 as	 State	A	 expected.	Then	the	problem	will	appear:	as	the	expectation	is	higher,	State	A	tends	to	care	a	 lot	 more	 about	 the	 process	 as	 well	 as	 the	 implementation,	 the	 likely	 result	would	be	a	lot	more	frequent	and	intense	conflicts	with	State	B.	Therefore,	how	to	find	appropriate	balance	for	the	results	of	state	trust	building	through	cultural	diplomacy	is	an	arduous	and	a	delicate	task.	 		Fifthly,	the	difficulty	about	how	to	combine	the	efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy	with	economic	 development	 and	 political	 stability	 in	 a	 better	 way.	 Actually,	 it	 is	 a	common	 problem	 that	 is	 in	 existence	 among	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 states.	 The	nature	 of	 the	 relations	 among	 culture	 framework,	 economic	 development	 and	political	stability	remains	an	open	question	 for	debate.	However,	Leiner	argues	that	 in	 accordance	 with	 historical	 and	 sociological	 research,	 especially	cross-cultural	studies,	 they	demonstrate	 that	 these	realms	cannot	be	separated	(Leiner,	 2010).	 Cultural	 diplomacy,	 with	 its	 invisible	 impact	 as	 well	 as	 some	surprising	 elements	 of	 unintended	 consequences,	 do	 tend	 to	 push	 some	 states	towards	their	preferred	choice	on	other	controllable	ways	 in	order	to	maintain	its	political	 stability.	Currently,	most	states	have	recognised	 the	great	potential	power	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 its	 influence	 on	 both	 economic	 and	 political	field.	However,	when	compared	with	a	number	of	efforts	in	cultural	diplomacy,	it	is	 particularly	 the	 case	 in	 the	 developing	 countries	 that	 most	 of	 them	 devote	more	 in	 the	 aspect	 of	 economic	 development	 and	 infrastructure	 construction.	For	these	countries,	the	potential	of	cultural	diplomacy	may	not	be	explored	well	in	state	trust	building.	 	 	 		
4.4 Factors	that	are	influential	on	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	
state	trust	building	 	In	 both	 academic	 and	 political	 areas,	 a	 growing	 number	 of	 scholars	 and	politicians	are	focusing	on	the	relationship	of	cultural	diplomacy	and	trust.	Most	of	 them	 merely	 talk	 about	 this	 relationship	 superficially	 while	 neglecting	 the	issues	 concerning	 the	 practical	 actions	 on	 solving	 the	 problem	 of	 how	 to	 use	culture	as	a	powerful	means	so	as	 to	 foster	state	 trust	building.	To	 the	current	
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academic	 field,	 it	 is	 a	 crucial	 issue	 in	 measuring	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	diplomacy.	 As	 it	 has	 been	 commonly	 agreed,	 cultural	 diplomacy	 requires	 a	relatively	 long	 period	 to	 demonstrate	 its	 effectiveness.	 For	 example,	 based	 on	Richard	 T.	 Arndt’s	 argument,	 ‘cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 a	 cost-effective	 practice	considering	 its	 outcomes	 and	 impacts	 on	 international	 ties	 between	 countries’	(Arndt,	2005,	p.75).	The	remainder	of	this	chapter	reflects	on	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 state	 trust.	High-level	 effectiveness	 could	create	or	increase	the	level	of	state	trust.	If	cultural	diplomacy	lacks	effectiveness,	then	state	trust	would	not	emerge	or	would	decrease.	In	this	chapter,	I	combine	the	main	components	of	cultural	diplomacy	as	well	as	the	indicators	of	existing	state	trust	and	I	also	suggest	that	five	key	factors	that	can	provide	effectiveness	in	state	trust	building:	
The	first	factor,	the	content	of	cultural	policies	and	foreign	policies.		As	elaborated	above,	the	orientation	of	policy	in	inter-state	relations	can	indicate	the	existence	of	state	trust	or	otherwise.	The	content	of	specific	cultural	policies	and	 foreign	 policies,	 in	 turn,	 influence	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	One	example	 can	be	 seen	 in	visa	 regimes.	Legitimate	 travellers	are	often	 faced	with	cumbersome,	lengthy	and	costly	visa	procedures,	 in	particular	for	persons	who	need	to	participate	 in	the	cultural	diplomatic	programs.	Sophisticated	visa	procedures	tend	to	delay	their	scheduled	arrangement	and	lower	the	efficiency	of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	While	 flexible	 or	 liberal	 visa	 policy	 of	 a	 state	 that	 could	shorten	and	simplify	procedures	so	as	to	actively	promote	the	culture	of	a	state	on	the	world	stage.	Smarter	visa	policies	will	facilitate	the	operation	of	cultural	diplomacy,	such	as	the	business	visiting	of	related	staffs,	travelling	of	the	artists	and	other	 cultural	 exchange	programs.	Those	 foreign	policy	 rules	 that	 support	and	encourage	cultural	export	and	import	are	a	channel	for	boosting	the	national	image	 of	 a	 state	 abroad	 and	 attaining	 “soft	 power”.	 It	 is	 also	 a	 reciprocal	 path	that	 could	 improve	 mutual	 understanding	 of	 each	 other	 as	 well	 as	 build	 or	strengthen	 the	 trusting	 relationship.	 Moreover,	 it	 could	 also	 create	 other	beneficial	 opportunities	 for	 both	 states,	 for	 example,	 the	 attraction	 for	 more	
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tourists,	 businesspersons,	 researchers,	 students,	 artists	 and	 cultural	professionals.		However,	in	the	area	of	international	politics,	foreign	and	cultural	policy	are	not	simply	 determined	 by	 good	wishes	 or	 economic	 benefits,	 but	 also	 by	military,	security	 and	 other	 issues	 related	 to	 national	 interests	 as	 well.	 Here,	 a	 recent	illustration	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 diplomatic	 row	 concerning	 the	 relationship	between	China	and	South	Korea	in	2016.	In	recent	years,	China	and	the	Republic	of	 Korea	 have	 already	 managed	 to	 hold	 a	 number	 of	 cultural	 events.	 Many	musical	artists,	groups,	and	actors	from	the	ROK	regularly	travel	to	China,	which	can	 be	 considered	 as	 the	 most	 profitable	 entertainment	 market	 for	 the	 ROK.	However,	in	2016,	those	pop	stars	of	the	ROK	appear	to	have	become	unwitting	pawns	 in	 an	 escalating	 diplomatic	 spat	 between	 Seoul	 and	 Beijing	 over	 the	deployment	 of	 an	 American	 missile	 defence	 system.	 The	 political	 tension	between	 China	 and	 the	 ROK	 has	 flooded	 into	 the	 entertainment	 industry,	resulting	 in	 the	 ban	 of	 movies,	 dramas	 and	 variety	 shows	 from	 the	 ROK.	 Pop	stars	 from	 the	 ROK	 have	 already	 been	 edited	 out	 of	 various	 kinds	 of	entertainment	issues	in	China.	According	to	a	commentator,	 ‘even	though	there	have	 been	 no	 written	 bans	 from	 [the]	 administration,	 an	article	by	 the	International	 Business	 Times	 reports	 that	 ban	 orders	were	 passed	 verbally	 by	the	officials	from	the	State	Administration	of	Press,	Publication,	Radio,	Film	and	Television’(Karen,	2016).	 		In	response,	At	the	same	time,	on	the	side	of	the	ROK,	the	authorities	have	taken	measures	 to	ban	Chinese	 tourists	 for	 entering	 Jeju	 Island	 in	 the	ROK	as	 a	kind	of	’reciprocity’	to	the	actions	of	the	Chinese	government.	According	to	a	report	in	Beijing	Times,	‘the	tourists	were	held	at	Jeju	airport,	prevented	from	entering	the	island.	Jeju	immigration	officials	reportedly	kept	the	Chinese	visitors	in	a	room	at	the	airport,	where	they	were	waiting	for	flights	to	return	them	to	China’	(Wang,	2016).	 Although	 currently,	 there	 is	 no	 research	 data	 showing	 that	 state	 trust	between	China	and	the	ROK	has	decreased	or	otherwise,	the	behaviours	of	both	states	have	already	triggered	unpleasant	public	reactions.	 		
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A	 lesson	 can	 be	 learnt	 from	 this	 case	 that	 the	 content	 of	 cultural	 policies	 and	foreign	 policies,	 including	 any	 verbal	 statements,	 could	 influence	 the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy;	just	like	a	chain	reaction,	state	trust	building	could	occasionally	be	affected	by	some	adverse	events.	Other	issues	in	the	aspect	of	trade,	education,	and	retail	industry	have	already	become	the	unwitting	tools	in	 a	 political	 brinkmanship.	 Moreover,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 public	 could	 not	completely	figure	out	what	is	behind	the	reality	and	what	is	the	consideration	of	the	states.	Misunderstanding	and	conflicts	are	emerging	among	the	public.	Those	frictions	have	caused	certain	degrees	of	damage	on	the	cultural	relationships	and	diplomatic	relationships	between	states.	 		
The	 Second	 factor,	 the	 clearly	 defined	 social	 roles,	 formal	 contract	 and	well-established	obligations	between	states.		In	 accordance	with	 the	 discussion	 in	 Chapter	 Three,	 Tonkiss	 argues	 that	 trust	tends	 to	be	a	kind	of	 feeling	established	on	 the	privacy	and	confidential	 issues	and	 ‘tends	 to	 be	 based	 on	 clearly	 defined	 social	 roles,	 formal	 contract	 or	well-established	obligations’	(Tonkiss,	2014a);	those	of	which	can	be	regarded	as	the	 parts	 of	 normative	 system.	 Under	 the	 framework	 of	 settled	 normative	system,	state	actors	might	be	able	to	align	with	the	trustworthy	partners	when	they	gradually	get	to	know	each	other	through	cultural	diplomacy;	therefore,	as	a	consequence,	 they	 might	 be	 able	 to	 move	 together	 closer	 and	 closer	 to	 their	common	 goals,	 the	 real	 mutual	 interests	 they	 expect	 with	 strong	 solidarity	among	 trustworthy	 state	 actors.	 Hence,	 both	 states	 need	 to	 ensure	 that	 their	programs	of	 cultural	diplomacy	 could	be	 correctly	 and	precisely	guided	by	 the	clearly	 defined	 social	 roles,	 formal	 contract,	 and	 well-established	 obligations.	Additionally,	 according	 to	 the	 argument	 of	 Frédérique	 Six	 with	 aspect	 to	 the	methodology	of	trust	building	(Six	and	Verhoest,	2017),	 in	order	to	consolidate	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	towards	state	trust	building,	state	actors	could	not	neglect	five	points	as	follows:	firstly,	suspend	opportunistic	behaviour	in	the	implementation	process	of	cultural	diplomacy;	secondly,	stimulate	system	resonance,	 or	 create	 a	 trust-enhancing	 organisational	 context;	 thirdly,	 send	positive	cultural	relational	signals	and	avoid	negative	cultural	relational	signals	
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through	 cultural	 diplomacy;	 fourthly,	 strengthen	 the	 state	 cultural	communication	 and	 interaction	 with	 other	 state	 actors;	 fifthly,	 open	 the	 civil	society	 to	 social	 and	 cultural	 influence	 and	 learn	 about	 trustworthiness	 from	other	state	actors.		
The	third	factor,	the	quality	of	cultural	diplomatic	programs.		With	respect	to	the	cultural	policies	and	foreign	policies	of	a	state,	as	more	and	more	states	join	the	tide	to	promote	their	cultures	on	the	world	stage,	what	type	of	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs	 could	 engage	 more	 attention	 from	 foreign	audiences	and	be	beneficial	to	state	trust	building?	In	reply	to	this	question,	not	only	 the	 content,	 but	 the	 quality	 of	 these	 programs	 is	 an	 essential	 element	 of	their	 efficiency.	 Most	 obviously,	 the	 quality	 of	 a	 cultural	 diplomacy	 program	depends	on	whether	it	 is	going	through	as	planned.	Good	quality	programs	can	successfully	 manage	 cultural	 variables	 and	 meet	 expectations,	 develop	 the	cultural	 strength	 of	 a	 state	 with	 mutual	 understanding,	 and	 be	 able	 to	 offer	appropriate	 responses	 to	 different	 cultures.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 cultural	diplomatic	programs	of	inferior	quality	might	damage	the	existing	state	trust	or	have	an	adverse	impact	on	state	trust	building	in	the	foreseeable	future:	 		Firstly,	a	state	is	likely	to	have	reduced	cultural	advantages	when	compared	with	high-quality	 cultural	programs	given	by	other	 states.	 Inferior	quality	programs	are	usually	in	need	of	systematic	planning,	the	dedicated	arrangement	of	cultural	content,	efficient	implementation,	etc.	All	these	issues	might	have	direct	negative	influences	on	the	cultural	advantages	of	a	state	and	might	have	crucial	possibility	in	 turn	 advantages	 into	 disadvantages.	 For	 example,	 assuming	 that	 if	 foreign	audiences	compare	the	high-quality	cultural	programs	with	the	inferior	ones,	in	the	 future,	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 join	 in	 with	 the	 better	 programs	 and	 ignore	 the	inferior	 ones.	 Programs	 of	 inferior	 quality	 could	 not	 help	 them	 to	 understand	other	 cultures	 clearly	 and	may	 even	 gradually	 lead	 foreign	 audiences	 to	 have	reduced	 interest	 in	 learning	 about	 that	 particular	 culture.	 Without	 a	 better	cultural	 communication	 and	 understanding,	 it	 would	 be	 quite	 difficult	 to	strengthen	state	trust	building	between	the	respective	states.	 	
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	Secondly,	inferior	quality	programs	might	lead	to	misunderstanding,	for	instance,	by	mishandling	a	language	barrier,	which	is	a	common	problem	that	exists	in	the	inferior	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs.	 Different	 languages	 within	communication	are	akin	to	a	process	of	coding	and	decoding	of	messages,	even	if	they	were	to	share	a	common	language,	sometimes	simple	semantic	usage	can	go	wrong	 as	 well.	 Being	 able	 to	communicate	 effectively	in	 a	 foreign	 language	requires	 a	 deep	understanding	 of	 slang,	 sarcasm,	 sense	 of	 humour	 and	 jargon.	Especially,	 knowledge	 of	 a	 language	 does	 not	 automatically	 give	 you	 the	background	 information	 of	 which	 native	 speakers	 may	 assume	 that	 you	 are	aware.	In	addition,	words	do	not	always	need	to	be	translated	from	one	language	to	the	other	in	a	clear	one-to-one	basis;	even	the	same	English	wording	may	have	different	meanings	 to	 people	 from	 various	 cultures.	 Such	 language	 differences	may	be	ignored	in	an	inferior	program.	This	problem	may	lead	foreign	audiences	to	 the	 situation	 of	misunderstanding	 and	 confusion.	 It	 is	 quite	 clear	 that	 there	are	many	points	in	the	cultural	diplomacy	process	where	the	communication	can	break	down.	It	would	become	a	nightmare	if	a	state	could	not	ensure	the	quality	of	 its	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs,	 which	 might	 generate	 more	misunderstandings	 afterwards.	 Therefore,	 the	 quality	 of	 cultural	 diplomatic	programs	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	 one	 of	 the	 factors	 with	 influences	 on	 the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building.	 		
The	 fourth	 factor,	 coordination	 among	 other	 institutions	 within	 and	 across	states.	 		Good	 coordination	 is	 necessary	 for	 ensuring	 quality,	 content,	 and	 delivery	 of	cultural	diplomatic	programs.	This	applies	in	particular	in	the	coordination	with	the	 respective	 departments	 of	 the	 partner	 state;	 then	 the	 quality	 of	 cultural	diplomatic	 programs	 could	 be	 more	 or	 less	 guaranteed.	 Therefore,	 how	 to	coordinate	 policy	 among	 departments	 of	 government	 and	 other	 institutions	 is	quite	 crucial	 to	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 state	 trust	 building.	Such	 coordination	 takes	 place	 first	 in	 a	 proposal	 period	 and	 then	 in	 a	 policy	implementation	period.	
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	In	 the	 policy	 proposal	 period,	 government	 departments	 normally	 have	 the	essential	 expertise	 in	 their	 domains	 to	 prepare	 policy	 suggestions.	 However,	most	policies	involve	varies	issues	cutting	across	the	domains	of	more	than	one	department;	 this	 increases	 the	 difficulties	 of	 coordination.	 Furthermore,	 in	 the	policy	 implementation	 period,	 technical	 expertise	may	 not	 be	 sufficient	 in	 any	one	 department	 but	 may	 depend	 on	 joint	 efforts	 of	 different	 departments	 to	enable	the	efficient	working	of	the	various	tasks	towards	a	cooperative	program	of	cultural	diplomacy.	 		The	 common	 problem	 that	 exists	 in	 both	 periods	 is	 disorder	 in	 coordination,	which	can	be	reflected	in	the	following	aspects:		Firstly,	 it	 is	 quite	 difficult	 for	 different	 departments	 to	 reach	 consensus	 and	conduct	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs	 abroad.	 The	 program	 could	 not	 run	 as	smoothly	as	expected	if	there	is	no	agreement	between	the	various	departments.	Conflict	 will	 inevitably	 take	 place	 when	 two	 different	 groups	 have	 competing	goals	 or	disagreed	opinions.	Any	disagreement	might	disrupt	 the	 flow	of	work	with	 impacts	 upon	 efficiency	 and	productivity.	 Furthermore,	 this	might	 not	 be	the	 only	 issue	 leading	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 but	 it	 can	 have	 an	influence	on	other	disputes,	such	as	the	cooperation	in	other	areas.		Secondly,	lack	of	certainty	about	behavioural	issues	may	hamper	coordination.	It	is	a	matter	of	the	comprehensive	strength	of	a	state	as	well	as	the	officers’	acting	style	 of	 that	 state.	 A	 state	 with	 higher	 comprehensive	 strength	 will	 typically	adhere	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 agreed	 policies,	 while	 a	 state	 with	 inferior	comprehensive	 strength	 may	 have	 overestimated	 its	 capacity	 to	 conduct	 a	successful	 cultural	 diplomatic	 program.	 Governmental	 officers	 are	 another	source	 of	 certainty.	 Take	 the	 officials	 of	 China	 and	 the	 UK	 as	 an	 example,	different	cultures	cultivate	unique	styles,	 just	 like	the	old	Chinese	saying,	“each	place	nurtures	its	own	inhabitants”.	The	UK’s	government	officers	prefer	making	detailed	plans	before	activities	 and	 then	 follow	 through	with	 the	decided	plan.	Chinese	government	officers	by	contrary	tend	to	make	a	general	or	macro	plan	
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The	fifth	factor,	existing	mistrust	and	conflictual	issues	between	states	 		Most	disputes	usually	arise	when	the	communication	or	interaction	among	state	actors	 break	 down	 or	 when	 there	 is	 a	 misunderstanding	 in	 existence	 among	them.	 Unlike	 the	 methods	 of	 hard	 power,	 taking	 cultural	 measures	 to	 solve	disputes	 would	 be	 an	 infinitely	 better	 method	 to	 prevent	 the	 complete	breakdown	of	rational,	normal	relationship	between	states.	If	these	problematic	issues	 cannot	 be	 resolved,	 they	 will	 inevitably	 influence	 the	 effectiveness	 of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building.	Tough	issues	might	be	resolved	when	effective	and	constructive	communication	is	restored,	and	then	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	would	be	increased.	 		A	 typical	 example	 in	 the	 political	 arena	 is	 the	 Sino-Japan	 relationship.	 Due	 to	some	 significant	 and	 highly	 emotionally	 charged	 historical	 reasons,	 these	 two	states	have	a	lot	of	serious	disputes,	such	as	the	issue	of	distorting	history	in	the	textbooks	of	Japan,	sovereignty	problems	of	Diaoyu	Islands	and	other	historical	issues	including	the	events	during	the	second	world	war.	If	these	disputes	could	not	be	resolved	in	a	calm	and	rational	way,	then	these	kinds	of	national	emotions	with	 detestation	 and	 resentment	 within	 the	 civil	 societies	 of	 China	 and	 Japan	might	be	evoked	and	maintained.	In	addition,	existing	issues	of	conflict	between	them	 might	 be	 multiplied	 with	 further	 exaggeration,	 and	 then	 the	 current	conflicts	would	 still	 be	 there	 gradually	 getting	out	 of	 hand	while	new	 conflicts	are	likely	to	start	to	appear	in	abundance	as	though	the	Pandora’s	box	is	opened.		As	for	this	factor,	if	the	mistrust	or	conflictual	issues	are	not	quite	serious,	then	reconciling	 cultural	 dilemmas	 might	 be	 an	 effective	 linchpin	 to	 increase	 the	effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 state	 trust	 building.	 It	 is	 not	 a	 strange	phenomenon	 that	 states	 will	 surely	 come	 across	 diverse	 cultures	 in	 the	international	society.	Trompenaars	and	Hampden-Turner	once	propose	a	model	that	 can	be	 used	 to	 reconcile	what	 appear	 to	 be	 values	 that	 conflict	with	 each	other	in	the	business	context	(Trompenaars	and	Hampden-Turner,	1993,	p.153).	However,	 some	points	of	Trompenaars	could	be	used	 in	 the	context	of	cultural	
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NEXT	STAGE	1	 Reaffirm	the	commitment	to	the	ongoing	relationship	and	its	benefit	to	both	parties	 Think	‘win-win’	and	concentrate	on	the	benefits	of	collaboration	towards	each	culture	2	 Recognise	the	differences	of	cultures	 	 Develop	a	global	mindset	Legitimise	diversity	
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Acquire	knowledge	of	other	culture	Display	‘acceptance’	when	appropriate	 	3	 Continue	by	searching	for	similarities	 Employ	dialogue	4	 Synthesize	the	solutions	or	create	outcomes	which	utilise	the	most	appropriate	elements	of	the	opposing	cultural	dimensions	 	
Practice	creative	thinking	Demonstrate	a	willingness	to	learn	Dialogue	5	 Review	the	learning	process,	capture	it,	and	make	it	available	for	the	future.	 Practice	experience-based	learning	 	Articulate	what	has	been	seen	and	known	Act	on	learning	at	a	later	stage.	 	
Table	6.	Framework	for	the	reconciliation	of	cross-cultural	conflict	Source	from:	(Estienne,	1997)		When	applying	 this	 reconciliation	model	 into	 the	context	at	 the	 state	 level,	 the	first	 mandatory	 stage	 should	 involve	 the	 commitment	 of	 both	 states	 so	 as	 to	develop	 their	 cultural	 resonance	 and	 then	 proceed	 to	 build	 state	 trust	 or	maintain	the	level	of	state	trust.	After	that,	both	states	should	carefully	search	for	the	 existing	 cultural	 differences	 and	 similarities.	 In	 this	 process,	 efforts	 of	cultural	 diplomacy	would	 facilitate	mutual	 cultural	 understanding	 among	 state	actors,	and	then	play	a	positive	role	in	state	trust	building.	 	 		
The	sixth	factor,	use	of	funding	for	cultural	diplomatic	programs.		In	order	to	promote	national	culture	abroad	and	encourage	cultural	agencies	or	institutions	 to	 develop	 national	 culture	 overseas,	 state	 governments	 usually	provide	funds.	Other	related	organisations	also	offer	funds	for	launching	cultural	projects.	 These	 efforts	 create	 opportunities,	 help	 to	 highlight	 the	 creative	 and	innovative	ideas	to	promote	culture	across	the	world	and	greatly	encourage	the	exchange	 of	 knowledge.	 This	 is	 likely	 to	 result	 in	 the	 finding	 of	 new	collaborations,	 new	 inspirations	 and	 connection	with	 other	 practitioners	 from	different	 cultural	 sectors.	 Proper	 use	 of	 funds	 could	 strengthen	 trusting	relationships	 and	 makes	 them	 more	 sustainable	 because	 sponsors	 trust	applicants’	 ability	 to	 take	 care	 of	 the	 intended	 use	 of	 the	 funds	 to	 promote	
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cultural	 development.	However,	 some	 applicants	might	 abuse	 their	 position	 of	authority	for	personal	financial	gain	when	they	have	successfully	received	funds	from	the	states	or	organisations	destined	for	cultural	projects.	 		Since	the	wave	of	cultural	exchange	has	attracted	the	attention	of	states	and	an	increasing	number	of	cultural	funds	are	made	available	for	application;	more	and	more	 applicants	 realise	 cultural	 funds	 are	 an	 excellent	 opportunity	 to	 be	 used	not	only	for	their	own	cultural	projects	but	can	also	be	used	for	personal	gains.	Embezzlement	issue	is	not	limited	to	external	applicants,	but	it	can	also	happen	within	 a	 ministry	 or	 organisation	 providing	 the	 funds.	 Such	 cases	 have	 been	reported	 across	 the	 world,	 for	 example,	 in	 Russia	 (Kinsella,	 2016),	 Lithuania	(Ward,	2016)	and	South	Korea	(Reuters,	2017).		Embezzlement	 and	 corruption	 cases	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 various	 fields.	 Such	misappropriation	 of	 cultural	 funds	 naturally	 has	 a	 direct	 influence	 on	 the	effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 Not	 only	 does	 it	 result	 in	 the	 decrease	 of	cultural	 funds	from	governments,	organisations	and	individuals,	but	also	unfair	or	 illegal	 gain	 from	 the	 cultural	 funds	 will	 irritate	 the	 public	 and	 gradually	decrease	 their	 trust	 and	 support	 from	 them.	When	 the	 funding	 received	 from	other	 states,	 whether	 these	 originated	 from	 overseas	 governments	 or	organisations,	state	trust	may	also	be	damaged	by	the	introduction	of	the	illegal	and	 dishonest	 factors	 in	 the	 trusting	 relationship,	 once	 the	 embezzlement	behaviour	has	been	exposed.	 		
The	seventh	factor,	the	operation	of	overseas	cultural	institutions.	 		Since	states	have	endeavoured	to	develop	the	various	branches	of	culture	side	by	side	and	those	cultural	organisations	are	becoming	truly	global;	both	the	number	of	 governmental	 cultural	 organisations	 and	 non-governmental	 cultural	institutions	has	increased	dramatically.	The	common	claimed	purpose	of	them	is	to	 promote	 mutual	 understanding	 between	 nations	 through	 cultural	 and	educational	 exchanges.	 In	 the	 area	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 overseas	 cultural	institutions	have	greater	convenient	access	 to	approach	 foreign	audiences	than	
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domestic	ones	so	as	to	assist	states	to	complete	their	tasks	of	cultural	diplomacy.	An	 additional	 advantage	 of	 these	 overseas	 institutions	 is	 to	 establish	 a	harmonious	 balance	 between	 different	 cultures	 and	 promote	 the	 greater	civilizational	advancement	of	human	beings.	 		Overseas	cultural	 institutions	enjoy	a	 lot	of	 resources	because	 they	are	usually	familiar	 with	 the	 environment	 of	 both	 states,	 policies	 and	 cooperative	opportunities,	 especially	 among	 different	 cultures	 between	 states.	 This	advantage	 of	 overseas	 cultural	 institutions	 can	 facilitate	 the	 conduction	 and	implementation	of	cultural	diplomacy	abroad.	Therefore,	the	role	of	these	kinds	of	 institutions	 tends	 to	 be	 more	 outstanding.	 However,	 just	 because	 of	 the	important	role	that	many	speculators	start	to	think	about	gaining	some	improper	profit	when	they	are	engaged	in	running	the	cultural	institutions.	Besides,	other	problems	within	the	operation	of	overseas	cultural	institutions	also	exist,	such	as	inferior	service	within	the	cultural	institution	and	unprofessional	promotion.	All	these	problems	will	have	an	influence	on	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building,	which	can	be	reflected	through	the	following	analysis:	 	 		Among	 the	 factors	 that	may	 have	 an	 influence	 on	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building,	taking	cultural	institutions	for	personal	gain	is	the	worst	 case	 that	 can	 definitively	 damage	 the	 trusting	 relationship	 between	states.	Some	directors	of	the	cultural	institutions	have	the	fraudulent	behaviour	with	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 personal	 business	 empire	 under	 the	 cloak	 of	charity	so	as	to	expand	on	their	own	profit.	They	are	not	operating	for	the	public	benefit;	 therefore,	 they	 would	 frequently	 fail	 to	 manage	 conflicts	 of	 interest.	‘Publicized	fraudulent	behaviour	by	key	executives	has	negatively	impacted	the	reputations,	 brands,	 and	 images	 of	 many	 organisations	 around	 the	 globe’	(Association	 of	 Certified	 Fraud	 Examiners,	 2012).	 But	 these	 types	 of	 indecent	behaviours	bordering	on	criminal	behaviour	would	not	only	have	an	impact	on	the	 reputation	 of	 institutions	 but	 also	 tainted	 the	 reputation	 of	 the	 state.	 For	example,	 assuming	 that	 the	 cultural	 institution	 mainly	 focuses	 on	 promoting	State	 A’s	 culture	 in	 State	 B	 and	 successfully	 obtained	 the	 funds	 from	 both	governments.	But	the	facts	of	its	fraudulent	use	will	lower	or	even	destroy	State	
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B’s	 trust	 level	 towards	State	A	 if	State	B	discovers	 the	evidence	concerning	the	director’s	fraudulent	activities.	 		Another	example	is	that	some	overseas	cultural	institutions	have	been	registered	as	 the	 form	 of	 charity	 in	 the	 local	 government.	 Under	 the	 non-profit	 cover	 of	“charity”,	it	would	be	easier	to	take	advantage	of	domestic	tax	policies	and	obtain	donations	from	the	public.	In	most	cases,	these	cultural	institutions	even	take	full	advantages	 of	 the	 kindness	 of	 volunteers	without	 telling	 them	 the	 truth.	 They	exist	in	every	corner	of	the	world,	because	of	the	“prime”	condition	of	a	charity	is	that	they	don’t	have	to	pay	high	tax	with	lower	labour	costs,	which	tempts	them	to	become	a	lot	more	unscrupulous.	 		Nowadays,	increasing	number	of	states	has	started	to	realise	the	seriousness	of	this	problem.	For	 instance,	 the	Chinese	government	has	published	an	extensive	list	of	the	offshore	communities	and	institutions,	which	are	usually	titled	with	a	grand	prefix,	such	as	China-UK,	China-USA,	China	State	Level,	etc.	(Xinhua	News,	2016).	 They	 carefully	 designed	 the	 name	 to	 deceive	 the	 general	 public.	 These	seemingly	 smart	 tricks	 gradually	 ruin	 the	 reputation	 of	 a	 state,	 while	 the	fraudulent	 behaviours	 of	 such	 cultural	 institutions	 will	 damage	 the	 fair	competition	 in	 the	 environment	 of	 the	 cultural	 market	 and	 pose	 an	 adverse	impact	 on	 the	 social	 trend.	 Furthermore,	 great	 fraudulent	 actions	 of	 overseas	cultural	institutions	can	even	lead	to	the	downfall	of	other	well-behaved	cultural	institutions.	 	In	 the	 overseas	 environment,	 not	 every	 cultural	 institution	 is	 established	 by	professional	 experts	 who	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 develop	 the	 culture	 of	 their	mother	 state.	 Additionally,	 some	 staffs	 of	 overseas	 cultural	 institutions	 are	 in	need	 of	 systematic	 training,	 professional	 guidelines	 and	 do	 not	 have	 enough	knowledge	about	the	culture	of	their	mother	state,	when	these	weaknesses	will	lead	 to	 the	 inferior	 service	as	well	 as	 the	 inferior	quality	of	 cultural	programs.	Those	who	can	speak	mother	tongue	fluently	do	not	necessarily	mean	that	they	have	known	the	culture	of	 their	mother	state	well.	Therefore,	 in	 the	process	of	cultural	development,	foreign	audiences	will	be	easily	trapped	into	the	confused	
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situation,	 which	 comes	 with	misunderstanding	 due	 to	 the	 issues	 listed	 above.	Especially	if	the	staff	offers	incorrect	information	about	the	history,	politics	and	other	 sensitive	 issues	 to	 foreign	 audiences,	 this	 will	 broadly	 generate	 the	misunderstanding	among	the	culture	of	different	states.	The	problems	about	the	inferior	 quality	 of	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs	 have	 been	 discussed	 in	 the	previous	 part.	 If	 the	 overseas	 cultural	 institutions	 have	 not	 been	made	 aware	with	 proper	 correction	 of	 their	 greedy	 and	 fraudulent	 behaviours,	 then	 these	problems	would	inevitably	tend	to	become	more	widespread.		
The	eighth	factor,	publicity	concerning	the	programs	of	cultural	diplomacy.	 		As	 an	 important	means	 of	 publicity	 to	 cultural	 diplomacy	 to	 foster	 state	 trust	building,	 the	power	of	mass	media	should	not	be	overlooked.	The	mass	media,	especially	the	international	mainstream	media,	plays	a	very	important	role	as	a	vehicle	in	discovering	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	towards	state	trust	building.	 For	 example,	 as	 the	 Foreign	 Ministry	 Spokesman	 of	 the	 Chinese	government,	Liu	Jianchao	states	that4	 ‘in	order	to	enable	China	to	have	a	better	mutual	understanding,	mutual	cooperation	and	mutual	integration	with	the	rest	of	 the	world,	 the	mass	media	 is	 a	very	 important	 intermediary.	Only	when	 the	government	 holds	 an	 open	 attitude	 towards	 the	 coverage	 of	 the	 mass	 media,	provides	more	useful	information	and	makes	it	more	transparent;	then	the	mass	media	 could	 give	 the	 government	 a	 hand	 so	 as	 to	 foster	 implementation	 of	cultural	 diplomacy’	 (Liu,	 2008).	Without	 immediate	 news	 report	 regarding	 the	particular	 program	of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 it	would	 be	 difficult	 to	 the	 domestic	and	 international	 audiences	 to	 participate	 in	 it.	 Furthermore,	 considerable	publicity	 will	 help	 both	 states	 to	 strengthen	 the	 promotion	 of	 their	 national	culture.	 		Additionally,	 state	 actors	 should	 also	 be	 minded	 that	 it	 cannot	 hold	 so	 much	higher	expectation	that	the	media	will	only	report	good	news,	they	should	have	






The	ninth	factor,	monitoring	the	impact	after	cultural	diplomatic	activities.	 		In	the	process	of	evaluating	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building,	monitoring	the	impact	especially	after	the	cultural	diplomatic	event	 is	an	essential	necessity.	The	 important	point	 is	not	about	getting	all	 things	done,	but	 how	 to	 continue	 and	maintain	 the	 rapport.	 In	 the	majority	 of	 the	 cultural	programs,	it	is	a	common	problem	that	quite	a	few	state	actors	or	organisations	will	monitor	the	impact	when	the	program	completes.	Monitoring	and	evaluating	the	 impact	 could	 assist	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 remedial	 measures	 to	 get	further	programs	back	on	track	and	remain	accountable	to	the	expected	results	towards	 the	 achievement	 of	 the	 goal	 of	 any	 further	 programs.	 Additionally,	 it	could	 also	 help	 to	 determine	 how	 the	 budget	 should	 be	 distributed	 across	 the	programs	of	cultural	diplomacy.	Moreover,	collected	 information	(such	as	data,	feedback,	 reports,	 etc.)	 could	 be	 beneficial	 for	 both	 state	 actors	 and	non-government	 organisations	 so	 as	 to	 evaluate	 the	 outcomes	 of	 cultural	diplomatic	efforts.	All	these	advantages	might	be	of	great	value	to	help	to	pave	a	better	path	towards	the	building	of	state	trust.	 	
4.5	Conclusion	The	 benefits	 of	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs	 are	 large	 in	 number	 because	cultural	diplomatic	programs	create	platforms	for	interaction	between	people	of	different	countries,	thus	laying	the	groundwork	for	the	forging	of	friendships	and	strong	connections	between	people	of	different	nationalities.	Moreover,	cultural	diplomacy	can	help	to	create	a	foundation	of	trust	among	states.		Cultural	diplomacy	is	a	dynamic	and	complex	process	requiring	ongoing	efforts,	and	 it	 is	 the	 same	 with	 state	 trust	 building.	 The	 long-term	 impact	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	 in	 state	 trust	 building	 takes	many	 years	 to	 show,	 as	 the	 associated	
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outcomes	and	impacts	are	often	intangible.	As	previously	established,	state	trust,	in	 fact,	 refers	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 phenomena	 that	 enable	 the	will	 of	 states	 to	 take	risks	in	dealing	with	other	states,	solving	problems	of	collective	action	or	acting	in	other	ways,	which	seem	contrary	to	standard	definitions	of	national	interest.	 	How	to	prove	the	existence	of	state	trust,	then	states’	trusting	relationships	are	behavioural	demonstrations	of	trust.	Therefore,	this	chapter	has	put	forward	five	indicators	of	existing	state	trust	as	follows:	1. Minimal	level	of	state	trust--Cooperation	among	states	2. Lower	medium	level	of	state	trust--Advantageous	orientation	of	states’	policies	3. Medium	level	of	state	trust--Carrying	out	benevolent	policies	between	states	4.	 	 Upper	medium	level	of	state	trust--Types	of	written	rules	with	leeway	5.	 	 High	level	of	state	trust--Discretionary	power	in	the	policy-making		When	 detecting	 the	 factors	 that	 may	 influence	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	 in	 state	 trust	 building,	 the	 great	 diversity	 of	 cultural	 diplomatic	programs	 and	 intangibility	 of	 state	 trust	 makes	 it	 impossible	 to	 measure	 all	outputs	 with	 the	 same	 tools.	 Different	 programs	 have	 different	 missions	 and	purposes,	ranging	from	cultural	promotion	to	political	development,	which	will	influence	 state	 trust	 in	 different	 ways.	 Because	 of	 the	 significant	 variation	 in	goals,	approaches,	and	methodologies	of	cultural	diplomatic	programs	and	their	evaluations,	 much	 of	 the	 evaluative	 data	 generated	 is	 not	 comparable,	 which	place	more	obstacles	to	measuring	its	effectiveness	in	state	trust	building.	 		Detecting	existing	state	trust	created	by	cultural	diplomacy	cannot	merely	rely	on	one	 indicator	 in	a	specific	case,	but	can	be	combined	by	a	combination	of	 these	five	 indicators.	For	example,	when	detecting	the	existence	of	state	 trust	created	by	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 the	 China-UK	 relationship,	 we	 may	 observe	discretion-granting	 policies,	 other	 rules	 and	 the	 orientation	 of	 policies.	 To	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomatic	programs	in	state	trust	building,	for	instance,	through	the	China-UK	Cultural	Year,	we	need	to	make	comparisons	over	 time.	 In	 the	 initial	 stage,	 they	 should	 try	 to	examine	whether	 the	policy	 is	discretion-granting	 and	 what	 its	 orientation	 is.	 In	 the	 progressing	 stage,	 they	
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5.1	Introduction	The	 surge	 of	 the	 Chinese	 economy	 has	 been	 recognised	 by	 the	 international	communities.	 ‘The	 rise	 of	 China	 has	 been	 significantly	 reshaping	 the	 current	international	 order.	 Xi	 Jinping’s	 leadership,	 in	 particular,	 is	 more	 willing	 to	promote	 China’s	 favourable	 changes	 in	 the	 international	 arena’(Zeng,	 2017).	Especially,	with	the	recent	significant	increase	in	the	national	expenditure	within	the	cultural	 sector,	China’s	actions	 in	soft	power	 that	 is	not	merely	a	matter	of	verbal	promise	but	solid	practical	actions	with	full	 implementations.	Therefore,	Chinese	culture	is	considered	as	the	essence	of	China’s	soft	power	in	developing	cultural	 influence	 of	 China	 flying	 in	 the	 face	 of	 popular	Western	 culture.	 It	 is	particularly	true	in	the	21st	Century,	China’s	strategy	in	cultural	diplomacy	is	not	solely	about	promoting	national	culture	on	the	world	stage,	but	also	a	matter	of	exploring	the	potential	of	cultural	diplomacy	as	well;	for	instance,	building	trust	and	friendship	with	other	states.	 			 	In	order	to	examine	the	effectiveness	of	China’s	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building,	this	chapter	combines	the	concept	of	cultural	diplomacy	and	state	trust	with	 the	 particular	 example	 of	 cultural	 diplomatic	 efforts	 in	 the	 2014	 APEC	Beijing	Summit.	The	first	section	outlines	the	historical	origin	of	China’s	cultural	diplomacy.	 The	 second	 section	 illustrates	 the	 development	 of	 China’s	 cultural	diplomacy	in	the	contemporary	era.	The	third	section	analyses	the	weakness	of	China’s	cultural	diplomacy		 	
5.2	The	Historical	Origin	of	China’s	Cultural	Diplomacy	 	Employing	 culture	 as	 a	 political	 tool	 of	 soft	 power	 to	 demonstrate	 its	 attitude	and	content	of	foreign	policy	that	has	a	very	long	history	in	China.	The	period	in	Chinese	 history	 that	 most	 emphasised	 the	 spread	 of	 Chinese	 culture	 is	 the	so-called	 Spring	 and	 Autumn	 era	 (771	 BC–476	 BC),	 which	 is	 famous	 for	 its	‘Hundred	Schools	of	Thought’.	At	this	time,	Confucius	stressed	the	limitation	and	
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regulation	 of	 hard	 power,	 so	 his	 teachings	 focused	 mainly	 on	 the	 aspects	 of	education	and	humanity.	This	era	fostered	outstanding	cultural	and	intellectual	development,	the	influential	effects	of	which	are	still	found	even	in	society	today,	with	firm	imprints	upon	the	ideology	or	practices	of	contemporary	China.		The	 appreciation	 of	 this	 cultural	 influence	 comes	 out	 as	 a	 notable	 them	 in	 the	interview5	 conducted	for	this	research	project.	For	example,	Professor	Qingmin	Zhang	argues	that6	 “from	the	studies	of	cultural	aspect,	when	analysing	a	state’s	foreign	policy,	it	is	often	associated	with	the	study	of	the	history	and	tradition	of	this	 country	 and	 that	 it	 is	 inseparable.	 Confucianism	 constitutes	 the	 essential	core	of	Chinese	culture	and	that	it	has	been	influential	on	Chinese	people’s	way	of	 thinking,	 interaction	 with	 others,	 even	 China’s	 diplomatic	 behaviour	 until	nowadays).	 This	 argument	 is	 also	 frequently	 found	 in	 academic	 texts	 by	 other	Chinese	 scholars	 (Zhang,	 2003,	 p.35).	 These	 historical	 influences	 are	 also	reflected	 in	 the	 governing	 philosophy	 of	 Communist	 Party	 of	 China	 and	 its	emphasis	on	cultural	diplomacy	 through	concepts,	 such	as	 ‘harmonious	world’,	‘peaceful	 development’,	 and	 establishing	 ‘friendship’	with	 other	 states.	 Thus,	 it	can	 be	 seen	 that	 Confucianism	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 developmental	process	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	China.		In	the	era	of	East	and	West	(372	BC-289	BC),	another	great	thinker,	Mencius,	also	denounced	wars	and	other	means	of	hard	power	with	the	 idea	that	benevolent	kings	 who	 could	 easily	 win	 over	 masses	 had	 no	 enemies	(Palit,	2013).	Later,	along	 with	 Confucianism	 and	 Mencius	 thoughts,	 the	 doctrine	 of	 Taoism	 and	Mohism	 also	 concentrated	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘universal	 love’,	 and	 the	 virtue	 of	discussion	and	persuasion	for	solving	problems	among	individuals	and	states.	In	this	regard,	ancient	political	and	military	thinkers	in	China	were	often	sceptical	of	 hard	 power.	 For	 example,	 the	 celebrated	military	 strategist	 Sun	 Tzu’s	 (545	BC—470	BC)	book	The	Art	of	War	concerns	the	development	of	military	strategy	but	also	emphasises	the	great	importance	of	a	person’s	ideology.	Sun	argues	that	
                                                5	 This	interview	was	conducted	in	Peking	University,	24	September	2014.	6	 在从文化角度研究或分析一个国家的外交政策时往往与对这个国家的历史和传统的研究分不开。儒家思
想构成了中国文化的基本内核	 ,至今都影响着中国人的思维方式	 ,为人处世	 ,乃至中国的外交行为”。	
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one	 should	 attack	 the	 enemy’s	mind	 rather	 than	 his	 fortified	 cities	(Sun,	2002,	p.38).	Sun	Tzu’s	writings	suggest	that	using	the	means	of	soft	power	is	easier	and	more	efficient	than	using	hard	power.	 		After	 that,	 in	 the	West	Han	period	 (202	BC—8	AD),	 Zhang	Qian	 and	Ban	Chao	started	to	visit	the	western	regions	of	China	and	established	what	became	known	as	 the	 “Silk	 Road”	(State	Council	of	China,	2016).	 It was	an	ancient	network	of	trade	routes	that	can	be	considered	as	a	central	 junction	to	cultural	 interaction	originally	through	regions	of	Eurasia	for	centuries.	By	the	time	of	Tang	and	Song	Dynasties,	 the	maritime	 ‘Silk	Road’	was	well	 developed	due	 to	 seven	maritime	voyages	 of	 Admiral	 Zheng	 He.	 Additionally,	 in	 the	 modern	 period,	 from	 the	Sino-Japanese	 cultural	 communication	 of	 Mr.	 Huang	 Xianzong	 to	 the	 Peking	opera	 performance	 of	 Mr.	 Mei	 Lanfang	 in	 the	 USA,	 Chinese	 external	 cultural	communication	has	been	a	never-ending	stream	of	cultural	activities	that	could	be	 regarded	 as	 a	 part	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 In	 general,	 Chinese	 ancient	 and	modern	 philosophy,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 official	 written	 history	 of	 China,	 rarely	endorse	 hard	power,	 but	mainly	 concentrate	 on	 cultivating	 friendship	 so	 as	 to	avoid	and	solve	conflicts	and	misunderstandings.	This	history	arguably	 laid	the	foundations	for	Chinese	cultural	diplomacy	in	the	last	century.		
5.3 The	 Development	 of	 China’s	 Cultural	 Diplomacy	 in	 the	 Contemporary	
Era	 	In	the	contemporary	era,	mixed	notices	have	arisen	towards	the	development	of	China’s	cultural	diplomacy	in	both	domestically	and	internationally.	For	instance,	Gary	Rawnsley	states	that	‘it	is	not	surprising	that	the	government	in	Beijing	has	privileged	culture	and	tradition	in	its	soft	power	strategy	as	these	should	be	the	easiest	 themes	to	sell	and	they	avoid	giving	 further	prominence	to	the	political	and	 social	 issues	 that	 undermine	 China’s	 soft	 power	 credibility’	 (Rawnsley,	2013).	Furthermore,	Rawnsley	also	considers	that	the	Chinese	government	have	a	clear	abiding	faith	in	the	power	of	culture	to	overcome	and	possibly	transform	the	 attitudes	 and	 prejudices	 of	 audiences	 throughout	 the	 world.	 As	 Chinese	investment	in	the	overseas	Confucius	Institutes	suggests,	they	are	confident	that	
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exposure	 to	 culture	 will	 have	 soft	 power	 rewards	 that	 intangibles	 can	 be	converted	into	tangible	benefits	(Rawnsley,	2013).	 		When	looks	at	the	Chinese	history,	the	philosophy	of	Confucius	has	taken	up	an	important	 position	 in	 the	 Chinese	 cultural	 system.	 Confucianism	 regards	intellectual	workers	as	rulers	and	positions	manual	labourers	as	mere	subjects.	Similarly,	 one	 of	Mencius’s	 famous	 sayings	 is	 that	 ‘those	who	work	with	 their	brain	rule	and	those	who	work	with	their	brawn	are	ruled’	(Mencius,	2006,	p.58).	This	 historical	 thinking	 even	 influences	 the	 policies	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	Party	 (CPC),	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 governing	 philosophy.	 As	 the	 sole	party	of	governance	 in	China,	 the	attitude	of	CPC	and	 its	policies	directly	affect	the	development	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	China.		In	 the	 academic	 arena,	 policies	 of	 the	 central	 government	 might	 influence	academic	focus	in	cultural	diplomacy.	Chinese	policies	are	often	delivered	to	the	public	 speeches	 by	 top	 government	 leaders	 in	most	 cases.	 After	 that,	 the	 local	authorities	 and	 academic	 institutions	 conduct	 related	 practices	 with	 relevant	research	 in	 responses	 to	 the	 “fresh”	 policy.	 As	 indicated	 by	 one	 anonymous	professor	 in	 Beijing7,	 ‘currently,	Chinese	academic	scholars	prefer	choosing	the	hotly-debated	research	areas,	which	are	usually	just	following	on	the	orientation	of	national	policies.	For	those	relatively	rare	or	unique	areas	of	research,	which	are	not	mentioned	by	the	authority	or	outside	the	main	national	policies	areas,	even	though	you	can	publish	a	paper,	but	it	could	not	attract	enough	attentions	of	 the	 intended	audience’	 (2014).	This	part	 looks	at	 some	significant	strategies	within	 the	 five	 governing	 periods	 of	 CPC’s	 influential	 leaders	 in	 the	 aspect	 of	cultural	 issues;	 it	 then	 proceeds	 to	 outline	 a	 general	 analysis	 of	 the	 cultural	policy	 of	 CPC	 and	 its	 influences	 on	 the	 development	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	China：		In	 the	 Maoist	 era	 (1949-1976),	 China’s	 cultural	 relations	 aroused	 fierce	argument	 among	 the	 public	 both	 domestically	 and	 internationally.	 One	 of	 the	




controversial	 debates	 surrounded	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 which	 caused	 huge	damage	and	seriously	hindered	the	development	of	 traditional	Chinese	culture.	Moreover,	massive	political	pressure	initiated	by	Cultural	Revolution	profoundly	influenced	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 public.	 During	 this	 period,	 Mao’s	 team	was	 not	positive	 to	 the	 Chinese	 traditional	 culture,	 particularly	 held	 negative	 attitude	towards	Confucius.	For	example,	it	launched	a	series	of	campaigns	to	undermine	Confucius	 vales,	 destroy	 status	 of	 Confucius	 and	 dispose	 relevant	 literature	products.	 However,	 the	 CCP	 started	 to	 gradually	 open	 the	 door	 of	 China	 to	foreign	 friends,	 although	with	 strict	 regulations	and	 limitations.	 In	1956	alone,	there	were	5,200	foreign	visitors	from	75	countries	coming	to	China.	At	the	same	time,	 the	Chinese	government	sent	more	than	1,300	cultural	representatives	to	some	 39	 countries	 (Passin,	 1963,	 p.2-4).	 While	 the	 Chinese	 government	 were	only	 open	 to	 short-period	 ceremonial	 and	 political	 visits	 and	 exchanges,	long-term	study	and	research	 remained	rather	 rare	 (Passin,	1963,	p.6).	At	 that	time,	 as	 Passin	 notes,	 ‘it	 was	 quite	 difficult	 to	 deviate	 or	 break	 away	 from	 an	officially	 organised	 or	 arranged	 tour	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 direct	 contacts	with	people	or	experience	an	environment	for	which	a	visitor	may	have	a	particular	affinity	or	research	interest’	(Passin,	1963,	p.10).		In	the	era	of	Deng	Xiaoping	(1978-1993),	the	domestic	cultural	situation	and	the	environment	of	foreign	communication	tended	to	be	better	and	more	open	than	the	 era	 of	 Mao	 Zedong.	 Deng’s	 strategy	 ‘Reform	 and	 Opening	 Up’	 (Gai	 Ge	 Kai	Fang)	 led	 to	 increasing	 international	 interest	 in	 exploring	 various	 aspects	 of	China,	including	Chinese	culture,	while	creating	incentives	for	Chinese	leaders	to	expand	the	nation’s	cultural	influence	(Gill	and	Huang,	2006).		In	the	era	of	Jiang	Zemin	(1994-2003),	the	Sixteenth	National	 Congress	could	be	regarded	as	a	turning	point	of	culture	and	soft	power	in	the	Chinese	government	and	 CPC’s	 policy	 plans	 (Xinhua	Net,	 2002).	 According	 to	 a	 statement	 from	 the	Congress,	‘the	country	(China)	should	not	only	provide	its	people	with	an	ample	material	 life,	 but	 also	 a	 healthy	 and	 rich	 cultural	 life’,	 and	 ‘the	 (Chinese)	government	would	 devote	more	 resources	 to	 boosting	 public	 cultural	 services	and	speed	up	the	reform	of	the	cultural	industry’	(Xinhua	Net,	2011).	
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In	 the	era	of	Hu	 Jintao	 (2004-2013),	 the	CPC’s	 the	Sixth	Plenary	Session	of	 the	Seventeenth	 Central	 Committee	 discussed	 the	 ‘cultural	 system	 transformation’	and	 ‘socialist	 cultural	 development’	 (CCTV,	 2011).	 It	 passed	 the	 Statement	 on	
Deepening	 the	 Reform	 of	 the	 Cultural	 System	 to	 Promote	 Socialist	 Development	
and	Prosperity	of	the	Decision	on	Major	Issues.	Leaders	of	the	CPC	committed	to	boosting	the	soft	power	of	China	while	maintaining	 ‘cultural	security’	 following	the	ongoing	economic	boom	(Xinhua	Net,	2011).	Hu	Jintao	states	that	‘culture	is	emerging	as	an	important	part	of	the	country's	comprehensive	competitiveness	in	 today's	 world,	 and	 China	 is	 facing	 a	 difficult	 task	 in	 protecting	 “cultural	security”	 and	 feeling	 the	 urgency	 of	 enhancing	 its	 soft	 power	 and	 the	international	influence	of	its	own	culture’(Xinhua	Net,	2011).	 		Before	the	Sixth	Plenary	Session,	a	series	of	measures	were	taken	to	provide	an	international	stage	for	Chinese	culture	so	as	to	express	the	ideology	of	China	or	the	governing	philosophy	of	CPC.	Such	measures	included	holding	2008	Beijing	Olympic	Games	and	2010	Shanghai	EXPO,	establishing	Confucius	Institute8	 and	China	Culture	Centres9	 in	other	countries,	organising	cultural	years	and	holding	relevant	cultural	activities.		In	the	present	era	of	Xi	Jinping	(2013-now),	after	the	Sixth	Plenary	Session,	the	current	 leadership	 has	 also	 shown	 signs	 of	 pursuing	 an	 accommodating	 and	pragmatic	cultural	policy.	It	emphasises	that	China’s	cultural	policy	should	keep	with	greater	national	interests	of	‘holding	high	the	banner	of	peace,	development,	cooperation,	and	mutual	benefit’	(Xinhua	Net,	2012).	A	resolution	adopted	at	the	18th	Congress	of	the	Communist	Party	of	China	in	November	2012	was	emphatic	about	 upholding	 China’s	 cultural	 heritage,	 arguing	 that	 ‘the	 country’s	 cultural	soft	power	should	be	improved	significantly	for	mutual	understanding’	(Xinhua	Net,	2012).	 		Furthermore,	 Xi	 has	 also	 vowed	 to	 promote	 China's	 cultural	 soft	 power	 by	disseminating	modern	Chinese	values	and	showing	the	charm	of	Chinese	culture	
                                                8	 In	December	2015,	there	were	500	Confucius	in	the	134	countries	(Hanban,	2015)	9	 China	Culture	Centre	has	established	9	overseas	branches	(in	Paris,	Berlin,	Rome,	Seoul,	Tokyo,	Malta,	Cairo,	Benin,	Mauritius,	Ulan	Bator)	until	March	2016	(China	Culture	Centre,	2015).	
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to	 the	world	 (Xi,	 2014).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 he	 also	 places	much	 emphasis	 that	‘China	should	be	portrayed	as	a	civilised	country	featured	with	the	rich	history,	ethnic	 unity,	 and	 cultural	 diversity.	 China	 should	 develop	 itself	 as	 an	 Asian	power	 with	 the	 good	 government,	 developed	 economy,	 cultural	 prosperity,	national	unity	and	beautiful	mountains	and	rivers’	(Xi,	2014).	A	guideline	 from	the	 CPC	 concerning	 the	 strength	 of	 Chinese	 cultural	 development	 promotes	various	 cultural	 activities,	 such	 as	 the	 2015	 China-UK	 Cultural	 Year	 (British	Council,	2015),	the	cultural	communication	and	cultural	industry	in	the	Belt	and	Road	 Initiative	 (State	 Council	 of	 China,	 2016).	 Other	 national	 cultural	 display	within	the	mega-events	also	can	be	considered	as	the	efforts	of	China’s	cultural	diplomacy,	such	as	the	2014	APEC	Beijing	Summit,	2016	G20	Hangzhou	Summit,	2017	Belt	and	Road	Beijing	Summit	and	2017	BRICS	Summit	in	Xiamen.	
 The	principal	general	directions	of	policies	development	concerning	 the	aspect	of	culture	in	the	past	twenty	years	are	listed	as	follows:		
1997	 	 	 The	Fifteenth	National	Congress	of	CPC	“江泽民总书记在阐述中国文化建设时明确指出：“我国文化的发展，不能离开人类文明的共同成果。
要坚持以我为主、为我所用的原则，开展多种形式的对外文化交流，博采各国文化之长，向世界展示
中国文化建设的成就”	 (Shi,	 2009).	 Translation:	 	 As	 for	 the	 aspect	 of	 China’s	 cultural	 construction,	Jiang	 Zemin	 explained	 clearly	 and	 pointed	 out,	 ‘China's	 cultural	 development	 cannot	 ignore	 the	collective	 achievements	 of	 human	 civilisation,	 and	 China	 should	 adhere	 to	 the	 principles	 “take	 the	initiative	 and	 for	 our	use’.	 China	 should	 carry	 out	 various	 forms	of	 international	 cultural	 exchanges	and	gatherings	so	as	to	show	China's	achievements	in	cultural	structure	and	to	set	to	the	world.	
2000	 	 	 Jiang	Zemin’s	work	inspection	in	Guangdong	Province	
江泽民提出了“三个代表”的重要思想,	 其中代表先进文化的前进方向”的思想，必然要求我们在对外开
放和外交政策中，体现中国伟大的民族精神、体现丰富的思想价值体系和坚定有力的主张，以此来拓
展文化外交和意识形态的吸引力(Shi,	2009).	Translation:	 Jiang	Zemin	came	up	with	the	idea	of	“Three	Representatives”.	One	representative	emphasises	the	orientation	of	advanced	culture,	which	requires	us	to	show	China’s	great	national	spirit,	value	system	and	firm	propositions	in	the	policy	of	opening	up	to	 the	 outside	world	 and	 Chinese	 foreign	 policies	 so	 as	 to	 expand	 the	 attraction	 of	 ideology	 in	 the	cultural	diplomacy	of	China.	
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2000	 	 	 The	5th	Plenary	Session	of	the	15th	Central	Committee	of	CPC	“2000 年 10 月，中共十五届五中全会在《关于“十五”规划的建议》里第一次提到“文化产业”。该文涉
及“文化产业”的提法多达 6 处。明确提出要“完善文化产业政策，加强文化市场建设和管理，推动有关
文化产业发展”Translation:	“In	the	"Proposal	of	the	Plan	for	the	Tenth	Five–Year”,	it	had	the	very	first	mentioning	of	 the	notion	of	 “cultural	 industries”.	Explicitly	mentioning	 the	proposal	 to	“improve	the	policy	of	cultural	 industry,	 strengthen	the	construction	and	management	of	 the	cultural	market,	and	promote	the	development	of	related	cultural	industries”	(Li	and	Zhang,	2008).	
2001	 	 	 The	Fourth	Session	of	the	Ninth	National	People's	Congress	“这个建议又被中国九届人大四次会议采纳，并正式纳入了《中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第
十个五年计划纲要”	Translation:	the	proposal	mentioned	in	2000	about	the	cultural	industry	has	been	confirmed	by	the	Fourth	Session	of	the	Ninth	National	People's	Congress	and	has	been	accepted	in	the	
Outline	 of	 the	 Tenth	 Five-Year	 Plan	 for	 the	 Development	 of	 the	 National	 Economy	 and	 Society	 of	 the	
People's	Republic	of	China	(Li	and	Zhang,	2008).	
2002	 	 	 Report	of	the	Sixteenth	National	Congress	of	the	CPC	 	“报告提出了文化建设和文化体制改革”	 (Xinhua	 Net,	 2002).	 Translation:	 cultural	 construction	 and	cultural	system	reform	have	been	mentioned	in	this	report.	 	
2004	 	 	 Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	P.R.	C	In	2004,	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	P.R.C	established	the	Public	Diplomacy	Department	aiming	to	be	in	charge	of	international	cultural	communication	(Zhang,	2012,	p.35).	
2005	 	 	 The	60th	Anniversary	of	the	Founding	of	the	United	Nations	“胡锦涛发表题为《努力建设持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界》的讲话，提出构建“和谐世界”的新理念。
以国家最高领导人的名义，向全世界推广从中国传统文化和当代内政中演绎出来的政治、社会和文化
理念——“和谐世界”理念”	Translation:	Hu	Jintao	delivered	the	speech	Efforts	to	Build	a	Lasting	Peace,	
Prosperous	 and	Harmonious	World.	 He	 proposed	 to	 a	 new	notion	 about	 “Harmonious	World”	 in	 the	name	of	 the	 state	 supreme	 leader.	 The	notion	 aims	 to	 deliver	 and	promote	 the	political,	 social,	 and	cultural	 philosophies	 to	 the	 world.	 These	 philosophies	 are	 produced	 and	 evolved	 from	 Chinese	traditional	culture	and	contemporary	internal	affairs.	 	 	 	
2006	 	 	 Central	Conference	on	Work	Relating	to	Foreign	Affairs	“胡锦涛：推动建设和谐世界，是我们坚持走和平发展道路的必然要求，也是我们实现和平发展的重
要条件……要致力于促进不同文明加强交流、增进了解、相互促进，倡导世界多样性，推动人类文明




2007	 	 	 The	Seventeenth	National	People’s	Congress	of	CPC	In	 the	Hu	 Jintao’s	Report	 to	 the	 Seventeenth	National	 Congress	 of	 the	 CPC,	 the	notion	of	 cultural	 soft	power	has	been	proposed	and	accepted	in	the	report	(Hu,	2007b).	 	 	
2009	 	 	 	 The	Eleventh	Meeting	of	Ambassadors		“胡锦涛强调要加强公共外交和人文外交，开展各种形式的对外文化交流活动，扎实传播中华优秀文
化”	(Xinhua	News,	2009)	Translation:	Hu	Jintao	emphasised	to	strengthen	the	development	of	public	diplomacy	and	humanity	diplomacy,	and	conduct	various	kinds	of	international	cultural	activities	so	as	to	cultivate	the	excellent	Chinese	culture	better”.	
2010	 CPC	 Central	 Committee’s	 Suggestions	 on	 the	 Formulation	 of	 National	
Economic	and	Social	development	of	the	twelfth	Five-year	Plan	(Document)	 	
胡锦涛强调“加强对外宣传和文化交流，创新文化‘走出去’模式，增强中华文化国际竞争力和影响力”;	“加强公共外交，广泛开展民间友好交往，推动人文交流，增进中国人民同各国人民相互了解和友谊”	(Xinhua	News,	 2010)	Translation:	Hu	 Jintao	 emphasised	 that	 (China)	 should	 strengthen	 the	 external	propaganda	and	cultural	communication,	and	make	the	pattern	of	“Go	Global	Strategy”	more	innovative	and	 increase	 China’s	 international	 influence.	 (China)	 should	 improve	 the	 development	 of	 public	diplomacy,	broadly	 conduct	 the	 friendly	public	diplomacy	activities,	 foster	 the	public	 communication	and	increase	the	mutual	understanding	and	friendship	with	international	society.	 	 	
2012	Report	of	the	Eighteenth	National	Congress	of	the	CPC	
习近平强调“建设社会主义文化强国，关键是增强全民族文化创造活力”(People’s	 Daily,	 2012)	Translation:	 Xi	 Jinping	 emphasised	 that	 in	 the	 aspect	 of	 constructing	 the	 powerful	 socialist	 culture	state,	the	key	is	to	enhance	the	cultural	creativity	of	the	whole	nation.	
2014	 Twelfth	 Collective	 Study	 of	 the	 Political	 Bureau	 of	 the	 CPC	 Central	
Committee		
习近平强调建设社会主义文化强国着力提高国家文化软实力，所以要努力展示中华文化独特魅要力；
注重塑造我国的国家形象；要努力提高国际话语权 	 (China	 Daily,	 2014).	 Translation:	 Xi	 Jinping	emphasised	 the	 importance	 to	 improve	 national	 cultural	 soft	 power.	 Therefore,	 in	 this	 improving	process,	 several	 points	 need	 to	 be	 focused:	 putting	 great	 efforts	 to	 show	 the	 charming	 power	 of	Chinese	culture;	Emphasizing	the	building	of	China’s	national	 image;	holding	 international	discourse	power.	
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创新对外传播、文化交流、文化贸易方式，推动中华文化	 “走出去”(Ministry	of	Culture	of	PRC,	2016)	Translation:	 Improving	 the	 innovation	 of	 international	 cultural	 dissemination,	 cultural	communication,	and	forms	of	cultural	trade,	and	fostering	Chinese	culture	to	“go	global”.	
Table	7.	The	principal	general	directions	of	policies	development	in	China	concerning	
the	aspect	of	culture	in	the	past	twenty	years.		The	 summary	 result	 of	 main	 academic	 literature	 in	 the	 past	 twenty	 years	 is	shown	as	follows:		Zhi	Li	 2005	 文化外交:一种传播学的解(Cultural	Diplomacy:	an	Interpretive	Mode	of	Communication)	H	Lai	 2006	 China’s	cultural	diplomacy:	Going	for	Soft	Power	Qingmin	Zhang	 2006	 全球化环境下的中国文化外交 	 (China’s	 Cultural	 Diplomacy	 in	 the	 Context	 of	Globalisation)	Kaijin	Miao	 2006	 中国文化外交研究(Studies	on	China’s	Cultural	Diplomacy)	Mingling	Yu	 2006	 21 世纪的中国文化外交措施研究 21	(Studies	on	Measures	of	China’s	Cultural	Diplomacy	in	the	21st	Century)	Naige	Liu,	 	Zhonghua	Zhang	 2007	 论中国文化外交的使命与选择(The	Destiny	and	Choice	of	China’s	Cultural	Diplomacy	)	Xinliang	Peng	 2008	 文化外交与中国的软实力:	 一种全球化的视角(Cultural	 Diplomacy	 and	 China’s	 Soft	Power—From	the	Globalisation	Perspective)	Pan	Weijuan	 2008	 Cultural	Diplomacy	and	a	Harmonious	World	Hui	Liu	 2008	 China-Africa	Relations	 through	 the	 Prism	of	 Culture–The	Dynamics	 of	 China’s	 Cultural	Diplomacy	with	Africa	Xianchao	Deng	 2010	 新时期中国文化外交兴起的必然(The	 Rise	 of	 China’s	 Cultural	 Diplomacy	 in	 the	 New	
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Era	)	Philip	Seib	 2012	 China’s	Embrace	of	Cultural	Diplomacy	Yue	Liu	 2013	 Arts	Exchanges	in	Contemporary	U.S-China	Cultural	Diplomacy	Kalika	A.	Tullock	 2013	 China’s	 Soft	 Power	 Offensive	 in	 the	 United	 States:	 Cultural	 Diplomacy,	 Media	Campaigning,	and	Congressional	Lobbying	Gary	Rawnsley	 2013	 Limits	of	China’s	Cultural	Diplomacy	Parama	 Sinha	Palit	 2013	 China’s	Cultural	Diplomacy:	Historical	Origin,	Modern	Methods	and	Strategic	Outcomes	Andrea	Beck	 2013	 The	Shanghai	Ballet:	A	Model	for	Chinese	Cultural	Diplomacy?	Su-Yan	Pan	 2013	 Confucius	Institute	project:	China’s	cultural	diplomacy	and	soft	power	projection	Jay	Wang,	Han	Chen,	etc.	 2014	 Reshaping	Cultural	Diplomacy	 in	a	New	Era:	Confucius	 Institutes	&	China’s	Soft-Power	Strategy	Ingrid	d’Hooghe	 2014	 China’s	Cultural	Diplomacy	 	Michael	Barr	 	 2014	 Chinese	cultural	diplomacy:	old	wine	in	new	bottles?	Yao	Yung-Wen	 2015	 The	Void	of	Chineseness:	Contemporary	Art	and	Cultural	Diplomacy	in	China	Yu-Shan	Wu	 2015	 Cultural	Diplomacy	through	‘China’s	Year	in	South	Africa’	Da	Kong	 2015	 Imaging	 China:	 China’s	 Cultural	 Diplomacy	 Through	 Loan	 Exhibitions	 to	 British	Museums	 	W.	Bilgsam	 2015	 China’s	Cultural	Diplomacy	and	the	“Chinese	Cultural	Year”	in	Turkey	Lan	Mi,	 	Xinyu	Xing,	etc.	 	2015	 中国周边国家和地区文化外交系列(Translation:	 China’s	 Cultural	 Diplomacy	 with	 the	Neighbouring	States	Collection)	Yaning	Wang	 	 2015	 中国文化外交可持续发展的基础(Translation:	The	Sustainable	Development	Foundation	of	China’s	Cultural	Diplomacy)	
Table	8.	The	summary	result	of	main	academic	literature	concerning	China’s	cultural	
diplomacy	in	the	past	twenty	years.		Many	 scholars	 studying	 on	 the	 aspect	 of	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 point	 out	that	 ‘China,	 a	 country	 with	 a	 long	 history,	 after	 more	 than	 30	 years	 opening	reform,	 its	 hard	 power	 has	 reached	 a	 relatively	 high	 level.	 If	 China	 wants	 to	achieve	the	national	culture	rejuvenation,	developing	its	soft	power	could	attract	more	attention	from	international	society’	(Li,	2012,	p.47.	see	also	Wang,	2015;	Kong,	 2015).	 Domestic	 academic	 research	 concerning	 the	 topic	 ‘cultural	
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diplomacy	 of	 China’	 particularly	 outstanding	 in	 2012	 as	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	following	figure	showing	the	number	of	articles	that	were	published	containing	the	 term	 in	 each	 year,	 as	 determined	 by	 a	 search	 on	 the	 Chinese	 National	Knowledge	Infrastructure	(CNKI)	academic	database.	 	 	 		
	
Figure	 7.	 Academic	 search	 results	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 from	
CNKI	 	 		From	this	figure,	it	can	be	seen	that	in	the	first	few	years	of	the	2000s,	the	topic	regarding	the	cultural	diplomacy	of	China	received	little	attention	until	the	year	2005.	 After	 the	 2008	 Beijing	 Olympic	 Games,	 the	 influence	 of	 Chinese	 culture	received	increasing	public	interest,	domestically	and	internationally.	At	this	time,	about	a	hundred	news	and	academic	works	discussed	about	Chinese	cultural	soft	power	during	the	period	of	 the	Olympic	Games,	with	title	such	as“北京奥运会开
幕式展示的中国文化让观众难忘	 The	 Opening	 Ceremony	 of	 Beijing	 Olympics	Shows	Chinese	Culture,	which	Leaves	a	Deep	Impression	on	the	Audience”	(Y.	Liu,	2008),	 北京奥运会助推汉语全球推 Beijing	 Olympics	 Promotes	 the	 Globalisation	
of	 Chinese	 Language	 (Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 of	 China,	 2008),	 Owning	 the	
Olympics:	 Narratives	 of	 the	 New	 China	 (Price	 and	 Dayan,	 2009),	 The	 Beijing	














Almost	every	Chinese	people	would	like	to	say	that	they	are	quite	proud	of	the	profound	 and	 rich	 Chinese	 culture;	 however,	 it	 is	 a	 fact	 that	 Chinese	 culture	remains	 as	 an	 abstract	 concept	 to	 international	 audiences,	 who	 continue	 to	receive	information	about	China	largely	from	the	sources	of	the	mass	media.	In	the	 global	 academic	 field,	 some	 scholars,	 journalists,	 and	 commentators	 often	hold	 sceptical	 perspective	 towards	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 China’s	 soft	 power,	national	image	or	trust	building.	These	academic	works	and	reports	can	be	found	through	the	various	journals	and	news	outlets.	For	example,	David	Shambaugh,	argues	that	‘since	2008	the	Chinese	government	increasingly	has	recognised	the	importance	 of	 its	 international	 image	 and	 building	 “soft	 power”	 as	 part	 of	 the	nation’s	 “comprehensive	 power”( 综 合 国 力 ).	 Various	 government	 and	Communist	Party	agencies	have	been	prioritizing	this	effort	and	pouring	billions	into	different	activities	abroad.	In	a	short	time,	China	has	managed	significantly	to	increase	its	“cultural	footprint”	overseas.	But,	the	question	remains:	is	all	the	investment	 producing	 dividends?	 Thus	 far,	 the	 answer	 must	 be	 “No”	(Shambaugh,	2013).	 		Dongchang	Liu,	 the	 chief	 executive	officer	of	 the	National	 Soft	Power	Research	Centre	 of	 Peking	 University,	 argues	 that10	 ‘soft	 power	 is	 a	 power	 of	 support,	creativity,	 impetus,	 and	 transmission.	 Particularly,	 it	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 spirit,	 faith,	ideology,	 moral	 support,	 social	 material	 and	 spiritual	 civilisation	 of	 original	strength.	 In	 order	 to	 form	 the	 powerful	 soft	 power,	 the	 key	 is	 to	 occupy	 the	commanding	heights	of	cultural	values	with	the	universally	accepted	conceptual	system.	 However,	 cultural	 differences	 and	 various	 cultural	 backgrounds	 are	bringing	difficulties	to	the	spread	of	culture’	(Chen,	2010).	Therefore,	according	to	 Liu,	 in	 the	 international	 environment,	 culture	 could	 not	 be	 satisfactorily	disseminated	 unless	 its	 weakness	 could	 be	 overcome.	 If	 China	 wants	 to	 use	cultural	diplomacy	to	either	shape	its	global	 image	or	establish	state	trust	with	other	 states,	 the	 following	 weaknesses	 of	 its	 cultural	 diplomacy	 should	 be	recognised	and	overcome.	





To	 begin,	 compared	 to	 developed	 countries,	 the	 strategies	 of	 China’s	 cultural	diplomacy	are	still	immature,	and	effective	system	of	cultural	diplomacy	has	not	been	 formed	yet,	which	 limits	 the	 relevant	plans	on	cultural	diplomacy	and	 its	implementation.	This	problem	is	reflected	in	a	number	of	ways:		Firstly,	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 has	 over	 emphasised	 Chinese	 traditional	culture	while	ignoring	creativity	and	innovation.	
 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 lacks	 creative	 and	 innovative	 content.	 Rawnsley	argues	 that	 ‘locating	culture	and	 tradition	at	 the	 forefront	of	soft	power	 is	 that	there	is	no	guarantee	that	cultural	interest	will	convert	into	tangible	soft	power	outcomes’	(Rawnsley,	2013).	As	one	of	the	four	great	ancient	civilisations,	China	enjoys	ample	cultural	 resources	 indeed;	however,	contemporary	culture	 is	also	the	 indivisible	 part	 of	 Chinese	 culture.	 Hence,	 in	 accordance	 with	 such	 an	exceptional	advantage	of	traditional	culture	and	the	emergence	of	contemporary	culture,	 policy	makers	 of	 Chinese	 government	 should	 be	much	 better	 to	 think	about	 what	 forms	 of	 culture	 could	 be	 demonstrated	 on	 the	 world	 stage	 and	accepted	well	by	international	audiences.	 				As	 for	 the	 connection	 between	 traditional	 culture	 and	 cultural	 soft	 power,	Hongxi	 Yang	 argues	 that11‘excellent	 part	 of	 ancient	 Chinese	 culture	 and	 the	reconstruction	of	contemporary	core	value	system	are	closely	related,	but	there	is	 a	 vast	 amount	 of	 differences	 in	 existence.	 For	 a	 long	 time,	 people	 generally	tend	to	promote	the	ancient	Chinese	culture	and	even	take	Confucianism	as	the	main	 content	 to	 enhance	 the	 soft	 power.	 If	 one	 were	 to	 look	 at	 the	 issues	objectively,	the	relationship	of	ancient	Chinese	culture	and	contemporary	value	system	form	a	connecting	 link	between	the	past	and	 the	present,	but	 there	are	differences	in	the	aspect	of	time,	space,	and	content.	It	cannot	just	combine	and	simplify	the	two	concepts	together.	Otherwise,	it	may	lead	to	a	state	of	monotony	on	 the	 content	 of	 soft	 power	 and	 the	 channel	 for	 dissemination’	 (Yang,	 2013).	






For	 example,	 every	man	 has	 his	 hobby-horse,	 if	 China	 puts	more	 emphasis	 on	Confucianism	 and	 allows	 it	 to	 be	 perceived	 as	 the	 pioneer	 in	 the	 process	 of	cultural	 diplomacy	while	 ignoring	 the	 current	 cultural	 reality	 in	 contemporary	China,	it	will	cause	a	somewhat	biased	understanding	towards	Chinese	culture.		In	 consideration	 of	 this	 weakness,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 should	 keep	 a	balance	between	traditional	Chinese	culture	and	contemporary	Chinese	culture.	As	 Kam	 Louie	 agrees	 that	 1949	 is	 taken	 to	 mark	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	contemporary	 era	 of	 China	 (Louie,	 2009).	 According	 to	 Prof.	 Lihua	 Zhang,	Chinese	 culture	 consists	 of	 three	 main	 elements:	 traditional	 Chinese	 cultural	resources	represented	mainly	by	Confucian	culture	as	its	main	content,	political	culture	represented	by	Marxist	theory	and	thinking,	and	contemporary	Chinese	culture.	In	most	cases	of	cultural	diplomacy,	traditional	culture	has	occupied	the	centre	 stage	 in	 the	 process	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 for	 a	 long	 time	 and	 has	 an	influence	 on	 the	 further	 development	 of	 contemporary	 Chinese	 culture.	 This	phenomenon	 also	 has	 unintended	 consequences,	 contemporary	 culture	 has	fewer	chances	to	be	improved	on	the	domestic	and	international	stage,	and	that	international	audience	does	not	fully	understand	the	current	political,	economic	and	cultural	situation	in	China	if	their	impression	towards	China	is	still	moulded	in	 the	past	 period	of	 China.	Therefore,	 in	 the	process	of	 developing	 traditional	cultural	elements,	boosting	contemporary	Chinese	culture	should	be	 taken	 into	further	consideration.		Secondly,	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 has	 over-emphasised	 professional	communication	 in	 the	 area	 of	 culture	 while	 ignoring	 perspectives	 and	participation	from	the	public.	 	 		In	China,	various	kinds	of	cultural	forums,	conferences,	and	activities	have	been	organised,	where	most	attendants	 come	 from	government,	high-level	academic	or	professional	fields.	In	the	development	cultural	diplomacy,	whether	it	is	in	the	aspect	of	cultural	export	or	cultural	import,	the	public	need	more	opportunities	to	get	to	know	about	domestic	and	international	culture.	In	the	current	stage	of	
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China’s	 cultural	diplomacy,	 this	problem	could	be	 regarded	as	one	of	 the	blind	spots	ignored	by	event	organisers	including	the	government.		Thirdly,	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 has	 over-emphasised	 the	 control	 of	 the	Chinese	 government	 while	 downplaying	 joint	 efforts	 by	 relevant	non-government	sectors.	 		As	a	single-party	state,	it	is	impossible	to	avoid	the	CPC’s	management	of	cultural	affairs	 completely.	 However,	 the	 strict	 management	 methods	 by	 the	 Chinese	government	regarding	the	cultural	issues	might	undermine	the	credibility	of	its	cultural	soft	power.	Gary	Rawnsley	argues	that	‘China’s	authoritarian	methods	of	political	 management	 undermine	 the	 credibility	 of	 its	 cultural	 soft	 power.	 In	other	 words,	 China	 experiences	 problems	 within	 the	 political	 realm	 which	prevent	 its	 soft	 power–including	 strategies	 privileging	 culture–being	 as	attractive	 to	 international	 audiences	 as	 they	 otherwise	 might	 be’	 (Rawnsley,	2013).	Annukka	Kinnari	argues	 that	 ‘control	brings	along	 ideas	of	 security	and	stability	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 it	 produces	 ideas	 of	 rigidity	 and	 inflexibility’	(Kinnari,	 2014,p.157).	 The	 central	 government’s	 excessive	 political	 control	towards	 the	 agenda	 of	 the	 cultural	 diplomatic	 activities	 might	 reduce	 the	diversity	of	cultural	contents	and	forms	when	meeting	foreign	audiences.		At	 the	 same	 time,	 government	 control	 of	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 may	 put	constraints	 on	 the	 enthusiasm	 of	 private	 enterprises,	 social	 organisations	 and	folk	 artists.	 Taking	 Hanban’s	 management	 of	 the	 Confucius	 Institutes	 as	 an	example,	which	 closely	under	 the	 control	 of	 central	 government.	However,	 the	similar	 institutes	 in	other	states,	 such	as	British	Council,	 the	Alliance	Francaise	or	the	Goethe	Institute,	 they	could	maintain	more	distance	and	autonomy	from	their	 respective	 governments.	 Recently,	 the	 situation	 with	 respect	 to	 the	diversity	of	actors	within	the	programs	of	cultural	diplomacy	is	getting	better.	An	increasing	 number	 of	 private	 enterprises	 are	 taking	 an	 active	 role	 in	 the	activities	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 international	 cultural	communication.	However,	strict	censorship	and	explicit	or	implicit	manipulation	by	 the	Chinese	government	 towards	cultural	 issues	 is	still	a	major	challenge	 to	
  
	 141	




    
Figure	8	The	proportion	of	cultural	expenditure	in	the	national	fiscal	expenditure	 	 	 	(Ministry	of	Culture	of	PRC,	2011b)	
Comparison	of	the	Average	Annual	Growth	Rate	of	Social	Expenses	in	Each	Period	
	
Figure	 9	 Comparison	 of	 the	 average	 annual	 growth	 rate	 of	 social	 expenses	 in	 each	
period	 	(Ministry	of	Culture	of	PRC,	2011)		In	 recent	 years,	 the	 problem	 of	 cultural	 expenditure	 is	 turning	 better.	 The	economic	 dominance	 of	 China	 on	 the	 international	 stage	 is	widely	 recognised,	and	recent	expenditure	in	the	cultural	sector	is	assuming	a	larger	proportion	as	well.	For	example,	according	to	the	estimation	of	the	Chinese	Ministry	of	Culture,	which	considers	that	cultural	expenditure	shall	increase	from	the	current	3%	to	5%	of	the	country's	GDP	by	the	end	of	“Thirteenth-Five	Period”	(2020)’	(Ministry	of	 Culture	 of	 PRC,	 2016).	However,	the	expenditure	of	cultural	diplomacy	only	accounts	for	a	minor	proportion	of	this	amount.	Therefore,	it	is	an	indication	of	the	position	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	the	national	strategy	of	China.		
	 	 	 	 “Ninth-Five”	Period	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 “Tenth-Five”	Period	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 “Eleventh-Five”	Period	
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Moreover,	 the	 problem	 concerning	 the	 complex	 administrative	 system	 of	 the	Chinese	 government	 that	 is	 the	 issue	 of	 overlapping	 responsibilities	 and	 lacks	the	 specific	 administrative	 range	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 which	 might	 lead	 to	inferior	overall	working	efficiency	of	cultural	diplomacy.		For	 example,	 the	 project	 of	 “China	 Cultural	 Year”	 should	 be	within	 the	 area	 of	responsibility	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Culture.	However,	 no	 related	 information	was	available	on	its	website.	The	Chinese	government	and	related	institutions	did	not	publish	 summary	 reports	 concerning	 any	 projects	 of	 the	 cultural	 year.	 It	 is	 an	obvious	problem	that	no	government	departments	or	organisations	summarise	and	 collect	 relevant	 information.	 According	 to	 the	 information	 collected	 from	Internet	database,	the	general	information	about	the	cultural	year	could	be	listed	as	followed:		
Summary	List	of	“China	Cultural	Year”	 	




Table	9.	Summary	List	of	“China	Cultural	Year”	 	As	for	publicity	about	the	cultural	years	 listed	above,	the	Ministry	of	Culture	of	the	 PRC	 does	 not	 publish	 any	 details	 of	 related	 events.	 English	 language	homepage	 of	 Ministry	 of	 Culture	 of	 the	 PRC	 offers	 some	 information	 about	Chinese	 culture	 to	 the	 international	 audience	 but	 mainly	 exhibits	 general	information	 about	 cultural	 activities	 domestically.	 It	 does	 not	 mention	 any	aspects	 concerning	 the	 relevant	 duties	 and	 cultural	 diplomatic	 program	of	 the	Ministry	of	Culture.	Therefore,	international	audiences	could	not	possibly	draw	a	better	 understanding	 of	 China’s	 cultural	 policies,	 and	 could	 not	 find	 current	forthcoming	events	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	China	or	other	countries.		In	 addition,	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 may	 be	 hampered	 by	 its	 Internet	censorship.	 This	 aspect	 mainly	 concerning	 the	 firm	 control	 of	 Chinese	government	 is	 the	 block	 issues	 of	 YouTube,	 Facebook,	 and	 Twitter,	 which	 are	used	by	the	most	countries	in	the	international	community.	Scholars	rightly	ask:	“Can	 you	 really	win	 hearts	 and	minds	 of	 current	 and	 future	 generations	when	you	are	known	as	a	country	that	blocks	Facebook,	Google,	YouTube,	and	Twitter?”	(Bishop,	 2013).	 This	 question	 is	 still	 in	 the	 situation	 of	 hot-debate.	 David	Shambaugh	 argues	 that	 ‘China's	 global	 public	 image	 is	mixed	 at	 best,	 although	there	do	exist	‘pockets	of	favourability’	in	Africa	and	Latin	America.	Elsewhere	in	the	 world,	 China's	 national	 image	 generally	 is	 mixed	 to	 poor	 and	 declining’	(Shambaugh,	2013).	In	recent	years,	China	also	greatly	try	to	project	its	positive	national	 image	 in	 other	 countries	 as	well,	 such	 as	 Pakistan,	 Bangladesh,	Nepal	and	 Myanmar.	 It	 is	 probably	 a	 natural	 part	 of	 becoming	 a	 global	 power,	 but	Shambaugh	considers	 that	 the	 czars	of	China's	 ‘external	propaganda’	would	be	better	served	to	reflect	on	the	kinds	of	activities	that	give	China	a	negative	image	abroad	than	simply	investing	in	programs	for	cultural	exchange.	‘If	the	‘message’	isn't	 sellable,	 no	well-resourced	 ‘messenger’	 can	 sell	 it’	 (Shambaugh,	 2013).	 It	might	 be	 a	 serious	 flaw	 in	 the	 government’s	 strategy,	 and	 it	 also	 could	 be	
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considered	 as	 the	major	 structural	 and	 cultural	 issues	 that	make	 it	 extremely	difficult	for	China	to	push	its	soft	power	agenda	over	the	Internet.			This	weakness	is	widely	recognised	by	other	scholars	as	well.	For	 instance,	Bill	Bishop	 argues	 that	 ‘China	 has	 planned	 the	 soft	 power	 effort	 as	 a	multi-decade	effort,	 but	 the	 lack	 of	 effective	 products	 for	 the	medium	 of	 future	 generations	may	 doom	 the	 government's	 efforts.	 In	 addition,	 none	 of	 the	 major	 Chinese	Internet	 social	 media--Baidu,	 Tencent,	 Sina,	 Sohu,	 Shanda	 and	 Netease--have	either	 the	 DNA	 or	 the	 credibility	 to	 succeed	 materially	 in	 the	 main	 overseas	markets’	(Bishop,	2013).	Therefore,	currently,	this	strategy	might	be	flawed	due	to	 the	 worries	 about	 media	 soft	 power	 efforts	 in	 promoting	 China’s	 cultural	diplomacy.		Furthermore,	China’s	 cultural	diplomacy	usually	give	a	 relatively	cold	shoulder	to	foreign	audiences	in	the	aspect	of	their	perceptions	and	understanding.	 		As	the	concept	of	cultural	diplomacy	has	been	discussed	in	Chapter	Two,	which	places	much	 emphasis	 on	 the	 purposes	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy:	 not	 only	matter	more	with	national	image	and	cultural	promotion	but	also	change	and	influence	the	attitudes	and	behaviours	of	 foreign	audiences.	However,	 those	programs	of	China’s	cultural	diplomacy	lack	the	experience	concerning	what	can	be	accepted	and	 perceived	 by	 international	 audiences.	 This	 weakness	 decreases	 the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomatic	efforts.	The	reason	leading	to	this	weakness	might	 rely	 on	 the	 current	 approaches	 to	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 which	concentrate	quite	a	lot	on	the	source	and	styles	of	the	communication,	while	not	providing	 enough	 focuses	 on	 the	 power	 of	 the	 receiver	 living	 within	 distinct	political,	social	and	cultural	contexts.	 	 		Overall,	 cultural	 forms	 are	 quite	 subjective.	What	 appeals	 to	 the	 public	 in	 this	state	 might	 not	 necessarily	 appeal	 to	 the	 audience	 in	 other	 states，especially	when	cultural	products	and	cultural	projects	are	dispersed	around	the	world	for	consumption	 by	 audiences	who	 have	 little	 or	 no	 cultural	 appreciation	 of	what	they	are	seeing	and	feeling.	Rawnsley	considers	that	 it	 is	because	 ‘the	audience	
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holds	the	power’	(Rawnsley,	2013).	Joseph	Nye	also	put	up	with	his	perspective	towards	 this	point,	and	he	states	 that	success	 in	soft	power	means	recognising	that	 ‘outcomes,	more	 in	 control	of	 the	 subject	 than	 is	often	 the	 case	with	hard	power’	(Nye,	2008).	That	 is	 to	say,	audiences	 for	 international	communications	and	cultural	flows	decide	whether	and	how	they	will	accept,	 internalise	and	act	upon	the	message.	 		Finally,	these	academic	works	and	official	reports	problematically	tend	to	abide	by	 the	Chinese	 saying	 to	 “Hui	 Ji	 Ji	Yi”12.	 In	other	words,	 it	means	 to	hide	one's	troubles	and	take	no	remedial	measures.	 	
Most	 academic	 works	 or	 government	 reports	 concentrate	 on	 the	 positive	messages	 about	 the	 government	 while	 ignoring	 its	 weaknesses	 and	 mistakes.	They	collectively	state	how	glorious	China’s	cultural	diplomacy	is	and	how	many	achievements	have	been	reached	through	cultural	diplomacy.	However,	in	order	to	 avoid	 touching	 the	 ‘sensitive’	 topics,	 few	 scholars	 mention	 the	 specific	disadvantages	 or	 weaknesses	 of	 action	 plans	 concerning	 cultural	 diplomacy	designed	by	the	Chinese	government.	Therefore,	these	papers	and	reports	often	fail	 to	 offer	 constructive	 suggestions	 for	 the	 development	 of	 China’s	 cultural	diplomacy.	 With	 regard	 to	 this	 problem,	 state	 censorship	 could	 be	 another	important	 cause.	 Chinese	 government	 maintains	 censorship	 over	 all	 media	capable	of	reaching	a	wide	audience.	This	includes	television	and	radio	programs,	print	 media,	 film,	 theatre	 projects,	 text	 messaging,	instant	 messaging	 of	 social	communication	 tools,	 video	 games,	literature,	 and	 the	sources	 on	 the	Internet.	Therefore,	 it	 is	not	an	easy	 job	 to	 find	 the	negative	messages	 towards	China.	
5.5	Practices	of	China’s	Cultural	Diplomacy	in	State	Trust	Building	 	When	 friction	 happens	 between	 China	 and	 other	 states,	 misunderstanding	 or	hostile	 attitudes	 could	 easily	 emerge.	One	of	 the	methods	 to	 ease	 such	 friction	and	 build	 mutual	 trust	 is	 to	 broaden	 cultural	 exchanges	 among	 state	 actors	further.	 To	 the	 Chinese	 government,	mutual	 trust	was	meant	 to	 imply	 that	 all	
                                                12	 讳疾忌医	 (English	translation:	hide	one's	troubles	and	take	no	remedial	measures)	
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General	Background	This	 APEC	 Summit	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	 the	 premier	 platform	 for	 the	 APEC	economic	 leaders	and	business	executives	 to	discuss	economic	 issues,	promote	
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trade,	 investment	 and	 cooperation	 in	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 Region.	 The	 Central	Government	 of	 China	 also	 made	 cultural	 diplomatic	 efforts	 in	 the	 stage	 of	preparation	and	 the	process	of	events.	For	example,	 the	conference	venue	was	decorated	with	classical	features	of	China,	Chinese	style	costumes	were	provided	for	state	 leaders	and	their	spouses,	and	typical	Chinese	cuisine	was	offered.	All	these	aspects	are	loaded	with	Chinese	cultural	elements,	which	are	the	attempts	to	demonstrate	the	culture	and	the	ideology	that	the	Chinese	government	wants	to	show	foreign	audiences.		The	 APEC	 Summit	 is	 an	 economically	 orientated	 summit,	 but	 the	 Chinese	government	 seized	 this	 opportunity	 to	 exhibit	 Chinese	 culture	 and	 attempt	 to	integrate	 it	within	 economic	 cooperation	 at	 that	 time.	 Furthermore,	 this	 APEC	Summit	was	a	channel	 for	the	Chinese	government	to	demonstrate	the	sublime	culture	of	China	by	association	with	 its	economic	successes.	As	for	the	previous	APEC	summits,	 cultural	elements	usually	played	a	major	 role,	 and	showing	 the	unique	culture	of	the	host	country	seems	to	be	an	unwritten	rule	of	APEC.	During	the	whole	week	of	the	2014	APEC	summit,	China	took	its	chance	to	use	elements	of	 Chinese	 culture	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 its	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 As	 a	 grand	international	event,	this	APEC	Summit	assembled	a	large	grouping	of	influential	international	media,	 which	 provided	 an	 ideal	 platform	 for	 China	 to	 exhibit	 its	national	characteristics.	 		With	the	aspect	of	state	trust	building,	Chinese	leaders	usually	prefer	to	use	the	concept	of	 friendship	 to	express	 the	will	 to	build	mutual	 trust	with	other	state	actors.	For	example,	in	this	summit,	Xi	accordingly	argued	‘we	should	make	more	friends	 with	 our	 neighbouring	 countries	 while	 abiding	 by	 the	 principle	 of	non-alignment	and	building	a	global	network	of	partnership’	(Xi,	2014b).	Xi	often	draws	 political	 wisdom	 from	 traditional	 Chinese	 culture	 to	 articulate	 China’s	contemporary	 diplomacy.	 Hence,	 Xi	 repeatedly	 stressed	‘establishing	 friendly	relationships	with	other	states’,	quoting	some	famous	lines	from	ancient	Chinese	poems.	 Furthermore,	 Xi	 used	 the	 term	of	 雁	 (yan-meaning	 geese)	 throughout	the	 summit,	 such	 as	 ‘overlooking	 the	 river,	 westerly	 winds	 reveal	 layers	 of	whitecaps	 like	one	 thousand	 falling	 flowers;	 look	up	 to	 the	 sky,	 a	 line	of	 geese	
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flying	in	the	blue	sky’	(风翻白浪花千片，雁点青天字一行);	‘a	single	flower	does	not	herald	the	arrival	of	spring;	a	 lonely	goose	cannot	make	a	 flying	formation’	(一花不是春，孤雁难成行)	(CCTV	News,	2014).	Additionally,	 the	 venue	 of	 this	APEC	 Summit	 is	 located	 in	 the	 ‘Yanqi	 Lake’	 (雁栖湖),	which	means	 the	 lake	where	the	geese	are	usually	having	a	rest.	It	contains	the	Chinese	character	‘yan’,	which	is	the	same	meaning	as	the	two	lines	quoted.	‘Yan’	is	a	kind	of	wild	geese	and	is	symbolic	in	Chinese	culture	with	reference	to	royalty,	ambition,	teamwork,	and	 cooperation	 (Cao,	 2014).	Regarding	 the	direction	of	 China’s	 foreign	policy	and	 its	 diplomatic	 attitude,	 Xi	 used	 “geese”	 as	 a	 metaphor	 to	 express	 his	perspective	 that	 it	 is	 quite	 significant	 to	 cultivate	 the	 awareness	 of	 a	 common	destiny.	 In	 general,	 these	 represent	 the	message	of	 the	Chinese	 government	 in	the	aspect	of	 enhancing	economic	 integration	 to	 thereafter	 shape	a	new	vision	for	the	development	of	the	Asia-Pacific	region.	In	the	eyes	of	people	who	are	not	quite	 familiar	 with	 Chinese	 culture,	 it	 might	 be	 difficult	 to	 understand	 the	profound	meaning	of	‘yan’;	hence,	the	Chinese	government	may	fail	to	deliver	the	relevant	message	with	the	efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	this	event.		
Impacts	of	the	Cultural	Diplomacy	in	this	Summit	This	APEC	Summit	can	be	perceived	as	a	great	improvement	for	China’s	cultural	diplomacy.	However,	some	improvements	and	several	weaknesses	that	influence	the	 effectiveness	 of	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 can	 be	 noticed	 in	 this	 summit,	those	 of	 which	 are	 discussed	 respectively	 in	 the	 following	 sections.	 Since	 the	2008	 Olympic	 Games	 in	 Beijing	 to	 the	 2012	 Shanghai	 EXPO,	 this	 2014	 APEC	Summit	 in	Beijing	 has	 grasped	 another	 chance	 to	 show	Chinese	 culture.	 Three	obvious	improvements	are	listed	as	follows:		Firstly,	 this	 summit	 fosters	 a	 group	 of	 cultural	 industries’	 rejuvenation	 and	improves	 their	 competitiveness.	 This	 summit	 uses	 Chinese	 culture	 as	 its	interaction	channel,	then	a	series	of	related	cultural	products	have	their	day.	For	example,	 according	 to	 the	 interview,	 an	 anonymous	 officer	 in	 Beijing	Government	mentioned	the	contract	bidding	for	APEC	costume.	During	the	first	phase,	there	were	136	companies	joining	the	costume	sketches	filtering	process,	
  
	 150	
and	then	there	were	4	companies	being	chosen	to	conduct	the	costume	making:	“Erdos	 1946”	was	 in	 charge	 of	 accessories;	 “NE	TIGER”	was	 in	 charge	 of	male	costume	making;	 “Chuhe	 Tingxiang”	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 female	 costume	making	and	“Dingsheng	Silk”	was	in	charge	of	fabric	supply.	They	cooperated	with	each	other	 through	 the	 strong	 competitiveness	 to	 create	 “xin	 zhong	 zhuang”,	which	had	 attracted	 the	 world’s	 attention.	 After	 the	 APEC	 Summit,	 some	 countries	clothing	companies	come	to	Beijing	to	get	more	information	and	try	to	establish	production	 line	 with	 China,	 and	 it	 also	 arises	 the	 “national	 costume	 research	fever”	both	domestically	and	internationally,	for	instance,	Studies	and	Analysis	on	
the	Style	of	Xin	Zhong	Zhuang	in	2014	APEC	Summit	(Ge,	2015,	p.17).	It	indicates	that	expression	of	costume	culture	in	promoting	cultural	exchanges	between	the	countries	 is	 a	positive	 factor,	 and	 this	 is	 an	 important	method	 for	 cultural	 and	national	philosophy	transmission	as	well.	Using	costume	as	a	method	of	cultural	diplomacy	 is	 innovative	when	 compared	with	 the	 past	 cultural	 events.	 On	 the	one	 hand,	 it	 is	 a	 direct	 way	 to	 exhibit	 Chinese	 costume	 and	 its	 embroidery	technique.	On	the	other	hand,	 it	 is	an	indirect	way	to	convey	the	message	from	the	patterns	embroidered	on	the	costume.	 		Secondly,	 strengthen	 the	 cultural	 influence	 after	 the	 summit.	 According	 to	 the	report	 from	Beijing	Daily	and	Travel	Daily,	after	the	APEC	Summit,	Water	Cube	launches	the	program	of	“APEC	Depth	Tour”	(Travel	Daily,	2014),	which	allows	tourists	to	visit	the	dining	venue	and	taste	the	desserts	of	the	national	banquet,	and	buy	the	APEC	souvenirs.	Water	Cube	also	offers	 free	tour	guide	service	 for	visitors.	 According	 to	 the	 reply	 from	 the	 National	 Aquatics	 Centre,	 the	 deputy	mentions	 that	 APEC	 Depth	 Tour	 attracts	 more	 than	 8,000	 visitors	 every	 day,	which	 increases	5,000	visitors	more	 than	 the	 same	period	of	 last	year	 (Xinhua	News,	 2014).	 This	 tour	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 for	 both	 domestic	 and	international	public;	the	detailed	tour	explanation	helps	to	broaden	the	public’s	
  
	 151	
knowledge	 of	 APEC	 and	 the	 cultural	 diplomatic	 efforts	 of	 the	 Chinese	government	 in	 this	 summit.	 Furthermore,	 this	 APEC	 Depth	 Tour	 unveils	 the	mask	of	leader’s	high-level	conference	and	dining	venue	and	meets	the	curiosity	of	the	public.	For	both	domestic	and	international	audience,	this	tour	offers	them	an	 opportunity	 to	 observe	 the	 cultural	 products	 vividly	 in	 person.	 The	effectiveness	of	this	cultural	diplomacy	will	not	merely	terminate	on	the	day	of	the	closing	ceremony.	 		Thirdly,	first	lady’s	cultural	diplomacy	propels	Chinese	culture	to	strengthen	its	cultural	 influence.	 Promoting	 culture	 is	 a	major	 task	 for	 a	 first	 lady,	 and	 Peng	Liyuan	 is	 the	perfect	example.	According	 to	Ruan	Zongze,	 the	vice-president	of	the	China	Institute	of	 International	Studies,	he	argues	that	 ‘people	can	discover	the	 beauty	 of	 Chinese	 culture	 through	 Peng’s	 dresses	 and	 her	 ideas’	 (Wang,	2015).	As	the	first	lady	and	folk	singer	with	almost	zero	negative	gossips,	Peng’s	appearance	and	behaviours	 in	this	Summit	boost	the	power	of	Chinese	cultural	communication.	The	benefit	of	first	lady’s	cultural	diplomacy	in	APEC	is	that	first	lady	 could	 easily	 pass	 on	 female’s	 soft	 and	 friendly	 image	 to	 the	 international	audience,	 and	 it	 is	 the	 most	 obvious	 manifestation	 of	 the	 contemporary	 idea	concerning	 soft	 power.	 According	 to	 the	 Report	 of	 China’s	 Public	 Diplomacy	
Development	(2015),	 the	first	lady’s	diplomacy	is	one	of	the	categories	of	public	diplomacy,	which	could	help	China	to	express	its	goodwill	so	as	to	shape	China’s	good,	peaceful	and	civilised	image	in	the	international	society	(Zhou,	2015,	p.68).	Zhao	Kejin,	 a	professor	of	Tsinghua	University,	 he	 argues	 that13‘the	 interaction	among	first	ladies	emphasise	on	the	aspect	of	soft	communication.	For	example,	culture	and	understanding,	which	can	indirectly	affect	the	relationship	between	their	husbands	and	then	provide	cooperation	opportunity	for	the	governments’	(Zhao,	 2014).	 In	 the	 contemporary	 era	 (1949-now),	 when	 looks	 at	 the	




performance	of	 first	 ladies	 in	China,	 Peng	 is	 the	 extraordinary	one	 to	promote	the	 development	 of	 China’s	 culture	 on	 the	 international	 stage.	 Additionally,	Peng’s	performance	as	a	first	lady	can	be	considered	as	an	effective	supplement	of	China’s	cultural	diplomacy.	 	 		 	Those	 weaknesses	 will	 not	 only	 affect	 state	 trust	 building	 but	 also	 bring	unfavourable	 impacts,	such	as	misinterpretation	of	Chinese	culture,	 inadequate	understanding,	doubtful	attitudes	 towards	China’s	 capability	 in	 similar	 cultural	events,	 and	 other	 ignored	 factors.	 In	 accordance	with	 the	 factors	 discussed	 in	Chapter	 Four,	 this	 APEC	 Summit	 has	 following	 disadvantages	 in	 the	 aspect	 of	cultural	diplomacy:		Firstly,	difficulties	 in	understanding	 the	metaphor	 in	 the	Chinese	 language.	For	this	 APEC	 Summit,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 devoted	 a	 large	 amount	 effort	 in	organising	the	cultural	events	 for	the	opening	ceremony	and	closing	ceremony.	Although	 the	 Chinese	 government	 had	 tried	 efforts	 to	 express	 its	 cultural	message	and	show	its	sincerity	and	goodness	to	the	world,	due	to	the	issues	of	cultural	 difference,	 Chinese	 culture	 tends	 to	 be	more	 implicit.	 Sometimes	 even	not	 all	 the	 Chinese	 people	 could	 grasp	 the	 “yu	 yi”	 (metaphor),	 hence,	 not	 to	mention	the	international	audience	with	different	cultural	backgrounds.	It	is	one	of	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 this	 APEC	 summit,	 how	 to	 convey	 the	 Chinese	 culture	message	 and	 make	 other	 international	 participants	 understand	 quickly	 and	easily,	 and	 how	 to	 well	 combine	 the	 traditional	 culture	 and	 contemporary	Chinese	culture	need	to	be	considered	the	Chinese	government.	 		Otherwise,	without	better	understanding,	then	the	international	audience	would	have	some	sort	of	misunderstanding.	Especially,	on	this	APEC	stage,	a	significant	amount	of	news	and	reports	could	be	published	by	international	media.	For	both	domestic	 and	 international	 journalists,	 sometimes	 they	may	 not	 feel	 the	 deep	meaning	behind	some	displays,	for	example,	these	foreign	guests	could	not	quite	understand	well	about	 the	selection	of	banquet	venue,	 the	dinnerware	and	 the	specially	 designed	 costume,	 they	 even	 may	 misinterpret	 the	 China’s	
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policy-making	 and	 the	meaning	 of	 diplomatic	 plan.	 For	 example,	 a	 hot	 debate	concerning	 the	 dinnerware	 used	 in	 the	 APEC	 banquet	 that	 has	 arisen	 mix	attentions.	 In	 according	 with	 the	 official	 explanation,	 the	 dinnerware	 means	“common	prosperity”,	while	some	news	commenters	considered	it	as	“wan	bang	lai	chao”	(A	collection	of	tribute	gathering	to	the	Central	Kingdom).	It	is	against	the	original	message	 that	 the	Chinese	 government	would	 like	 to	 convey	 to	 the	international	 community,	 and	 it	 even	 adds	 ingredients	 into	 the	 China	 Threat	Theory.	In	this	case,	good	intentions	lead	to	the	negative	results.	 		Secondly,	insufficient	services	after	the	summit.	As	discussed,	this	APEC	costume	has	 attracted	 significant	 attention.	 However,	 after	 the	 summit,	 there	 are	 no	further	exhibitions	showing	the	details	of	“xin	zhong	zhuang”,	except	the	private	exhibition	 in	 the	 NE-Tiger	 Workshop.	 As	 a	 very	 crucial	 cultural	 factor	 in	 the	summit,	without	 further	activities,	 the	public’s	 impression	towards	the	Chinese	culture	 in	 “xin	 zhong	 zhuang”	 has	 been	 gradually	 decreasing,	 and	 then	 its	cultural	 influence	 of	 this	 costume	 tends	 to	 be	 void.	 Additionally,	 once	 lose	 its	cultural	influence,	it	is	difficult	to	rebuild	it	again.	 		Thirdly,	the	role	of	the	First	Lady	lacks	a	certain	of	authorisation.	As	there	is	no	clear	diplomatic	role	of	First	Lady	in	the	Constitution	and	laws	of	China,	what	the	First	Lady	could	do	to	some	extent	entirely	depends	on	the	requirements	of	state	diplomatic	 regulation,	which	 largely	 influences	 the	potential	of	 the	First	Lady’s	soft	power.	When	compared	with	the	role	of	First	Lady	of	the	USA,	it	has	a	clearly	defined	rule	and	specific	 regulations.	The	Office	of	 the	First	Lady	of	 the	United	States	is	accountable	to	the	First	Lady	for	her	to	carry	out	her	duties	as	hostess	of	the	White	House,	and	is	also	in	charge	of	all	social	and	ceremonial	events	of	the	White	 House.	Even	 though	 for	 China	 and	 the	 USA,	 distinctive	 political	 systems	make	the	role	of	the	First	Lady	quite	different.	For	example,	in	this	summit,	Peng	only	 could	 company	 other	 first	 ladies	 to	 visit	 cultural	 heritage	 and	 join	 some	cultural	activities,	but	how	to	promote	Chinese	culture	to	a	higher	 level	 lacks	a	certain	 kind	 of	 efforts	 and	 arrangements.	 Moreover,	 Peng	 could	 be	 a	 capable	assistant	to	President	Xi	in	the	international	event,	while	Peng	could	not	directly	and	 fully	 engage	 herself	 into	 cultural	 cooperation	 issues	 or	 relative	 affairs.	 In	
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comparison	 with	 the	 First	 Lady	 of	 the	 USA,	 China’s	 First	 Lady	 lacks	 a	 certain	authorisation	 and	 autonomy.	 This	weakness	 decreases	 the	 role	 of	 Peng	 as	 the	First	Lady.	Then,	Peng’s	potentials	in	cultural	diplomacy	cannot	be	explored	to	a	certain	extent.	 		Generally	speaking,	 these	similar	efforts	of	 cultural	diplomacy	 in	building	state	trust	 or	 friendship	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 a	 series	 of	 events	 organised	 by	 the	 Chinese	government.	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 various	 factors	 that	 may	 generate	 the	weaknesses	 and	 then	 influence	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 the	process	of	state	trust	building	might	not	go	as	smoothly	as	expected.	It	needs	a	relatively	long	and	stable	period	when	the	outcomes	of	state	trust	building	might	be	demonstrated.	Besides,	other	unseen	evidence	of	 state	 trust	building	by	 the	cultural	 diplomatic	 efforts	 in	 this	 summit	 might	 emerge	 and	 might	 be	demonstrated	 in	 any	 future	 interactions,	 such	 as	 increased	 cooperative	opportunities,	 strengthening	 of	 confidential	 issues,	 and	 publication	 of	 positive	policies.	 		In	 accordance	 with	 pieces	 of	 collected	 evidence,	 which	 firmly	 indicates	 the	existence	 of	 the	minimal	 level	 of	 state	 trust	 among	member	 states,	 shows	 the	sign	of	the	medium	level	of	state	trust	and	the	upper	medium	level	of	state	trust.	In	 this	 summit,	 the	 aspect	 of	 cooperative	 issues	 can	 be	 seen	 throughout	 the	summit.	All	the	member	states	actively	promote	the	Blueprint	of	APEC	Interaction,	which	brings	numerous	cooperation	for	them	(People,	2014).	The	role	of	APEC	in	facilitating	 regional	 integration	 has	 proven	 essential	 to	 promote	 trade	 and	economic	 growth	 in	 the	 Asia-Pacific.	 For	 instance,	 as	 the	 committee,	 ‘reducing	trade	 barriers	 between	members,	 harmonising	 standards	 and	 regulations,	 and	streamlining	customs	procedures	enable	goods,	services,	investment	and	people	to	move	easily	across	borders’	(APEC	Secretariat,	2015,	p.2).		Moreover,	in	2014,	‘APEC	members	committed	to	taking	a	concrete	step	towards	greater	 regional	 economic	 integration	 by	 endorsing	 a	 roadmap	 for	 the	 Free	Trade	 Area	 of	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 to	 translate	 this	 vision	 into	 a	 reality’	 (APEC	Comittee,	2017).	In	2015,	APEC	members	continued	its	efforts	towards	achieving	
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the	 Bogor	 Goals	 of	 free	 trade	 and	 investment	 and	 carry	 forward	 the	 newly	agreed	roadmap	for	APEC’s	contribution	to	the	realisation	of	the	Free	Trade	Area	of	 the	Asia-	Pacific.	This	behaviour	can	be	considered	as	 the	aspect	of	 relevant	reciprocal	benevolent	policies.	However,	within	the	short-term	examination,	the	medium	level	of	state	trust	cannot	be	merely	affirmed,	but	 it	 is	surely	a	sign	of	the	medium	level	of	state	trust.	 	 	 		Additionally,	 in	 the	 2014	 APEC	 Summit,	 the	 APEC	 Committee	 published	 a	statement,	which	said	 it	had	set	up	the	Network	of	Anti-Corruption	Authorities	and	Law	Enforcement	Agencies	(ACT-NET),	which	laid	a	foundation	for	member	states	 to	 fight	 against	 transnational	 corruption.	 Actually,	 in	 the	 2004	 Santiago	APEC	 Summit,	 State	 leaders	 endorsed	 the	 Santiago	 Commitment	 to	 Fight	Corruption	and	Ensure	Transparency	 (APEC	Secretariat,	2016).	 It	has	been	 ten	years	passed	by,	then	in	the	2014	APEC	Summit,	setting	up	the	ACT-NET	among	the	APEC	countries	was	proposed	by	 the	Chinese	government.	 In	 this	scenario,	ACT-NET	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 one	 type	 of	 rules	 that	 APEC	 state	 actors	 adopt.	However,	with	the	short-term	examination	and	the	shortage	of	evidence,	it	could	only	be	considered	as	a	sign	of	the	upper	medium	level	of	state	trust.	State	trust	building	 cannot	 be	 built	 in	 one	 day	 because	 that	 high-level	 state	 trust	 is	extremely	difficult	to	obtain,	and	it	is	also	quite	difficult	to	be	maintained	by	both	sides,	even	multi-sides.	 In	 the	 formation	process	of	state	 trust,	state	actors	had	better	not	 ignore	 the	power	of	cultural	diplomacy.	Besides	 that,	how	to	ensure	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	needs	a	large	amount	of	attention	as	well.	 		
5.7	Conclusion	Human	society	 is	 indeed	a	 civilised	cultural	 society	with	different	 cultures	and	cultural	 elements	 do	 exist	 within	 communication	 and	 interaction	 among	people.	 	There	is	a	Chinese	proverb	“He	Er	Bu	Tong”14	 that	could	offer	a	Chinese	featured	explanation	 for	 this	situation.	 It	means	the	Chinese	tradition	keeps	on	living	 in	 harmony	 and	 smoothly	 with	 others	 while	 persisting	 in	 its	 own	 way	going	forward.	Cultural	diversity	makes	the	world	more	charming	and	attractive,	
                                                14	 和而不同	 (English	translation:	harmony	in	diversity)	
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but	 cultural	 diversity	 can	 also	 foster	 misunderstanding	 and	 cultural	 conflict	among	state	actors.	Therefore,	 the	management	of	 cultural	differences	 through	cultural	diplomacy	is	considered	to	be	a	crucial	issue.	As	Taylor	argues,	‘cultural	relations	are	our	best	hope	of	transmuting	traditional	prejudices	into	attitudes	of	understanding	and	cooperation.	Culture	has	the	advantage	of	being	a	possession,	which	all	people	can	share’	(Taylor,	2013,	p.5).	 		This	chapter	has	looked	at	the	development	history	of	China’s	cultural	diplomacy	and	summarised	the	important	cultural	policy	in	different	leaderships.	Although	the	 development	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 China	 indicates	 a	 significantly	increasing	 trend	 in	 China	 in	 recent	 decades,	 and	 the	 Central	 Government	 of	China	has	grasped	the	significance	of	cultural	diplomacy	to	thereafter	support	its	purpose	of	peaceful	rise,	especially	in	the	aspect	of	building	trust	and	friendship	with	 other	 state	 actors,	 the	weaknesses	 of	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 still	 a	constraining	 factor	 in	 its	 development	 compared	 to	 other	 states.	 This	 chapter	has	outlined	the	weakness	from	six	major	aspects:	 		1)	China’s	cultural	diplomacy	is	still	immature,	and	there	is	no	effective	system,	which	 can	 be	 reflected	 in	 the	 following	 three	 aspects:	 over-emphasising	 the	Chinese	traditional	culture,	over-emphasising	professional	communication	in	the	cultural	area,	and	over-emphasising	the	management	and	control	of	the	Chinese	government.	 	2)	 Problems	 of	 national	 cultural	 expenditure:	 cultural	 expenses	 only	 take	 a	minor	part	in	the	total	fiscal	expenditure,	and	its	growth	is	relatively	slow.	 	3)	The	complex	administrative	system	of	the	Chinese	government.	4)	China’s	cultural	diplomacy	may	be	hampered	by	its	Internet	censorship.	5)	China’s	cultural	diplomacy	usually	ignores	the	perception	and	understanding	of	foreign	audiences.	 	6)	 Most	 academic	 works	 or	 government	 reports	 concentrate	 on	 the	 positive	messages	about	the	government.	 	 		This	chapter	has	also	taken	the	2014	APEC	Summit	 in	Beijing	to	reflect	China’s	cultural	 diplomatic	 efforts	 and	 its	 effectiveness	 in	 state	 trust	 building.	 This	
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6.1	Introduction	The	United	Kingdom	was	one	of	 the	earliest	countries	 to	adopt	 the	methods	of	cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 has	 committed	 to	 international	 cultural	 relations	 for	decades.	 As	 a	 pioneer	 in	 the	 area	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 the	 UK’s	 cultural	diplomatic	 efforts	 have	 been	 influential	 worldwide.	 The	 British	 Council	 has	played	an	important	role	in	assisting	the	UK	government	to	develop	its	cultural	relations	with	other	states,	both	academically	and	practically.	The	British	Council	has	managed	to	take	advantage	of	the	rich	cultural-historical	heritage	of	the	UK	while	 maintaining	 and	 improving	 the	 breadth,	 the	 depth	 of	 expertise	 and	 the	creativity	of	the	UK’s	cultural	sectors.	 		Since	both	governments	have	declared	the	importance	of	a	‘golden	relationship’	between	 the	 UK	 and	 China,	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 joint	 cultural	 events	 are	going	 to	 take	 place	 or	 have	 already	 taken	 place	 in	 both	 states.	 This	 study	 has	examined	the	cultural	efforts	of	the	British	Council	in	recent	decades	and	made	comparisons	with	the	relevant	organisations	in	China,	for	instance,	the	Ministry	of	 Culture.	 It	 has	 raised	 questions,	 such	 as	 how	 have	 the	 cultural	 relations	between	China	and	the	UK	evolved?	Why	has	the	UK	attached	great	importance	to	 its	 cultural	 diplomacy	 towards	 China?	 What	 are	 the	 advantages	 of	 British	Council?	And	in	particular,	how	effective	 is	the	UK’s	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building	with	China?	 		This	 chapter	 answers	 these	 questions	 by	 analysing	 the	 general	 developmental	situation	of	the	UK’s	cultural	diplomacy	and	in	particular,	the	role	of	the	British	Council	 in	 the	 UK’s	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 A	 case	 study	 of	 the	 2015	 China-UK	Cultural	 Year	 is	 adopted	 to	 assess	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 UK’s	 cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building.		
  
	 159	
6.2	Development	of	the	UK’s	Cultural	Diplomacy	in	China	As	argued	by	previous	research,	 ‘the	strength	of	 the	UK’s	historical	 collections,	their	 global	 reputation,	 long-term	 relationships	 with	 foreign	 institutions,	 the	breadth	and	depth	of	expertise	and	the	creativity	of	the	cultural	sector	have	all	made	 the	 UK	 a	 forerunner	 on	 cultural	 diplomacy’	 (Yin,	 2014).	 The	 detailed	examination	of	the	historical	relations	between	the	UK	and	China	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter,	but	analysis	of	this	chapter	will	nonetheless	benefit	from	a	brief	chronology	between	the	UK	and	the	People’s	Republic	of	China.	 		On	 the	 6th	 January	 1950,	 the	 British	 government	 formally	 recognised	 the	sovereign	 status	 of	 the	 People's	 Republic	 of	 China	 and	 was	 the	 first	 major	Western	 country	 to	 do	 so.	 Before	 the	 official	 recognition	 between	 two	 states,	civilian	 groups	 from	both	 sides,	 especially	 from	 the	UK,	 had	 already	 started	 to	visit	 each	 other	 for	 business,	 trade,	 cultural	 exchange,	 education	 and	 other	purposes.	For	example,	the	first	time	the	British	Council	came	into	the	views	of	Chinese	 people	 was	 in	 1943	 (Fisher,	 2009).	 In	 1951,	 pressure	 on	 permit	requirement	 of	 visas,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 suspension	 of	 most	 British	 Council’s	cultural	programs	in	China.	Funding	from	the	British	Council	originally	allocated	for	China	was	redirected	to	Japan	and	activities	were	paused	(Fisher,	2009).	This	hindered	further	cultural	development	between	China	and	the	UK. 	On	17th	June	1954,	the	UK	and	China	established	diplomatic	relations	at	the	level	of	charge	d’-affairs	(Chinese	Embassy	 in	the	UK,	2010).	Around	this	period,	 the	direction	 of	 the	 UK	 and	 China’s	 cultural	 relations	 mostly	 depended	 on	 the	attitude	of	the	Chinese	government.	At	that	time,	China	did	not	fully	realise	that	the	 importance	 of	 cultural	 ties	 between	 two	 states	 could	 be	 used	 against	 the	backdrop	of	 the	Cold	War.	The	UK	had	 in	 turn	been	shocked	by	the	 ideological	interference	 of	 Communism,	 including	 in	 China	 (Fisher,	 2009).	 Cold	 War	 is	 a	major	reason	for	the	limited	cultural	ties	between	China	and	the	UK.	Therefore,	during	 this	 period,	 political	 goals	 still	 remained	 the	 top	 priority	 of	 foreign	relations	between	China	and	the	UK.	Cultural	diplomacy	was	often	considered	to	serve	political	purposes.		
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On	 13th	 March	 1972,	 diplomatic	 relations	 between	 China	 and	 the	 UK	 were	upgraded	 to	 ambassadorial	 level	 (Chinese	 Embassy	 in	 the	UK,	 2010).	 The	 two	sides	 later	 signed	 the	 Joint	 Communiqué	 on	 the	 Agreement	 on	 an	 Exchange	 of	
Ambassadors,	which	marked	the	formal	establishment	of	diplomatic	ties	(Xinhua	Net,	2003).	In	the	1970s,	Chinese	society	was	affected	by	the	cultural	revolution.	While	 formal	 diplomatic	 relations	 were	 established	 in	 the	 1970s,	 the	 cultural	revolution	had	an	extremely	negative	impact	on	cultural	relations	between	China	and	 the	 rest	of	 the	world,	 including	 the	UK.	Due	 to	domestic	 turbulence,	China	had	not	got	enough	capacity	to	maintain	its	relations	with	other	states,	especially	in	the	area	of	cultural	relations.	 		In	1976,	after	the	death	of	Mao	Zedong,	an	alteration	in	China’s	economic	system	was	 introduced	 (Chinaorbit,	 2014).	 The	 Chinese	 government	 started	 an	open-door	 policy,	 which	 quickly	 warmed	 up	 cultural	 relations	 between	 China	and	 the	 UK.	 Evidence	 of	 warmth	 could	 be	 seen	 in	 various	 signed	 agreements	from	 the	 history	 that	 offered	 policy	 guidelines	 for	 facilitation	 of	 cultural	exchanges.	The	British	Council	 also	 took	up	and	expanded	cultural	activities	 in	China,	 which	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 reflection	 upon	 the	 growing	 interaction	between	the	two	sides	(Yin,	2014).		In	November	1979,	the	first	Agreement	on	Educational	and	Cultural	Cooperation	at	 the	 governmental	 level	 was	 signed.	 In	 this	 agreement,	 the	 UK	 and	 China	agreed	 to	 boost	 dialogue	 and	 cooperation	 extensively	 in	 the	 aspects	 of	 arts,	culture,	education,	social	science,	media,	publishing,	sports,	and	tourism,	on	the	basis	of	equality	and	mutual	benefit	(Xinhua	Net,	2003).		In	the	1980s,	the	Ashington	Group	of	the	UK	set	up	the	first	exhibition	from	the	West	in	China	since	the	cultural	revolution	(Artist	Biographies,	2009).	Since	then,	the	 British	 Council	 has	 expanded	 its	 work	 in	 China	 and	 has	 established	information	 centres	 in	 the	 major	 cities	 already,	 such	 as	 Beijing,	 Shanghai,	Guangzhou,	and	Chongqing.		
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In	the	1990s,	after	the	smooth	handover	of	Hong	Kong	to	China	on	1st	July	1997,	bilateral	 relations	 stepped	 onto	 a	 new	 stage	 of	 comprehensive	 development	(Chinese	 Embassy	 in	 the	 UK,	 2010).	 In	 1998,	 China	 and	 the	 UK	 established	 a	comprehensive	partnership	(Chinese	Embassy	in	the	UK,	2010).	In	1999,	the	UK	and	 China	 signed	 important	 agreements	 including	 the	 Program	 of	 Cultural	
Exchanges	from	1999	to	2002	(Xinhua	Net,	2003).	 		In	 2000,	 the	UK	 and	 China	 signed	 the	Memorandum	Concerning	 the	 Reciprocal	
Establishment	 of	 Cultural	 Centres	 (Xinhua	 Net,	 2003),	 and	 after	 2004,	 the	 two	countries	established	a	comprehensive	strategic	partnership	 (Chinese	Embassy	in	 the	 UK,	 2010).	 According	 to	 the	 published	 document	 from	 the	 Chinese	Embassy	 in	the	UK,	 ‘in	recent	years,	 the	UK	has	attached	greater	 importance	to	advancing	 relations	 with	 China	 and	 has	 seen	 the	 progress	 of	 China	 from	 a	pragmatic	perspective.	It	works	for	deeper	cooperation	with	China	and	hopes	to	see	 that	China	plays	a	greater	role	 in	 international	affairs	 (Chinese	Embassy	 in	the	UK,	2010).	Both	of	the	Chinese	Embassy	and	the	UK	government	agree	that	the	 two	countries	have	maintained	 frequent	high-level	exchanges	and	contacts,	have	established	 the	mechanism	of	prime	ministerial-level	annual	meeting,	 the	economic	 and	 financial	 dialogue,	 the	 bilateral	 relations	 interaction	 groups,	 the	strategic	dialogue	and	the	mechanisms	for	consultation	and	dialogue	on	strategic	security,	foreign	policy,	human	rights	and	arms	control	(Chinese	Embassy	in	the	UK,	2010;	The	British	Council,	2015).	During	former	Premier	Wen	Jiabao’s	visit	to	 the	 UK,	 the	 two	 sides	 signed	 the	 2009—2013	 China-UK	 Cultural	 Exchange	
Implementation	Plan.	It	includes	the	mid-term	and	long-term	plans	for	exchange	and	 cooperation	 in	 publishing,	 performing	 arts,	 radio,	 film	 and	 television,	cultural	heritage	protection	and	many	other	fields	(Xinhua	Net,	2003).		In	 the	 2010s,	 the	 British	 Council	 claims	 that	 ‘the	 UK	 Government	 has	 been	leading	 the	 drive	 to	 build	 closer	 cultural	 and	 people-to-people	 relations	 with	China	 as	 part	 of	 ongoing	 efforts	 to	 forge	 closer	 diplomatic	 and	 economic	ties’(The	 British	 Council,	 2015).	 For	 example,	 the	 China-UK	 High-Level	People-to-People	 Exchange	 Mechanism	 was	 launched.	 A	 Memorandum	 of	Understanding	was	 signed	 in	 2012	 to	 build	mechanisms	 of	 high-level	 cultural	
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exchanges	 between	 the	 two	 states.	 In	 2013,	 the	 then	 British	 Prime	 Minister’s	visit	to	Beijing	attracted	heated	discussion	in	the	media	of	both	China	and	Britain.	During	previous	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron’s	visit,	a	new	cultural	agreement	was	signed	by	Maria	Miller,	 the	Secretary	of	State	 for	Culture,	Media	and	Sport	with	Cai	Wu,	 the	Chinese	Minister	of	Culture,	aiming	to	give	a	boost	 to	cultural	and	creative	exchanges	between	the	two	states	(Department	for	Culture,	Media	and	Sport,	2013).	Moreover,	the	2015	China-UK	Year	of	Cultural	Exchanges	(also	named	the	“Cultural	Year”	in	the	following	case	study),	which	recognised	that	the	economic	 trajectory	of	China	 is	 closely	 aligned	with	 strengths	of	 the	UK	 in	 the	creative	industries	and	other	cultural	sectors.		From	 this	 brief	 chronology,	 four	 points	 are	 worth	 noting	 with	 regards	 to	 the	contemporary	 cultural	 relations	between	 the	UK	and	China.	 Firstly,	 it	 could	be	witnessed,	obviously,	various	factors	have	an	influence	on	the	implementation	of	cultural	diplomacy,	which	is	not	only	a	matter	of	culture	but	also	has	connections	with	other	aspects,	such	as	the	 foreign	policy	and	the	 internal	policy	of	a	state,	domestic	stability	of	a	state	and	its	external	political	environment.	Secondly,	the	general	 orientation	 of	 China	 and	 the	 UK’s	 cultural	 relations	 show	 a	 positive	upward	 trend	 and	 is	 becoming	 increasingly	 close.	 Thirdly,	 cultural	 diplomatic	efforts	 of	 the	 two	 states	 could	 facilitate	 the	 establishment	 of	 their	 economic	dialogue	 and	 cooperation.	 Finally,	 the	 British	 Council	 has	 played	 a	 very	significant	 role	 in	 China,	 whether	 it	 is	 in	 the	 past	 or	 contemporaneously.	 The	next	 part	 of	 this	 chapter	 explores	 the	 role	 of	 the	 British	 Council	 in	 cultural	diplomacy,	especially	in	the	area	of	state	trust	building	with	China.		 	
6.3	The	Role	of	British	Council	in	Cultural	Diplomacy	Cultural	 diplomacy	 involves	 the	 work	 of	 governments	 and	 organisations	authorised	 by	 governments,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Two.	 When	 discussing	cultural	diplomacy	of	the	UK,	the	British	Council	is	usually	the	first	organisation	to	come	to	the	mind.	Two	other	government	departments	should	also	be	noted	as	 well.	 The	 first	 one	 is	 the	 Foreign	 and	 Commonwealth	 Office,	 which	 is	responsible	for	controlling	and	managing	its	cultural	diplomacy,	but	with	no	role	in	 domestic	 cultural	 services.	 The	 second	 one	 is	 within	 the	 Foreign	 and	
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Commonwealth	 Office,	 the	 Cultural	 Relations	 Department	 (CRD).	 The	 CRD	 is	mainly	 responsible	 for	 the	 cultural	 diplomacy	 of	 the	 UK,	 including	 guiding	cultural	exchange	programs	of	the	British	Council	through	funding	and	reviews,	offering	direct	leadership	of	the	Cultural	and	Education	Section	of	the	Embassies,	and	coordinating	relations	with	the	UN	and	UNESCO	(Li,	2012,	p.24).	However,	the	British	Council	is	the	main	governing	body	for	the	implementation	of	cultural	diplomacy.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 offer	 a	 brief	 background	of	 the	British	Council	if	we	are	to	understand	the	effectiveness	of	the	UK’s	cultural	diplomacy.	 		The	British	Council	is	a	registered	charity	governed	by	Royal	Charter.	As	such,	it	is	operationally	independent	of	the	UK	government.	However,	the	British	Council	works	 in	 close	 collaboration	with	 the	UK	government	 at	 all	 levels	 and	ensures	strategic	alignment	with	priorities	of	UK	policy	(the	British	Council,	2017).	This	unique	position,	 as	 a	 non-governmental	 public	 body	 sponsored	by	 the	 Foreign	and	 Commonwealth	 Office,	 gives	 the	 British	 Council	 significant	 space	 and	freedom	to	carry	out	its	cultural	programs	on	the	global	stage.	 		The	British	Council	was	inaugurated	in	1933	as	a	joint	committee	set	up	by	the	Board	 of	 Education	 and	 Board	 of	 Trade	 so	 as	 to	 promote	 British	 education,	culture,	 science	 and	 technology	 (Taylor,	 1978,	 p.249).	 Currently,	 the	 British	Council	 has	 around	 7,000	 staff	 working	 in	 more	 than	 100	 countries	 with	thousands	 of	 professionals,	 policy-makers,	 and	millions	 of	 young	 people	 every	year.	Main	activities	focus	on	English	language,	arts,	education,	and	society.	As	an	important	 body	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 UK’s	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 the	British	Council	is	supported	by	the	UK	government	through	policy	guidance	and	funding.	 It	collaborates	with	other	non-governmental	organisations	 to	promote	cultural	diplomacy,	including	the	British	Library,	the	Arts	Council	of	England,	the	British	 Film	 Institute,	 the	 Arts	 and	 Crafts	 Board,	 the	 Museums	 and	 Galleries	Commission	and	the	British	Museum	(Li,	2012,	p.24).The	effective	collaboration	with	 government	 organisations	 and	 other	 non-governmental	 organisations	contributes	to	the	great	success	of	the	UK’s	cultural	diplomacy.	Furthermore,	the	British	 Council	 works	 in	 close	 cooperation	 with	 the	 related	 embassies	 or	
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consulates	 in	 host	 countries,	 and	 its	 person	 in	 charge	would	 also	work	 as	 the	cultural	head-consultant	in	some	countries.		
6.4	Effectiveness	of	the	UK’s	Cultural	Diplomacy	in	State	Trust	Building	Since	 the	 beginning	 of	 21st	 century,	 the	British	 Council	 has	 devoted	 increasing	efforts	to	develop	its	role.	It	is	not	just	trying	to	establish	a	brand	or	promoting	British	culture,	but	also	making	efforts	in	how	to	maximum	cultural	strength	in	other	aspects,	 such	as	 trust	building,	conflict	management,	business,	and	trade.	Among	these	factors,	trust	building	is	the	most	important.	As	the	British	Council	puts	 it,	 ‘we	 create	 friendly	knowledge	 and	understanding	 among	 the	people	of	the	UK	and	other	countries.	We	do	this	by	making	a	positive	contribution	to	the	UK	 and	 the	 countries	 we	 work	 with–changing	 lives	 by	 creating	opportunities,	building	connections	and	engendering	 trust’	 (the	British	Council,	2016b).	 Sir	 Roger	 Carr,	 the	 Chairman	 of	 Centrica	 and	 President	 of	 the	 CBI	(Confederation	 of	 British	 Industry),	 says	 that	 ‘the	 UK	 has	 invested	 in	 building	trust	 through	 the	 work	 of	 the	 British	 Council	 in	 English,	 education	 and	culture for	nearly	80	years’	(Carr	and	the	British	Council,	2012,	p.20).	
	The	official	report	Trust	Pays	published	by	the	British	Council	in	2012	elaborates	that	‘the	British	Council	creates	international	opportunities	for	the	people of	the	UK	 and	 other	 countries	 and	 builds	 trust	 between	 them	 worldwide’	 (British	Council,	2012,	p.5).	Moreover,	this	research	shows	that	this	relationship	between	trust	and	an	increased	openness	to	the	UK	and	its	people	holds	true,	not	just	in	Europe	 and	 in	 the	 Commonwealth,	 but	 also in	 many	 of	 the	 countries	 where	we do	not	have	such	a	strong	traditional	relationship	and	which	will	be	vital	to	the	 UK’s	 future”	 (Carr	 and	 the	 British	 Council,	 2012,	 p.4).	 In	 2016,	 the	 British	Council	 emphasised	 its	 role	 again	 ‘we	 create	 friendly	 knowledge	 and	understanding	among	the	people	of	 the	UK	and	other	countries	and	build	trust	with	 them’	 (the	 British	 Council,	 2016a).	 These	 statements	 indicate	 that	 the	British	 Council	 considers	 that	 it	 has	 already	made	 the	 cultural	 efforts	 to	 build	trust	with	the	rest	of	the	world.	 		
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China	 is	 one	 of	 the	 primary	 cultural	 diplomatic	 targets	 of	 the	 UK.	 As	 the	 UK’s	international	 organisation	 for	 educational	 opportunities	 and	 cultural	 relations,	the	 British	 Council	 in	 China	 is	 also	 known	 as	 the	 ‘Cultural	 and	 Educational	Section	 of	 the	 British	 Embassy/Consulate’,	 which	 shows	 that	 it	 is	 not	 entirely	independent	 from	governmental	 influence.	 Its	present	Director,	Carma	Elliot,	 is	also	the	Consul-General	in	Shanghai	(the	British	Council,	2014).	In	order	to	build	a	 long-term	 trust-based	 relationship	 with	 China,	 the	 UK	 agrees	 that	 cultural	efforts	 cannot	 be	 ignored.	 According	 to	 the	 research	 of	 the	 British	 Council,	‘Chinese	people's	level	of	trust	in	people	from	the	UK	also	rose	significantly	with	the	 number	 of	 cultural	 relations	 activities	 they	 engaged	 in’	 (British	 Council,	2015).		The	five	indicators	of	state	trust	elaborated	in	Chapter	Five	can	now	be	used	to	evaluate	the	level	of	state	trust	between	China	and	the	UK.		Firstly,	 the	 highest-level	 indicator	 of	 state	 trust	 is	 discretion	 in	 policy-making	and	implementation.	This	level	of	state	trust	between	China	and	the	UK	has	not	yet	materialised	to	some	significant	degree.		As	for	the	British	policy	towards	China,	Kerry	Brown	argues	that	 ‘British	policy	towards	 China	 has	 always	 been	 ambiguous,	 and	 that	 is	 unlikely	 to	change’(Brown,	2015).	Ambiguity	can	be	defined	as	either	deliberate	ambiguity	or	 unintentional	 ambiguity.	 Usually,	 a	 state	would	 adopt	 a	 policy	 of	 deliberate	ambiguity	towards	another	state	if	it	is	not	sure	about	the	political	situation,	or	it	wants	 to	 leave	 spaces	 for	 excuses	 in	 case	 something	 unexpected	 happens.	Deliberate	ambiguity,	also	called	strategic	ambiguity,	is	the	practice	by	a	state	of	being	intentionally	ambiguous	on	certain	aspects	of	its	foreign	policy	or	whether	it	possesses	certain	weapons	of	mass	destruction.	It	might	be	useful	 if	 the	state	has	contrary	foreign	and	domestic	policy	goals,	or	 if	 it	wants	to	take	advantage	of	risk	aversion	to	abet	a	deterrence	strategy.	Such	a	policy	can	be	very	risky	as	it	may	 cause	 misinterpretation	 of	 a	 nation's	 intentions,	 leading	 to	 actions	 that	contradict	that	nation's	wishes.	 		
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To	 a	 certain	 extent,	 this	 kind	 of	 ambiguity	 in	 policy	 is	 similar	 to	 discretion	 in	policy.	Both	deliberate	ambiguity	and	discretion	leave	an	appropriate	margin	for	unforeseen	 circumstances	 and	 needs.	 But	 whether	 the	 deliberate	 ambiguity	derives	 from	 state	 trust	 or	 not	 will	 need	 further	 attention	 and	 examination,	which	depends	mainly	on	the	content	of	the	policy	wording.	The	foreign	policy	of	the	UK	 towards	China	 is	 indeed	as	ambiguous	as	Kerry	Brown	argues,	 and	 the	UK’s	 puzzling	 behaviour	 in	 foreign	 policy	 towards	 China	 makes	 the	 task	 of	measuring	the	state	trust	a	lot	more	complex.	Therefore,	currently,	this	indicator	of	state	trust	between	China	and	the	UK	is	not	sufficiently	present.	Hence,	there	is	not	sufficient	evidence	to	suggest	a	high	level	of	state	trust	between	China	and	the	 UK.	 Maybe	 under	 both	 states’	 continuing	 cultural	 diplomatic	 efforts,	 the	higher	level	of	state	trust	might	be	reached	in	the	future.	 		The	second	indicator	of	state	trust	is	the	presence	of	written	rules	with	leeway	to	regulate	 relations	 between	 two	 states.	 Unlike	 discretionary	 power	 in	policy-making	 and	 implementation,	 this	 indicator	 can	 be	 shown	 in	communication	between	China	and	the	UK.	 		Chapter	 Four	 has	mentioned	 the	 ‘2015	UK-China	 Joint	 statement’,	 which	 is	 an	example	 of	 written	 rules	 with	 leeway.	 Another	 example	 is	 the	 2015	 UK-China	
Co-production	 Treaty,	 which	 has	 greatly	 boosted	 the	 opportunities	 for	 the	 UK	film	 in	 China	 but	 also	 contains	 high	 risks	 (Berger,	 Lorimer	 and	 Guo,	 2015).	Chinese	 authorities	 have	 a	 reputation	 for	 being	 particularly	 cautious	 in	protecting	 domestic	 industry	 and	 guarding	 against	 influence	 from	 foreign	cultures.	 Moreover,	 Chinese	 Media	 is	 famous	 for	 its	 strict	 censorship,	 the	provision	of	which	has	been	controlled	by	Chinese	State	Administration	of	Press,	Publication,	 Radio,	 Film	 and	 Television	 (SARFT).	 This	 time	 around,	 while	 the	Co-production	 Treaty	 contains	 important	 rules	 and	 creative	 hurdles,	 the	 good	news	for	UK	film	producers	is	that,	in	the	interest	of	stimulating	productivity,	the	qualifying	criteria	are	relatively	simple.	As	 to	 the	UK	side,	 the	 final	standard	of	the	treaty	that	is	vaguely	defined	and	with	leeway.	It	is	open	to	the	interpretation	of	 SARFT	 and	 as	 such	 may	 serve	 to	 stifle	 creativity	 while	 there	 is	 also	 no	guarantee	 that	 SARFT	 will	 determine	 that	 the	 Chinese	 content	 of	 the	 film	 is	
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adequate.	Therefore,	Berger	and	other	 two	 lawyers	 consider	 that	 in	 this	 treaty	British	film	producers	still	 face	the	risk	that	a	film	will	not	be	approved	for	the	exemption,	despite	on	the	face	of	it	complying	with	the	treaty.		The	potential	risks	of	the	treaty	can	be	taken	as	evidence	of	existing	state	trust	between	China	and	the	UK.	Firstly,	in	this	co-production	treaty,	the	UK	side	has	left	 some	 leeway	 for	 the	 SARFT,	which	 indicates	 that	 the	UK	 trusts	 that	 China	would	not	unilaterally	breach	the	treaty	by	setting	up	barriers	when	reviewing	the	 eligibility	 of	 co-productions.	 Secondly,	 simplifying	 the	 criteria	 can	 be	interpreted	as	a	way	for	China	to	show	a	level	of	sincerity	when	cooperating	with	the	UK	film	industry	and	welcome	the	UK	film	into	the	Chinese	market.	Arguably,	it	 also	 shows	 that	 China	 respects	 and	 appreciates	 British	 culture,	 otherwise,	China	would	not	easily	allow	it	to	become	a	competitor	in	their	domestic	market.	Finally,	the	key	factor	of	state	trust,	reciprocity,	can	be	seen	in	the	attitudes	and	behaviours	on	both	sides.	In	this	case,	it	can	be	said	that	the	upper	medium	level	of	state	trust	exists	between	China	and	the	UK.	Although	one	case	alone	does	not	provide	conclusive	evidence,	 it	 is	a	good	sign	of	 state	 trust	between	China	and	the	UK.	 	 	 	 	 		Thirdly,	 the	 implementation	 of	 benevolent	 policies	 between	 China	 and	 the	 UK	indicates	a	medium	level	of	state	trust.		Looking	at	the	development	of	cultural	relations	between	China	and	the	UK,	from	1949	onward,	most	policies	 carried	out	by	both	 states	 are	benevolent	policies.	Some	 important	 policies	 have	 improved	 mutual	 understanding	 and	 better	communication	between	China	and	the	UK.	The	implementation	of	these	policies	plays	a	significant	role	in	state	trust	building.	 		 	On	the	UK	side,	its	visa	requirement	for	people	with	a	Chinese	passport	is	getting	more	 relaxed.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 2010s,	 the	 UK	 government	 started	 to	loosen	 tough	 visa	 rules	 for	 Chinese	 citizens	 (Anderson,	 2014),	 and	 the	government	 has	 announced	 a	 number	 of	 measures	 to	 speed	 up	 the	 visa	application	process	for	Chinese	visitors.	The	Home	Office	has	also	made	it	easier	
  
	 168	
for	Chinese	suppliers	to	visit	the	UK	on	business.	Currently,	Chinese	visitors	who	travel	to	the	UK	on	business	only	need	to	provide	a	completed	application	form,	an	invitation	letter	and	a	letter	of	employment	to	support	their	visa	application.	However,	 previously,	 that	 privilege	 was	 only	 open	 to	 Chinese	 staff	 that	registered	 on	 the	 payroll	 of	 a	 UK	 company.	 Suppliers	 or	 partners	 also	 had	 to	provide	 bank	 statements	 and	 household	 registration	 books	 along	 with	 other	paperwork	to	visit	the	UK	on	business	(Anderson,	2014).	 		Previously,	 Chinese	 tourists	 travelling	 to	 Europe	 with	 connecting	 flights	 at	British	airports	were	required	to	obtain	an	expensive	UK	visa	even	though,	quite	often,	 they	did	not	have	to	 leave	the	terminal	building	of	a	British	airport.	This	resulted	 in	 many	 Chinese	 visitors	 going	 directly	 to	 other	 European	 countries	without	even	touching	down	in	the	UK,	as	Schengen	visas	give	Chinese	tourists	access	 to	 26	 countries	 in	 Europe,	 but	 not	 the	 UK.	 In	 June	 2015,	 the	 UK	government	extended	a	pilot	scheme	that	allowed	certain	Chinese	tour	operators	to	use	 the	 Schengen	 form	 to	 apply	 for	 the	UK	visas	 as	well.	 The	 changes	were	designed	to	encourage	a	greater	number	of	Chinese	tourists	to	include	the	UK	as	one	of	their	visiting	destinations	when	planning	to	visit	Schengen	area.	 		From	2016,	new	visitor	visas	for	tourists	from	China	are	valid	in	the	UK	for	two	years	(Prime	Minister’s	Office,	2015).	Furthermore,	new	visa	rules	also	offer	an	extension	of	standard	visitor	visas	from	6	months	to	2	years	multiple	entries	and	plan	 to	 introduce	 a	 new	 10-year	 multiple	 entry	 visit	 visa	 for	 the	 same	 price.	Mobile	 fingerprinting	 service	 has	 been	 extended	 to	 an	 additional	 50	 cities	 to	make	 it	 easier	 to	 apply	 for	 a	 visa.	 These	 initiatives	 are	 a	 part	 of	 the	 UK	government’s	 ambition	 to	 strengthen	 the	UK-China	 relations,	 for	 the	benefit	 of	the	whole	of	Britain’	(Prime	Minister's	Office,	2015).		Relaxing	the	visa	policy	means	that	the	UK	tends	to	become	more	open	to	China,	which	 indicates	 the	 trust	 that	 Chinese	 visitors	will	 pose	 a	 problem	 to	 the	 UK.	Some	members	of	 the	public	have	questioned	why	American	tourists	can	enter	the	UK	without	 a	 visa	 for	 short	 stays,	while	 Chinese	 visitors	 need	 to	 apply	 for	permission	 and	 have	 their	 fingerprints	 recorded.	 This	 issue	 perhaps	 indicates	
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that	 state	 trust	between	 the	UK	and	 the	USA	 is	 relatively	higher	 than	 the	state	trust	between	the	UK	and	China.	However,	this	does	not	contradict	the	argument	here	that	there	has	been	a	significant	 improvement	in	trust	between	China	and	the	UK.	Due	to	the	continuing	efforts	of	cultural	diplomacy,	there	are	increasing	indications	of	 trust	between	 the	 two	states,	 and	 this	visa	 issue	 is	 another	 such	indication.	 If	 the	 UK	 government	 did	 not	 trust	 China	 and	 still	 holds	 the	old-fashioned	impression	about	the	ideology	of	Chinese	communism,	it	would	be	impossible	 for	 the	UK	 to	 relax	 its	 visa	 policy.	Openness	 on	 the	 visa	 issues	will	encourage	more	Chinese	visitors	and	investors	to	come	to	the	UK	and	boost	its	economy.	If	 the	UK	did	not	trust	China,	this	openness	might	be	considered	as	a	problem.	 If	 the	UK	merely	wanted	 to	 find	 financial	 supporters	and	 investors,	 it	could	 devote	more	 efforts	 to	 establishing	 closer	 ties	with	 the	 US,	which	 has	 a	number	 of	 convenient	 factors	 than	 China,	 such	 as	 visa-free	 travelling,	 same	written	 and	 spoken	 the	 language	 and	 relatively	 affluent	 economic	 resources.	However,	the	UK	chooses	China	as	its	partner,	not	only	because	of	the	economic	strength	of	China	but	also	due	to	the	long-term	cultural	efforts	that	have	enabled	the	UK	to	understand	China	better	and	progress	toward	the	generation	of	state	trust	within	their	relationship.	 	 		On	the	Chinese	side,	although	China	has	not	taken	any	measures	to	relax	its	visa	application	 procedures	 for	 UK	 visitors,	 China	 also	 does	 not	 offer	 this	 type	 of	privilege	to	any	other	state.	With	respect	to	reciprocity,	China	has	instead	carried	out	some	benevolent	policies	to	the	UK	in	other	fields.	For	instance,	according	to	the	UK	government	 reports	Policy	Outcomes	 of	 the	 8th	UK-China	Economic	 and	
Financial	 Dialogue,	 ‘welcomes	 the	 UK’s	 continued	 openness	 to	 trade	 and	investment,	 [and]	 the	 UK	 government	 will	 continue	 to	 encourage	 Chinese	companies	 to	strengthen	 their	 investment	 to	 the	UK,	and	reaffirms	 that	 the	UK	continues	 to	 be	 China’s	 leading	 economic	 partner	 in	 Europe’	 (UK-China	Global	Comprehensive	Strategies,	2016,	p.1).	In	this	case,	as	the	old	proverb	goes	‘action	speaks	 louder	 than	 words’.	 Before	 the	 UK	 launched	 the	 Brexit	 referendum	 in	2015,	 President	 Xi’s	 state	 visit	 confirmed	 almost	 £30	 billion	 in	 trade	 and	investment	 deals,	making	 it	 inevitable	 that	 Chinese	 companies	would	 launch	 a	new	wave	of	investment	in	the	UK.	Even	after	the	decision	of	the	UK	to	exit	the	
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European	 Union,	 China	 has	 not	 cancelled	 confirmed	 orders	 or	 withdrawn	 any	investment	 from	the	UK.	Roderic	Wye,	also	argues	 that	 ‘though	Beijing	 favours	remaining	 and	 sees	 some	 benefits	 in	 the	 UK’s	 membership,	 a	 Leave	 vote	 is	unlikely	to	lead	to	an	exodus	of	Chinese	investment	and	interest	in	Britain’	(Wye,	2016).		There	are	other	examples	of	benevolent	policies,	which	are	fairly	common	in	the	UK	 and	 China.	 For	 instance,	 the	 UK	 is	 among	 the	 first	 European	 economies	to	embrace	 the	China-initiated	Asian	 Infrastructure	 Investment	Bank	(AIIB)	in	 the	earlier	 period	 of	 2015,	earning	 it	 a	 sharp	 rebuke	from	 its	 ostensibly	 most	important	 diplomatic-ally,	 the	 USA	 (Brown,	 2015).	 In	 return,	 China	 has	 not	disappointed	the	UK’s	economic	expectations.	 		There	is	an	argument	that	‘Britain’s	cultural	diplomacy	towards	China,	as	part	of	wider	diplomacy,	is	also	subject	to	the	economic	goals	and	national	interests	as	a	whole’	 (Yin,	 2014,	 p.51)	 This	 cannot	 be	 entirely	 denied,	 as	 the	 advantages	 of	good	economic	relations	with	China	are	clear.	This	is	especially	so	for	the	UK	as	it	needs	a	much	greater	economic	support	to	assist	its	economic	recovery	from	the	2008	 financial	 crisis.	 This	 can	 also	 be	 confirmed	 by	 the	 annual	 report	 of	 the	British	 Council,	 which	 says	 that	 the	 British	 Council’s	 goal,	 for	 instance,	 is	 to	improve	awareness	and	understanding	of	Britain	in	order	to	encourage	people	to	visit,	 study	and	do	business	 in	 the	UK,	 so	 contributing	 to	 long-term	prosperity	and	security	(British	Council,	2016,	p.20-26).	However,	although	the	economy	of	China	has	dramatically	surged,	particularly	in	the	last	two	decades,	if	the	UK	did	not	 trust	 the	 capacity	 of	 China	 and	 its	 benevolent	 policies	 towards	 the	 UK,	 it	would	not	devote	such	considerable	amount	of	effort	to	building	closer	ties	with	China.	 		As	 seen	 from	 these	 examples,	 though	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomatic	efforts	 of	 both	 states	 cannot	 be	 directly	 proved	 by	 the	 aspect	 of	 benevolent	policy-making,	it	is,	nevertheless,	the	case	that	after	2015	China-UK	Cultural	Year,	both	 states’	 governments	 have	 carried	 out	 a	 series	 of	 benevolent	 policies	
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towards	 each	 other.	 Therefore,	 we	 can	 conclude	 indicators	 of	 a	 medium	 level	state	trust	can	be	confidently	confirmed.	 	 	 		Fourthly,	 the	 favourable	 orientation	 of	 policies	 demonstrates	 a	 lower	medium	level	of	state	trust	between	China	and	the	UK.	 		Most	 realists	 and	 liberal-institutionalists	 consider	 that	 China	 has	 attained	 the	position	 of	 the	 global	 superpower,	 and	 the	 UK	 is	 adjusting	 to	 the	 reality	 of	 a	dramatic	 relative	 power	 shift	 since	 the	 late	 1990s	 (Lin,	 2015).	 As	 for	 the	relations	 between	 China	 and	 the	 UK,	 the	 handover	 of	 Hong	 Kong	 could	 be	regarded	as	a	turning	point	in	their	contemporary	relations.	Before	1997,	Kerry	Brown	 argues	 that	 ‘Hong	 Kong	 was	 the	 reason	 why	 Britain	 was	 amongst	 the	earliest	to	recognise	the	PRC’	(Brown,	2016).	In	order	to	preserve	its	interests	in	Hong	 Kong	 and	 maintain	 at	 least	 some	 semblance	 of	 dialogue	 with	 the	Communist	 government	 in	 Beijing,	 the	 UK	 kept	 a	 liaison	 office	 with	 a	 charge	d’-affaires	in	the	PRC’s	new	capital	(Brown,	2016).	 		After	 1997,	 under the	 newly	 elected	 leadership	 of	 Tony	 Blair	 and	 the	 Labor	party,	 Brown	 thinks	 that	 these	 two	 states’	 relations	 have	 changed	 to	‘engagement’.	Like	friends	who	knew	each	other	well,	the	UK	and	China	could	be	open,	 honest	 and	 frank	 with	 each	 other	 (Brown,	 2016).	 British	 officials	 of	 a	particular	 generation	 had	 learned	 about	 how	 their	 Chinese	 counterparts	negotiated,	what	was	their	attitudes	to	the	outside	world	and	their	expectations	of	opening	up	to	it.	The	Chinese	had	also	learned	a	lot	about	the	UK.	In	the	2010s,	generally	speaking,	the	UK	government	has	shown	its	sincerity	towards	Chinese	government,	from	the	hospitality	of	royal	family	to	the	state	visit	of	the	Chinese	President	in	2015,	to	the	implementation	of	benevolent	policies	towards	China,	such	as	relaxed	visa	policies	and	the	memorandum	of	cooperation	in	the	various	areas.	 All	 these	 events	 exhibit	 the	 favourable	 orientation	 of	 policies	 between	China	and	the	UK.		Before	Xi’s	state	visit,	the	Chinese	government	proposed	Belt	and	Road	Initiative	in	 2013,	 to	 revitalise	 the	 old	 Silk	 Road,	 hoping	 to	 generate	 huge	 investment	
  
	 172	
opportunities	 in	 more	 than	 60	 countries.	 Seeing	 London	 as	 a	 global	 financial	centre	and	a	bridge	to	the	Euro	Zone,	the	Central	Bank	of	China	made	its	first	sale	of	debt	on	London’s	markets,	drawing	orders	of	more	than	£3	billion	(Liu,	2016).	In	2015,	Xi’	state	visit	to	the	UK	resulted	in	both	states	signing	a	large	project	of	up	 to	 40	 billion	 pounds	 involving	 a	 number	 of	 Chinese	 enterprises,	 including	China	 Guangdong	 Nuclear	 Power,	 China	 Investment	 Corporation,	 China	Shipbuilding	 Group,	 China	 Huadian	 Group,	 China	 National	 Petroleum	Corporation,	 HNA	 Group	 and	 CITIC	 Group.	 Xi’s	 leading	 role	 in	 this	 state	 visit	demonstrated	 the	 trend	 of	 the	 policies	 of	 China	 and	 its	 diplomatic	 attitude	towards	the	UK.	In	the	Joint	Statement	from	Government	of	the	People's	Republic	
of	 China	 &	 Government	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 of	 Great	 Britain	 and	 Northern	
Ireland,	 both	 states	 agree	 to	 the	 comprehensive	 global	 strategic	partnership	 in	the	21st	Century.	The	official	 term	 ‘comprehensive	global	 strategic	partnership’	indicates	that	through	a	 long	history	of	 interaction,	 the	UK	has	 identified	China	as	an	increasingly	important	partner	in	all	aspects	and	regarded	China’s	rise	as	an	opportunity	rather	than	a	threat	(Shi	and	Liu,	2014,	p.7).		This	 trend	 is	 quite	 significant,	 with	 the	 economic	 benefit	 for	 both	 states.	However,	 without	 long-lasting	 cultural	 efforts,	 the	 current	 mutually	 beneficial	situation	of	China	and	the	UK	may	not	have	been	achieved.	With	respect	to	the	indicator	 concerning	 the	 favourable	 orientation	 of	 policy,	 there	 is	 a	 clear	indicator	that	the	lower	medium	level	of	state	trust	exists	between	China	and	the	UK.	 		Fifthly,	cooperation	between	China	and	the	UK	demonstrates	 the	minimal	 level	of	state	trust.	 		China	 and	 the	 UK	 have	 long-history	 cooperation	 in	 various	 fields,	 with	 the	common	goal	 to	make	an	economic	profit	while	 realising	other	benefits.	These	cooperative	 opportunities	 and	 trust	 have	 been	 generated	 through	 cultural	diplomatic	 efforts.	 For	 instance,	 the	 British	 Council	 claims	 that	 ‘there	 is	 an	evidence	 of	 a	 link	 between	 participation	 in	 cultural	 activities	 with	 another	
  
	 173	
country	and	higher	levels	of	trust	in	that	country	and	its	people,	in	turn	leading	to	greater	enthusiasm	to	do	business	with	that	country’	(British	Council,	2015).	 	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 cooperative	 opportunities	 can	 be	 obtained	 through	 cultural	diplomacy.	On	the	other	hand,	cooperation	is	one	of	the	indicators	of	state	trust.	Therefore,	cooperation	between	China	and	the	UK	could	have	been	influenced	by	the	 cultural	 diplomatic	 efforts.	 For	 example,	 both	 China	 and	 the	 UK	 have	attached	 importance	 to	 cooperation	 on	 energy	 and	 transport	 in	 each	 other’s	countries	 (Foreign	 and	 Commonwealth	 Office,	 2015).	 This	 cooperation	 took	place	after	the	2015	China-UK	Cultural	Year.	 		According	 to	 a	 report	 of	 the	 British	 Council,	 ‘the	 use	 of	 culture	 to	 underpin	 a	wider	 economic	 and	 diplomatic	 drive	 makes	 sense	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 UK’s	stature–increasingly	 recognised	 in	 China–as	 a	 world	 leader	 for	 the	 creative	industries,	 as	 well	 as	 China’s	 own	 moves	 towards	 building	 a	 more	 creative,	consumer-driven	 economy,	with	 Chinese	 creative	 industries	 currently	 growing	annually	at	almost	17%’	(British	Council,	2015).	For	China,	it	needs	to	cooperate	with	 the	 UK	 in	 the	 field	 of	 intellectual	 imports	 and	 high-technology	communication.	 Recently,	 in	 the	 UK,	 ‘companies	 emerging	 from	 China	 like	 the	telecoms	provider	Huawei	and	 the	 internet	 company	Alibaba	 started	 to	have	a	presence	 from	 2007:	 the	 former	 secured	 a	major	 supply	 deal	with	 the	 British	Telecom	despite	security	fears;	the	latter	had	set	up	an	office	in	London’	(Brown,	2016,	p.20).	 		In	addition,	a	Chinese	company	bought	the	cereal	brand	Weetabix,	and	there	are	Chinese	 investments	 in	 the	 Heathrow	 Airport,	 Anglia	 Water,	 and	 other	 utility	companies.	With	respect	to	the	UK,	it	presented	itself	as	a	more	open,	convenient	and	flexible	place	to	do	business	than	anywhere	else	in	Europe.	In	China,	besides	the	 economic	 cooperation,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 also	 warmly	 welcomes	British	universities	 to	extend	 their	reach	with	Chinese	domestic	universities	as	can	be	 seen	 in	 collaborative	 issues,	 such	as	Xi’an	 Jiaotong	Liverpool	University	and	Nottingham	Ningbo	University,	which	have	received	great	support	from	the	Chinese	 government	 at	 all	 levels.	 These	 examples	 explain	why	 the	UK	 chooses	China	as	its	cooperative	partner.	With	this	regard,	both	states	have	the	reciprocal	
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Abstract	Using	 culture	 as	 a	 tool	 in	 international	 politics	 has	 attracted	 considerable	attention	while	many	states	employ	cultural	diplomacy	as	a	tool	of	soft	power	in	the	world.	 The	 United	 Kingdom	was	 one	 of	 the	 earliest	 countries	 to	 carry	 out	cultural	diplomacy	and	gained	many	outstanding	achievements	 in	 the	previous	decades.	China	is	catching	up	with	this	cultural	trend	to	promote	Chinese	culture	on	 the	 world	 stage	 as	 well.	 The	 2015	 UK-China	 Year	 of	 Cultural	 Exchange	(usually	called	“cultural	year”)	appears	to	be	a	sprawling	collection	of	events	and	activities	across	several	cities	in	China	and	the	UK.	This	part	aims	to	explore	the	effectiveness	of	this	cultural	year	as	an	approach	to	cultural	diplomacy,	and	then	proceeds	to	examine	whether	the	cultural	year	is	the	icing	on	the	cake	or	just	the	idle	work.	
	
Introduction	 	Soft	power	has	been	rejuvenated	 in	China	recently	and	has	been	accepted	as	a	core	concept	into	Chinese	cultural	development	framework	(Zhang,	2010,	p.383).	China,	 as	 a	 country	 with	 a	 history	 of	 more	 than	 5000	 years,	 which	 has	 been	regarded	as	an	emerging	country	with	powerful	 status.	 Its	 culture	 is	 certain	 to	
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become	an	important	part	of	worldwide	culture.	As	a	result	of	years	of	the	twin	effects	 with	 debates	 by	 political	 and	 academic	 elites’,	 together	 with	 extensive	dissemination	 by	 the	 popular	 media,	 the	 term	 soft	 power	 was	 eventually	incorporated	into	the	highest-level	policy	documents	on	15	October	2007.	In	the	keynote	report,	issued	by	the	then	President	of	China	Hu	Jintao,	on	behalf	of	the	Central	 Committee	 of	 the	16th	Chinese	People’s	 Congress	 to	 the	17th	National	Congress	of	the	Communist	Party	of	China,	he	stressed	the	necessity	to	promote	Chinese	 culture	 to	 thereafter	 develop	 the	 soft	 power	 of	 a	 state	 on	 the	international	stage	(Hu,	2007a).	The	United	Kingdom,	as	a	pioneer	in	developing	cultural	 diplomacy,	 has	 already	 conducted	 a	 series	 of	 cultural	 diplomatic	activities	 in	 China	 for	many	 years.	 2015	 is	 a	 significant	 year	 for	 both	 UK	 and	China;	“2015	promises	to	be	a	flagship	year	for	the	UK	in	China	and	China	in	the	UK,	with	the	first	ever	UK-China	Year	of	Cultural	Exchange”,	which	is	claimed	by	the	Chinese	Government.		
General	Overview	of	the	2015	China-UK	Cultural	Year	As	 both	 states	 claimed,	 2015	 is	 a	 significant	 year	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	relationship	between	China	and	the	UK.	Liu	Xiaoming,	who	is	the	current	serving	Chinese	 ambassador	 in	 the	 UK,	 mentions	 that	 “this	 cultural	 year	 is	 of	 great	significance,	both	China	and	the	UK	enjoy	quite	long	history	and	splendid	culture,	cultural	 cooperation	 between	 the	 two	 countries	will	 significantly	 contribute	 to	the	process	of	human	civilisation.	At	 the	same	 time,	 culture	 is	one	of	 the	 three	pillars	of	UK-China	comprehensive	strategic	partnership.	This	culture	year	could	deepen	mutual	knowledge	and	understanding	between	 the	Chinese	and	British	people	 and	 lay	 a	more	 solid	 foundation	 for	 the	 public	 communication”	 (China	Embassy,	 2015).	 Liu’s	 comment	 is	 correct	 to	 some	 extent,	 but	 the	 important	premise	 is	 that	 both	 UK	 and	 China	 could	 have	 a	well-conducted	 cultural	 year,	from	the	planning	stage	of	 the	program	through	 to	 the	practical	activities	 later	on.	 The	 cultural	 background	of	 China	 and	 the	UK	 is	 quite	 different,	 and	 this	 is	especially	 so	 when	 it	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 following	 aspects:	 unique	 political	systems	 of	 China,	 institutional	 bureaucracies,	 specific	 strategic	 demands	 and	different	cultural	resources.	All	 these	 features	distinctively	showed	the	cultural	
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diplomacy	 of	 China	 with	 its	 own	 unique	 characteristics,	 which	 have	 a	 huge	impact	on	this	cultural	year.	 		This	cultural	exchange	was	formally	announced	when	Premier	Li	Keqiang	visited	the	 UK	 in	 June	 2014	 (British	 Council,	 2015).	 Then	 Prince	 William,	 Duke	 of	Cambridge,	added	a	final	touch	to	the	sculpture	of	the	“Sheep	Shaun”(画羊点睛)	in	a	traditional	Chinese	eye-dotting	ceremony	in	the	British	Embassy	 in	Beijing	as	 a	major	 event	 so	 as	 to	 launch	 the	 cultural	 event	 in	 an	official	 capacity.	This	study	starts	with	the	observation	of	related	events	in	the	2015	UK-China	cultural	exchange	and	then	raise	a	research	question:	is	it	“锦上添花”	(icing	on	the	cake)	or	 “事倍功半”(idle	 work;	 getting	 the	 half	 results	 with	 double	 efforts)	 in	 the	UK-China	cultural	relation? This	study	examines	this	cultural	exchange	from	the	following	 aspects:	 theoretical	 analysis,	 empirical	 settings,	 any	 relevant	organisations,	events,	its	overall	evaluation,	and	achievements.	It	then	continues	to	analyse	the	merits	and	defects	of	this	state-level	cultural	exchange	from	two	sections:	the	UK	cultural	season	in	China	and	the	Chinese	cultural	season	in	the	UK.	Currently,	 there	 is	no	precise	definition	of	 “cultural	year”.	According	to	 the	elaboration	of	Chinese	scholars,	Zhifei	Li	and	Haifen	Yu,	cultural	year	refers	to	“a	kind	of	diplomatic	form	serving	to	the	country's	overall	diplomatic	strategy	and	is	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 overall	 national	 pattern	 and	 deployment	 of	 external	relations.	In	the	specific	time	and	specific	area	agreed	by	the	bilateral	countries,	using	 culture	 as	 the	 expression	 carrier	 and	 holding	 the	 public	 favourite	 and	acceptant	cultural	activities	 in	a	country	or	between	two	countries”	(Li	and	Yu,	2007).	 		 	Taking	 the	 2015	 UK-China	 Cultural	 Year	 as	 an	 example,	 this	 cultural	 year	includes	 two	parts:	 the	 first	 half	 (from	March	 to	 June	2015)	 is	 the	UK	 cultural	season	 in	 China,	 themed	 Next	 Generation;	 and	 the	 second	 half	 (from	 July	 to	October	2015)	 is	China’s	cultural	season	 in	 the	UK,	 themed	Creative	China,	 and	launched	in	the	UK	to	present	Chinese	culture	and	creativity	to	the	British	public.	They	are	supported	by	two	state	governments,	both	of	which	desire	to	see	their	nations	 as	 cultural	 leaders	 and	 learn	 from	 one	 another.	 Both	 UK	 and	 China	
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exchanged	 cultural	 seasons	 to	 showcase	 the	 diversity	 and	 creativity	 of	 each	other.	 	 		 	In	the	UK	cultural	season,	which	is	mainly	organised	by	the	British	Council	and	other	 public	 associations,	 as	 mentioned	 previously;	 the	 theme	 is	 called	 Next	
Generation.	Marchant,	the	director	of	Tate	Museum,	claims	that	“we	use	that	term	in	a	very	broad	sense,	 it’s	not	 just	about	 the	next	generation	of	people.	We	are	talking	 about	 the	next	 generation	of	 audiences,	 next	 generation	of	 artists,	 next	generation	of	delivery	when	it	comes	to	the	arts”	(Marchant,	2014).	There	are	30	events	in	total,	and	digital	arts	are	in	strong	focus,	pushing	creative	boundaries	while	actively	engaging	audiences	through	a	variety	of	integrated	platforms.	Xin,	a	commentator	from	Beijing	Today,	argues	that	 ‘its	ground-breaking	digital	arts	will	push	creative	boundaries,	and	the	launch	of	a	new	online	arts	portal	will	give	viewers	a	chance	to	engage	through	a	variety	of	integrated	platforms’	(Xin,	2015).	Various	exhibitions,	dramas,	and	other	cultural	events	have	been	taking	place	in	China,	 and	 the	 art	 wave	 stretches	 well	 beyond	 the	 major	 cities	 of	 Beijing,	Shanghai,	Guangzhou.	Some	cultural	events	have	been	held	 in	other	cities	with	strong	artistic	foundations,	such	as	Chongqing,	Wuhan,	Shenzhen,	and	Chengdu.	China	cultural	season,	which	is	primarily	organised	by	the	Ministry	of	Culture	in	China	and	other	related	organisations,	provides	more	innovative	presentational	methods	 and	 contemporary	 cultural	 works,	 such	 as	 fashion	 week,	 creative	industry	 events,	 training	 program	 and	 opera,	 rather	 than	 merely	 promoting	traditional	Chinese	culture	for	overseas	audiences.	These	events	stretched	out	to	some	main	cities	of	the	UK,	such	as	London,	Liverpool,	Edinburgh,	Newcastle,	etc.		 	Both	of	the	UK	cultural	season	in	China	and	China	cultural	season	in	the	UK	had	so	 many	 outstanding	 cultural	 events	 and	 performances	 in	 towns	 and	 cities	across	Britain.	These	two	seasons	were	featured	with	a	broad	range	of	cultural	projects,	 exhibitions,	 and	 performances	 encompassing	 art,	 design,	 cuisine,	culture,	science,	business,	technology,	and	education.		 	Before	 this	 cultural	 year,	 China	 has	 already	 hosted	 similar	 events	 in	 other	countries,	such	as	China-France	Cultural	Year	(2003-2005),	China-Italy	Cultural	
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Year	 (2006),	 China-Russia	 Cultural	 Year	 (2006),	 etc.	 It	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 these	events	 that	 cultural	 year	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	 essential	 means	 of	 China’s	intercultural	 communication	 and	 a	 channel	 to	 be	 used	 it	 for	 its	 cultural	propaganda	overseas.	The	2015	UK-China	Cultural	Year	is	not	an	exception,	with	more	 than	30	 creative	 and	 cross-boundary	modern	 art	 programs.	 The	 cultural	season	 of	 UK	 offers	 the	 Chinese	 audience	 a	 rich	 and	 diversified	 experience	 of	contemporary	 cultural	 and	 creative	 development	 of	 the	 UK,	 which	 can	 be	regarded	as	 a	new	attempt	 in	 the	history	of	 cultural	 relations	between	 the	UK	and	China.	Furthermore,	although	 the	state	visit	of	President	Xi	 to	 the	UK	took	place	 in	October	2015,	which	 is	not	on	 the	program	 list	of	 this	cultural	year;	 it	indeed	 makes	 2015	 to	 be	 the	 “no	 ordinary	 year”	 and	 “golden	 time”	 for	 both	states	to	have	a	further	communication	and	cooperation	due	to	the	highest-level	state	visit	and	reception	(Canton,	2015).		
Impacts	of	the	2015	UK-China	Year	of	Cultural	Exchange	
	
Advantages:	Behind	a	surface	that	can	seem	hard	to	navigate,	the	activities	organised	by	both	China	and	the	UK	prove	to	be	a	dynamic	strategy	to	encourage	innovation	and	to	build	 new	 creative	 networks	 and	 partnerships.	 They	 are	 supported	 by	 two	governments,	 both	of	which	desire	 to	 see	 their	nations	 as	 cultural	 leaders	 and	learn	from	one	another.	Creativity	and	cultural	exchange	can	be	seen	at	the	heart	of	the	relationship	between	the	two	countries,	both	with	long	and	rich	but	very	divergent	 cultural	 histories.	 Therefore,	 this	 cultural	 year	 can	 be	 reckoned	 as	 a	forward	for	improving	the	political	and	cultural	relations	between	both	states.		 	This	 cultural	 year	 follows	 a	 period	 of	 strong	 cultural	 ties	 between	 the	UK	 and	China.	 The	 current	 phase	 started	 in	 2008	 with	 the	 China	 Now	 festival	 in	conjunction	with	 the	 Beijing	 Olympics.	 Since	 then,	much	 of	 the	work	 took	 the	form	 of	 bilateral	 activities	 such	 as	 one-off	 exhibitions	 and	 tours.	 London’s	Hayward	 Gallery	 exhibition	 “Art	 of	 Change:	 New	 Directions	 from	 China”	 was	presented	 as	 an	 aspect	 of	 these	 arrangements.	 Unlike	 the	 previous	 cultural	events,	 the	 current	 Cultural	 Year	 has	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 exchange,	 creating	
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opportunities	for	artists	from	UK	and	China	to	meet,	share	experiences	and	build	working	 relationships.	 This	 cultural	 year	 also	 provided	 a	 range	 of	 events,	including	conventional	exhibitions	and	performances	but	behind	 these	 facades,	new	frameworks	were	built	for	individuals	and	organisations	to	work	together.	Once	 established,	 these	 frameworks	would	 still	 be	 in	 operation	 even	 after	 the	specific	events	have	ended.	 It	was	 intended	that	 the	cultural	year	would	create	ongoing	opportunities	 for	artists	 to	work	 together.	This	 is	not	 a	 set	of	 isolated	events,	but	a	focus	on	possibilities	that	have	grown	from	a	long	and	productive	period	 of	 meetings	 where	 people	 in	 China,	 the	 UK	 have	 worked	 together	 and	shared	their	 insights.	The	present	period	 is	an	exciting	time	for	culture	 in	both	countries.	 This	 cultural	 year	 also	 offered	 the	 sustainable	 future	 where	 new	cross-fertilisation	provides	the	perspective	to	strengthen	the	infrastructure	and	encourage	the	innovation.		Unlike	the	previous	patterns	of	cultural	exchange,	this	time	Chinese	government	started	to	recognise	the	weakness	and	would	like	to	learn	the	excellent	aspects	of	the	UK.	For	example,	management	of	Chinese	museums	lacks	innovation	and	professional	methods	when	 compared	with	 the	 UK	 (Kong,	 2015,	 p.45).	 In	 this	cultural	year,	Chinese	government	offers	some	opportunities	for	museum	staffs	to	 attend	 training	 programs	 in	 the	 UK.	 Carma	 Elliot,	 the	 Cultural	 &	 Education	Minister	of	British	Embassy,	makes	a	comment	concerning	this	cultural	year,	 ‘If	we	 look	at	culture	at	 its	wider	sense	around	cultural	relations,	 then	the	people	relationships,	 the	 opportunities	 there	 are	 for	 education	 and	 the	 core	 elements	that	 fit	 into	 the	 culture	 relations	 there,	 whether	 it's	 learning	 about	 museum	management,	 culture	 skills,	 looking	at	 culture	 tourism,	and	ultimately	enjoying	the	very	best	of	other	people's	cultures...	It's	very	important	that	we	capture	that	richness	and	strong	connections	between	our	two	countries’	(CCTV	News,	2015).		This	cultural	year	creates	a	chance	for	both	states	to	boost	the	creative	industry,	especially	 for	China.	 “The	growth	of	 the	UK	creative	 industries	has	outstripped	other	parts	of	the	economy.	The	creative	industries	contributed	£71.4	billion	to	the	economy	in	2014”	(Department	of	Culture,	Media	and	Sport,	2014).	The	UK	is	renowned	 for	 its	 experience	 and	 reputation	 in	 fostering	 creativity	 across	 all	
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industrial	 sectors	 to	 drive	 growth	 and	 investment.	 In	 fact,	 the	 UK’s	 creative	industries	generate	a	staggering	£8	million	pounds	an	hour,	and	grew	almost	10%	in	2012,	outperforming	all	other	sectors	(British	Council,	2015).	As	for	the	side	of	China,	 it	 would	 like	 to	 see	 a	 similar	 expansion	 of	 the	 cultural	 industries,	 to	account	for	five	percent	of	the	economy	by	2016.	Culture	is	one	of	the	‘five	pillars’	of	Chinese	economic	growth.	The	creative	industry	is	a	newly	emerging	industry,	which	 could	 also	 provide	 more	 inspiration	 and	 innovative	 ideas	 for	 cultural	diplomacy.		 	The	 dialogue	 of	 this	 cultural	 year	 from	 diplomatic	 level	 and	 down	 to	 intimate	meetings	 between	 individuals	 is	 a	 reflection	 on	 the	 convergence	 of	 national	ambitions.	 The	 recognition	 of	 the	 diversity	 of	 cultural	 approaches	 and	 the	richness	of	the	two	respective	countries’	artistic	traditions	will	be	experienced	in	the	 opportunities	 created	 through	 exchange	 visits.	 It	 is	 the	difference	between	the	two	cultural	traditions	that	make	these	exchange	visits	a	lot	more	rewarding.	For	instance,	the	cultural	exchange	is	designed	to	include	a	broad	assortment	of	art	forms	along	with	involvement	across	the	creative	and	cultural	sectors	in	the	two	countries.	The	program	in	China	has	involved	contrasting	experiences:	from	pioneers	of	the	fashion	and	design	industry	to	museum	directors	and	visits	from	individuals.	 For	 example,	 the	Gentle	Good,	 a	British	 singer,	 brings	other	Welsh	musicians	to	Chengdu,	which	is	a	city	that	not	conventionally	on	the	cultural	map	from	the	perspective	of	the	UK.	 	 		 	Media	 is	one	of	 the	hot	spots	 in	this	cultural	year.	The	differences	between	the	cultures	 of	 these	 two	 nations	 meant	 that	 much	 of	 the	 work	 that	 will	 be	 on	 a	travelling	exhibition	would	confound	expectations	and	introduce	people	to	new	experiences.	The	British	Council	 and	 their	Chinese	counterpart,	 the	Ministry	of	Culture,	 were	 using	 a	 blend	 of	media	 to	 extend	 the	 reach	 of	 events	 when	 the	visits	 were	 going	 to	 take	 place.	 The	 new	 websites	 UK	 Now	 and	 China	 Now	provide	a	platform	to	sample	and	learn	more	about	the	artists	and	events	from	these	 two	 countries.	 These	 sites	 will	 also	 provide	 materials	 on	 festivals	 and	traditional	cultural	celebrations	so	that	the	background	of	the	two	cultures	can	
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be	 understood.	 These	materials	 are	 all	 free	 and	 can	 be	 downloaded	 for	 use	 in	schools.		
Weakness:	 	The	 problem	 of	 information	 update	 and	 transparency,	 which	 will	 have	 a	significant	 influence	on	 the	participation	rate	by	 the	public.	With	regard	 to	 the	Chinese	 government	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 cultural	 year,	 it	 claims	 that	 the	media	would	be	used	 extensively	 in	 the	 cultural	 year.	However,	 in	April	 2015,	when	 trying	 to	 discover	 some	 related	 information	 from	 the	 official	website15--Embassy	of	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	of	Great	 Britain	 and	 Northern	 Ireland,	 it	 did	 not	 mention	 the	 details	 about	 the	China-UK	Cultural	Year	until	20th	July	2015.	This	cultural	year	is	a	typical	way	of	cultural	diplomacy,	 but	 the	Chinese	Embassy	did	not	 grasp	 this	opportunity	 to	fully	develop	it	well.	Instead,	the	main	news	published	on	the	website	are	mostly	reporting	on	the	ambassador’s	attendance	in	some	events.	Most	Chinese	people	in	the	UK	usually	will	catch	a	glimpse	of	information	from	the	official	website	of	Chinese	embassy;	it	is	also	one	of	the	services	that	the	embassy	should	provide	to	let	others	know	what	kind	of	events	regarding	China	will	take	place	in	the	UK,	rather	than	just	publish	a	news	report	at	the	end	of	the	event.	 		More	specifically,	when	searching	for	the	related	information	from	the	website	of	the	Ministry	of	Culture	 in	 the	P.R.C,	 the	speed	of	 information	update	 is	quicker	than	 the	 Chinese	 Embassy.	 But,	 it	 seldom	mentions	 the	 details	 of	 this	 cultural	year.	As	the	chief	organiser	of	 this	cultural	year,	 the	Ministry	of	Culture	should	publish	more	 information	 about	 the	Year	 and	 let	 the	public	 know	 the	 relevant	details	so	that	they	could	engage	with	the	interesting	events	in	this	cultural	year.	Otherwise,	 the	cultural	year	could	not	be	considered	as	a	successful	program	if	only	with	less	attention	and	participation	from	the	public.	 		 	However,	on	the	side	of	the	UK,	the	British	Council	did	a	great	job	in	promoting	this	Cultural	Year.	From	the	British	Council’s	official	website16,	which	showed	in	
                                                15	 http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/	16	 http://www.britishcouncil.cn/programmes/arts/2015yoce	
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detail,	the	activities	of	the	cultural	year	with	related	information	in	both	English	language	 and	 Chinese	 language	 versions.	 Moreover,	 the	 British	 Council	 also	launch	 a	 website17	 offering	 exclusive	 use	 for	 this	 Cultural	 Year.	 This	 is	 an	excellent	method	of	 the	British	Council	 to	 provide	 a	 platform	 for	 the	public	 to	engage	 themselves	 in	 this	 cultural	 year	 better,	 and	 offers	 a	 base	 for	 both	academic	 research	 and	 the	public’s	 participation	 to	have	 access	 to	 the	 cultural	year.	 		 	In	contrast,	one	aspect	that	Chinese	government	had	ignored	in	the	Cultural	Year	was	how	to	attract	the	attention	and	participation	of	the	British	public.	Usually,	overseas	 Chinese	 people	 will	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 Cultural	 Year	 through	 the	channel	 of	 local	 Chinese	 community	 or	 society.	 After	 a	 street	 interview	 in	 the	Chinatown	of	London,	it	was	shown	that	even	some	Chinese	students	and	people	who	are	living	or	working	in	London	were	not	aware	of	this	cultural	year.	Due	to	the	lack	of	publicity,	not	so	many	British	people	know	the	events	of	the	Cultural	Year	except	 those	who	are	working	 in	 the	 cultural	 fields	or	having	 the	 specific	interest	 in	 the	 Chinese	 culture.	 The	 same	problem	 is	 also	 evidenced	 in	 the	UK	cultural	 season	 in	 China.	When	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 those	 people	who	 are	 living	 in	 Beijing	 and	 Shanghai,	 most	 of	 them	 had	 no	 idea	 about	 the	cultural	year	and	did	not	get	involved	with	the	cultural	events.	This	problem	will	largely	 influence	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Cultural	 Year,	 because	 one	 of	 the	purposes	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 to	 exchange	 different	 ideology	 and	 cultural	perspectives.	But	without	good	reaching	to	both	British	and	Chinese	people,	this	kind	of	invisible	cultural	connection	is	difficult	to	be	established.	 		 	China	 has	 a	 lot	 of	 dramatic	 improvement	 in	 many	 aspects	 of	 diplomatic	strategies.	However,	there	are	some	deficiencies	in	this	cultural	year,	such	as	a.	lack	 of	 full	 preparation;	 b.	 lack	 of	 specific	 cultural	 promotion;	 c.	 lack	 of	comprehensive	program	plans.	As	 listed	on	 the	website	of	Chinese	Embassy	 in	the	UK,	 there	were	21	events	 in	 total.	However,	 some	programs	were	not	well	implemented	in	both	the	UK	and	China.	For	example,	for	the	UK	cultural	season	
                                                17	 http://www.uknow.org.cn		
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in	China,	the	power	of	advertising	and	broadcasting	effects	of	the	media	had	not	been	used	 to	 the	 full.	Only	 the	major	cities	 like	Beijing,	Shanghai,	and	Chengdu	joined	 this	 cultural	 year,	 while	 the	 public	 in	 other	 cities	 does	 not	 even	 know	about	this	mega-event.	Hence,	the	participation	rate	could	not	possibly	be	high	at	all.	Whenever	there	is	a	plan	to	roll	out	the	cultural	events,	other	cities	should	be	taken	into	consideration	as	well.	Although	it	is	virtually	impossible	to	encourage	every	 city	 to	host	 related	 events,	 various	means	of	media	 could	 reach	 to	more	cities	 and	 evoke	 the	 public	 participation.	 For	 example,	 Wechat’s	 information	push,	 Weibo’s	 interaction,	 etc.	 Spreading	 the	 news	 of	 the	 cultural	 events	 by	means	of	these	Internet	media	could	provide	significant	opportunities	for	those	people	who	have	no	interest	in	the	culture	of	UK	but	could	not	personally	go	to	other	cities	to	join	the	cultural	event	due	to	the	limitation	of	their	working	time,	personal	budget	and	other	reasons.	 		Another	problem	with	 influence	on	 the	effectiveness	of	 the	cultural	year	 is	 the	“services	after	the	event”.	When	the	mega-event	finished,	organisers	will	seldom	put	 further	human	 resources	with	 further	 funding	 to	 cover	 for	 the	 subsequent	issues.	For	example,	when	written	inquiries	are	sent	to	the	related	governmental	departments	 in	China	asking	 for	 some	 information	and	data	 about	 the	 cultural	year,	the	usual	answer	is	“no	reply”.	In	this	respect,	the	UK	is	much	better	than	China.	 The	 officers	 of	 the	 Britain	 Council	 always	 provide	 a	 reply	 within	 2-3	working	 days	 on	 receipt	 of	 your	 e-mail.	Holding	 an	 event	 is	 not	 that	 easy,	 but	without	further	ongoing	efforts	after	the	event,	the	results	achieved	may	be	lost	gradually	soon	afterwards.		 	In	general,	this	chapter	uses	the	2015	UK-China	Cultural	Year	as	an	example	so	as	to	compare	and	analyse	the	effectiveness	of	the	methods	of	China	and	the	UK	in	 their	 respective	ways	 of	 conducting	 cultural	 diplomacy	 during	 this	 Cultural	Year.	Considering	what	is	happening	in	China	and	the	UK	right	now,	such	cultural	events	assist	 in	the	challenge	of	stereotypes	and	provides	new	perspectives	for	understanding	 the	 China	 and	 the	 UK	 contemporaneously,	 which	 can	 have	 a	positive	contribution	to	the	cultural	diplomacy	of	both	the	China	and	the	UK.	The	intention	of	 the	cultural	exchanges	during	 this	year	 is	not	specifically	meant	 to	
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create	new	work,	but	 for	 the	provision	of	opportunities	so	that	creative	people	can	meet	as	well	as	to	share	their	experiences,	to	gain	an	insight	into	a	different	context	 with	 different	 ways	 of	 working.	 The	 organisers	 had	 created	opportunities	 for	 those	 artists	 with	 an	 appetite	 for	 challenge	 plus	 curiosity	 in	order	 to	 make	 new	 connections	 that	 might	 have	 a	 result	 in	 a	 change	 in	 their	works.	 The	 meetings	 can	 well	 end	 up	 in	 the	 making	 of	 ongoing	 and	 lasting	creative	partnerships.	This	Cultural	Year	looked	at	culture	in	the	broadest	sense	and	 sought	 to	make	 business	 connections	with	 the	 emphasis	 on	 opportunities	that	would	be	likely	to	be	taken	forward	in	the	near	future.		As	 elaborated	 previously,	 some	 problems	 of	 the	 China-UK	 Cultural	 Year	 have	been	exposed,	 such	as	 immature	diplomatic	 strategy,	 incomplete	publicity,	 and	the	vague	position	of	Chinese	culture	in	the	international	cultural	system	and	the	low	level	of	public	engagement.	The	Cultural	Year	is	not	just	a	slogan	or	a	chance	for	China	to	stage	a	catwalk	show	in	the	UK.	The	central	role	of	this	platform	has	been	 recognised	 by	 both	 states,	 grasping	 this	 rare	 opportunity	 to	 thereafter	enhance	the	power	of	its	cultural	diplomacy	or	just	treating	it	as	a	normal	stage	show	will	 ultimately	 lead	 to	 the	 overall	 performance	with	 results	 for	 the	 year.	Both	China	and	UK	are	in	possession	of	a	profound	culture	respectively,	and	they	are	exceptionally	keen	on	protecting	and	developing	their	own	national	culture.	The	 China-UK	 Cultural	 Year	 could	 promote	 mutual	 understanding	 between	people	of	two	countries	and	offer	a	platform	for	the	integration	and	development	of	two	civilisations	so	as	to	maintain	the	cultural	diversity	of	our	world.		 	However,	both	China	and	the	UK	just	appeared	to	put	some	more	positive	formal	art	presentations	 for	audiences	on	both	sides	while	 ignoring	 the	contemporary	art,	which	may	unwittingly	expose	the	darker	and	indecent	side	of	the	two	states.	Therefore,	this	cultural	year	was	more	like	a	governmental	cultural	propaganda	year.	If	attention	were	to	focus	on	this	point,	then	the	Cultural	Year	would	be	a	very	valuable	format	to	serve	for	the	national	reputation	and	image	of	both	China	and	UK.	In	addition,	it	could	have	been	used	as	a	tool	to	preserve	human	cultural	diversity	 and	 promote	 the	 deep	mutual	 understanding	 between	 two	 states	 as	well.	
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All	 these	 problems	 mentioned	 above	 does	 seem	 to	 have	 no	 connections	 with	state	 trust	 building	 between	 China	 and	 the	 UK	 because	 neither	 state	 has	 ever	mentioned	as	to	which	particular	programs	were	being	used	to	target	the	issue	of	 state	 trust	 building.	 However,	 according	 to	 the	 five	 indicators	 that	 may	influence	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 state	 trust	 building,	 these	problems	 have,	 nonetheless	 and	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 been	 considered	 to	 be	influential	 on	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 these	problems	 encountered,	 it	 is	 highly	 likely	 that	 it	 will	 lead	 to	 the	 reduction	 of	efficiency	concerning	state	trust	building	between	China	and	the	UK.	 	 		 	
6.6	Conclusion	This	 Chapter	 mainly	 includes	 three	 parts:	 the	 first	 part	 outlines	 the	 general	development	of	the	cultural	relations	between	China	and	the	UK;	it	then	provides	the	analysis	on	the	role	of	British	Council	in	the	cultural	diplomacy	of	the	UK.	In	this	 part,	 the	 chronology	 concerning	 the	 development	 of	 two	 states’	 cultural	relationship	 is	 a	 necessary	 and	 important	 issue.	 This	 part	 offers	 the	 historical	background	 to	 the	 analysis.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 if	 there	 is	 no	 clue	 on	historical	 events	 and	 statement,	 then	 some	 quoted	 examples	 cannot	 be	understood	 fully.	 The	 analysis	 on	 the	 roles	 of	 British	 Council	 in	 the	 cultural	diplomacy	of	the	UK	shows	the	reasons	that	the	cultural	diplomatic	efforts	of	the	UK	 could	 be	 more	 of	 a	 showcase	 with	 greater	 success	 than	 other	 states.	Moreover,	 the	 comparisons	 between	 the	 British	 Council,	 China’s	 Ministry	 of	Culture	 and	 China’s	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 also	 provide	 the	 suggestion	concerning	the	advantages	of	the	British	Council	when	the	programs	of	cultural	diplomacy	are	implemented.		The	second	part	combines	the	previously	proposed	indicators,	which	have	been	discussed	in	Chapter	Five	with	real	examples	of	foreign	affairs	so	as	to	examine	the	 existence	 or	 otherwise	 of	 state	 trust	 between	 two	 states.	 When	 applying	these	indicators	into	examining	the	current	state	trust	level	between	China	and	the	UK	concerning	the	high	 level	of	state	 trust,	 there	 is	no	significant	evidence,	which	 is	 strong	 enough	 to	 prove	 the	 existence	 throughout	 the	 available	 public	files	 and	 resources.	 It	may	 be	 possible	 that	 these	 two	 states	 have	 confidential	
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deals	 and	 agreements	with	 discretion,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 known	 to	 the	 public.	With	regard	to	the	upper	medium	level	of	state	trust,	this	study	has	already	adopted	an	 example	 to	 show	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 facts.	 However,	 there	 is	 no	 any	quantifiable	and	qualified	examples,	hence	the	power	of	persuasion	is	relatively	weak	here.	As	a	result,	this	upper	medium	level	of	state	trust	between	two	states	is	not	considered	to	be	tenable	at	this	moment,	although	it	does	show	the	signal	for	the	time	being.	As	for	the	medium	level	and	lower	medium	level	of	state	trust,	a	 lot	 of	 evidence	 can	 be	 collected	 and	 confirmed	 when	 checking	 through	 the	public	 records	 on	 the	 policies	 between	 China	 and	 the	 UK.	 Therefore,	 in	 the	current	 situation,	 the	 existence	 of	 state	 trust	 between	 China	 and	 the	 UK	 has	attained	the	medium	level	and	that	 the	minimal	 level	of	state	trust	 is	clearly	 in	existence	 between	 two	 states	 with	 the	 facts	 on	 the	 aspects	 of	 cooperation.	However,	 one	 point	 that	 must	 be	 mentioned	 is	 that	 the	 level	 of	 state	 trust	 is	transitory	 and	 it	may	 vary	 due	 to	 other	 factors	 as	well.	 Therefore,	 one	 cannot	simply	 judge	 the	 level	 of	 state	 trust	 by	 merely	 applying	 these	 indicators	mechanically	when	the	measurement	is	being	made.	On	some	occasions,	it	might	be	 necessary	 to	 combine	 all	 the	 indicators	 and	 take	 the	 status	 quo	 into	consideration;	 it	 then	 draws	 a	 conclusion	 and	 attempts	 to	 predict	 the	 future	trend.	 	 	 	 	 	 		In	the	third	part,	as	both	China	and	the	UK	claim	that	2015	is	the	important	year	for	 both	 states,	 it	 then	 introduces	 the	 2015	 China-UK	 Cultural	 Year	 as	 a	 case	study	 to	 comment	 on	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomatic	 efforts	 by	 both	states.	 From	 the	 period	 of	 preparations	 till	 the	 stage	 of	 implementation,	 two	different	ways	of	 conducting	 cultural	 programs	by	 these	 two	 states	 are	 clearly	shown.	Though	the	economy	of	China	grows	faster	than	the	UK,	the	continuous	efforts	 in	promoting	national	 culture	by	 the	UK	have	 received	many	 rounds	of	applause	in	China.	It	 is	an	explicit	recognition	concerning	the	culture	of	the	UK,	and	this	 is	also	one	of	the	purposes	of	the	cultural	diplomacy	by	the	UK.	As	for	China,	it	needs	to	have	a	serious	discussion	and	consideration	on	the	way	when	cultural	 policy	 guidelines	 are	 being	 made	 as	 well	 as	 on	 how	 to	 conduct	 the	cultural	programs	domestically	and	internationally.	It	is	no	longer	a	moot	point	that	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Chinese	 government	 officers	 is	 a	 crucial	 issue	 in	 cultural	
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diplomacy.	 Cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 a	 platform	 for	 another	 country	 to	 obtain	 the	knowledge	on	the	culture	of	another	state.	It	is	not	a	stage	show	or	an	exhibition	for	 political	 officers	 to	 present	 their	 charming	 personal	 characteristics.	 The	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	is	connected	to	state	trust	building.	Effective	cultural	 diplomacy	may	 promote	 state	 trust	 building	while	 ineffective	 cultural	diplomacy	may	not	generate	or	maintain	state	trust,	and	it	may	even	destroy	the	existing	 state	 trust.	 Even	 though	 the	 significant	 potential	 outcomes	 of	 this	Cultural	Year	might	not	be	seen	in	any	immediate	tangible	ways	and	that	it	even	might	not	be	seen	 in	 the	 forthcoming	years,	 the	essential	 role	of	 these	cultural	efforts	is	an	obvious	factual	issue	which	cannot	be	denied.		Generally	 speaking,	 the	 clear	 evidence	 of	 a	 positive	 result	 concerning	 the	effectiveness	 of	 the	 cultural	 diplomacy	 by	 the	UK	 in	 trust	 building	 that	 can	 be	seen	 clearly,	 particularly	 concerning	 the	 trust	 among	 the	public.	 In	 accordance	with	the	research	report	by	the	British	Council,	which	shows	that	young	persons	from	 China	 who	 had	 been	 involved	 in	 cultural	 activities	 with	 the	 UK,	 such	 as	attendance	 for	 major	 art	 exhibitions	 and	 cultural	 events	 organised	 by	institutions	from	the	UK,	where	15%	more	likely	to	trust	the	people	coming	from	the	UK	and	8%	more	likely	to	be	interested	in	opportunities	to	do	business	with	the	people	and	organisations	of	the	UK.	The	level	of	trust	by	the	Chinese	towards	people	 coming	 from	 the	 UK	 also	 increases	 significantly	 with	 the	 number	 of	cultural	activities	they	engaged	in	(British	Council,	2012).	 		The	 British	 Council	 has	 intentionally	 launched	 cultural	 programs	 with	 young	people	 in	China	as	a	 target	audience,	and	 it	has	a	conceptual	map	 in	which	 the	young	generation	is	considered	to	have	a	great	potential	to	develop	their	talents	in	the	political,	economic	and	other	fields.	It	is	a	good	sign	to	improve	state	trust	between	states	as	well.	For	the	UK,	it	is	conceivable	that	it	must	have	known	that	cultural	efforts	need	a	 long	 time	 for	 its	effectiveness	 to	 show	through	and	 that	some	 benefits	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 have	 been	 gradually	 brought	 into	 the	 UK.	The	British	Council	claims	that	the	trust	built	by	its	cultural	diplomatic	programs	between	people	of	different	background	has	the	resultant	effect	that	it	can	bring	economic	benefits	for	the	UK	eventually	and	then	the	British	Council	contributes	
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7.1	Postscript	In	the	current	academic	area,	cultural	diplomacy	and	state	trust	are	two	concepts	that	have	remained	rather	unexplored	in	the	field	of	social	science.	Particularly,	the	concept	of	state	trust,	which	is	a	new	idea	and	with	great	significance	when	linking	with	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 The	 absence	 of	 reliable	 information	 about	 the	intentions	of	other	state	actors,	the	shortage	of	deeper	forms	of	cooperation,	and	the	specific	cultural	norms	embodied	 in	connecting	state	actors	have	made	 the	concepts	 of	 state	 trust	 and	 cultural	 diplomacy	 seem	 difficult	 to	 discuss	 in	 the	academic	field.	Moreover,	lack	of	reliable	resources	and	intentions	of	states	make	the	 concept	of	 state	 trust	 seem	 incompatible	with	other	 concepts,	 for	 instance,	cultural	 diplomacy.	 While	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 some	 scholars	 agree	 that	 can	maintain,	 enhance	 and	 even	 create	 state	 trust.	 This	 research	 places	 much	emphasis	 on	 this	 perspective,	 and	 this	 thesis	 is	 built	 up	 with	 the	 supportive	analysis	 firmly	 and	mainly	 based	upon	 this	 argument.	 Therefore,	 this	 research	develops	a	conceptual	and	measurement	framework	for	understanding	cultural	diplomacy	and	state	trust	respectively,	and	in	relation	to	one	another.		When	 looking	 at	 the	 two	 subjects	 of	 this	 research—China	 and	 the	 United	Kingdom,	both	states	are	experiencing	historical	change.	In	today’s	international	arena,	the	role	of	China	playing	has	sufficiently	attracted	other	state	actors.	With	increasingly	 strained	 relations	 with	 neighbouring	 states,	 such	 as	 Japan,	 North	Korea,	South	Korea	and	Philippine,	the	majority	disputes	are	reflected	in	various	areas,	 economically,	 politically	 and	 militarily.	 Merely	 this	 negative	 political	environment	 could	 stamp	 unfavourable	 labels	 towards	 the	 reputation	 and	national	 image	 of	 China.	 Such	 uncertainties	 might	 result	 in	 negative	 publicity	regarding	China’s	national	 images	 through	 the	mass	media.	Gradually,	 growing	conflicts	 and	 misunderstanding	 would	 appear	 and	 even	 deteriorate.	 These	disadvantageous	factors,	the	common	point	is	that	they	might	lower	the	trusting	attitude	 of	 other	 states	 towards	 China.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 Chinese	 government	
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claims	 that	 China	 shall	 peacefully	 rise	 and	 create	 a	 harmonious	 environment	domestically	and	externally.	 		Some	hostility	may	be	caused	by	lacking	understanding	of	China	and	its	culture.	One	 of	 the	 methods	 to	 help	 China	 jump	 out	 of	 the	 dilemma	 is	 to	 offer	 the	opportunities	for	other	states	to	know	more	about	China	and	understand	China’s	culture	 with	 various	 aspects.	 It	 is	 because	 that	 clear	 understanding	 and	recognition	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	 the	 original	 recipe	 for	 states	 to	 solve	 their	domestic	and	external	problems.	Another	concern	is	that	even	though	some	state	actors	have	already	known	more	about	Chinese	culture	and	development	of	CPC	if	 their	 perspectives	 are	 jammed	 in	 the	 past	 times	 and	 without	 the	 updated	knowledge	 and	 fresh	 information,	 that	 might	 greatly	 influence	 the	 interaction	between	 states.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 1940s-1990s,	 China’s	 diplomacy	 had	 a	clearly	 defensive	 purpose	 due	 to	 its	 weak	 national	 strength	 and	 a	 series	 of	historical	disputes	with	other	states.	However,	nowadays,	under	the	influence	of	soft	 power	 developed	by	 Joseph	Nye,	 although	China	 is	 not	 the	 first	 runner	 to	notice	 the	 positive	 influences	 of	 soft	 power,	 Chinese	 authorities	 and	 scholars	have	gradually	realised	the	necessity	for	reformulating	its	old	image.	Therefore,	one	of	the	aims	of	China’s	cultural	diplomacy	is	to	create	an	image	of	the	state	as	civilised,	innovative,	open,	peaceful	and	responsible.	 		According	to	the	state	quo	of	China,	taking	cultural	diplomacy	can	be	considered	as	a	good	way	to	resolve	these	conflicts.	As	Da	Kong	puts	it,	 ‘in	the	past	decade,	China’s	 economic,	 political	 and	 military	 rise	 has	 caused	 mounting	 external	concerns	 and	 a	 crisis	 of	 trust	 and	 credibility	 just	 as	 the	 US	 did	 after	 its	 2003	invasion	 of	 Iraq.	 In	 both	 cases,	 cultural	 diplomacy	 has	 been	 pursued	 to	 repair	damaged	 reputations	and	 shape	a	 favourable	 image’	 (Kong,	2015,	p.66).	As	 for	the	 United	 Kingdom,	 its	 excellence	 in	 developing	 cultural	 diplomacy	 has	 set	 a	good	example	for	China.	However,	at	 this	particular	time	of	Brexit,	 the	Sino-UK	relationship	seems	more	significant	than	ever	since.	China’s	rapid	development	consists	 both	 of	 successful	 achievements	 and	 mistakes,	 the	 aspect	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	 is	 not	 an	 exception.	 Even	 though	 both	 states	 have	 devoted	 many	cultural	 diplomatic	 efforts	 in	 promoting	 mutual	 cultural	 understanding,	 when	
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compared	with	the	developmental	level	of	cultural	diplomacy	by	the	UK,	it	can	be	seen	 that	 it	might	be	quite	hard	 to	build	or	maintain	a	high	 level	of	 state	 trust	between	these	two	states	within	the	environment	of	relatively	unequal	abilities.	Therefore,	 this	 thesis	 has	 asked	 several	 crucial	 questions：How	 to	 define	 the	concept	of	cultural	diplomacy?	How	to	define	the	concept	of	state	trust?	How	to	improve	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy?	 What	 are	 the	advantages	of	the	UK’s	cultural	diplomacy?	How	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	China’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 state	 trust	 building	 within	 the	 China-UK	relationship?	 		These	 questions	 have	 exercised	 the	 central	 project	 in	 this	 thesis	 of	 building	 a	model	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building.	The	 following	 part	 recapitulates	 the	 results	 of	 this	 research,	 briefly	 discussing	them	 to	highlight	 the	major	 findings	before	discussing	 its	 limitations.	 Lastly,	 it	will	point	out	the	directions	for	future	studies.	 	 	 	 	 		
7.2	Summary	of	Findings	 	Chapter	One	 is	 the	preliminary	but	 important	part	 of	 this	 thesis.	 It	 set	 out	 the	aims	and	objectives,	outlined	 the	main	argument,	method,	and	structure	of	 the	thesis.	With	these	efforts,	both	primary	and	secondary	data	have	been	collected;	multiple	 interviews	 have	 been	 conducted	 in	 the	 both	 academic	 and	 political	fields,	 which	 have	 provided	 an	 in-depth	 understanding	 of	 this	 research.	Additionally,	extensive	literature	reviews	offer	solid	theoretical	support	that	can	be	seen	throughout	the	thesis.	 		Chapter	Two	is	the	second	cornerstone	that	paves	the	way	towards	the	central	argument.	This	chapter	distinguished	a	host	of	definitions	of	cultural	diplomacy	and	then	categorised	these	definitions	into	three	schools.	Based	on	the	results	of	questionnaire	and	interviews,	it	argues	that:	1)	state	actors	cannot	be	dismissed	in	 the	 activities	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy;	 2)	 non-government	 actors	 are	 quite	necessary	 for	 the	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 but	 they	 need	 to	 be	 authorised	 and	recognised	 by	 the	 state	 actors;	 3)	 cultural	 diplomacy	 is	 not	 merely	 about	“cultural	 propaganda”	 and	 “national	 image”	 privileged	 by	 governments,	 it	 also	
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concerns	 cultural	 respect	 and	 mutual	 cultural	 understanding	 among	 different	states.	The	next	section	of	 this	chapter	differentiated	the	similar	terms	so	as	to	avoid	 some	 sort	 of	 semantic	 confusion	 among	 these	 concepts,	 such	 as	 cultural	soft	 power,	 public	 diplomacy,	 foreign	 cultural	 relations	 and	 intercultural	communication.	 This	 chapter	 also	 discussed	 the	 limits	 and	 merits	 of	 cultural	diplomacy.	 The	 critical	 analysis	 in	 this	 section	 helps	 to	 produce	 a	 better	understanding	towards	the	concept	of	cultural	diplomacy.	 		 	 	 	 	 	In	Chapter	Three,	the	concept	of	state	trust	provided	an	original	contribution	to	the	 academic	 field.	 This	 chapter	 has	 clarified	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	misconceptions	regarding	trust,	confidence,	social	capital,	social	 trust,	and	then	conceptualised	 the	 term	state	 trust.	State	 trust	 is	a	kind	of	mature	relationship	among	 states,	 with	 each	 state	 treating	 the	 other	 respectfully,	 equally	 and	truthfully,	 while	 five	 important	 elements	 of	 state	 trust	 including	 1)	people/institution;	 2)	 cooperation;	 3)	 shared	 norms;	 4)	 shared	 obligation;	 5)	Network	 among	 states	 (inter-state	 network).	 This	 chapter	 also	 analysed	 the	relationship	 between	 cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 state	 trust.	 Since	 these	 two	concepts	 have	 been	 discussed	 explicitly	 in	 the	 foremost	 chapters,	 the	relationship	of	 cultural	diplomacy	and	state	 trust	 then	becomes	not	difficult	 to	discuss.	This	research	provides	an	innovative	interlinking	of	these	two	concepts,	and	three	propositions	are	put	forward	in	this	part	to	discuss	the	key	argument	of	 this	 thesis,	 assuming	 that	 when	 everything	 else	 being	 equal,	 if	 cultural	relations	can	be	strengthened	and	 improved,	 the	challenges	of	 cultural	 identity	can	 be	 solved	 well,	 and	 reciprocal	 behaviour	 can	 be	 increased	 or	 maintained,	then	 cultural	 diplomacy can	 maintain,	 enhance	 and	 even	 create	 state	 trust.	Furthermore,	in	the	last	section,	in	order	to	explore	how	cooperation,	state	trust	and	cultural	diplomacy	can	reinforce	with	each	other,	the	last	section	introduces	and	discusses	the	Game	of	State	Trust,	explicitly	and	arguably.	 		Chapter	Four	is	one	of	the	significant	parts	of	the	whole	thesis.	There	is	a	dearth	of	literature	with	regard	to	trust	indicators	in	various	disciplines	and	areas;	after	the	 specific	 selection	and	numerous	discussion,	 some	of	 these	 indicators	 could	be	further	developed	and	then	applied	into	proving	the	existence	of	state	trust.	
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This	 chapter	 combined	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 analyses	 to	 provide	 five	indicators	of	different	levels	of	state	trust	created	by	cultural	diplomacy,	directly	and	indirectly.	These	indicators	are:	1)	minimal	level	of	state	trust--cooperation	among	states;	2)	lower	medium	level	of	state	trust--advantageous	orientation	of	states’	 policies;	 3)	 medium	 level	 of	 state	 trust--benevolent	 policies	 between	states;	 4)	 upper	 medium	 level	 of	 state	 trust--types	 of	 rules	 that	 state	 actor	employ	 in	 the	 written	 forms	 and	 with	 leeway;	 5)	 high	 level	 of	 state	trust--discretionary	power	in	policy-making.	 		Furthermore,	 this	 chapter	has	discussed	 five	obstacles	of	 cultural	diplomacy	 in	state	 trust	 building:	 1)	 the	 difficulty	 concerning	 the	 existence	 of	misunderstanding	and	confusion--what	state	trust	is	and	how	can	it	be	applied	to	the	state	operation	via	cultural	diplomacy;	2)	the	difficulty	about	 if	one	state	 is	not	aware	of	the	importance	of	joint	efforts,	then	state	trust	will	not	be	formed	as	expected;	3)	 the	difficulty	of	 consistent	and	efficient	 cultural	diplomacy;	4)	 the	difficulty	 concerning	 over-estimated	 higher	 expectation	 towards	 the	 role	 of	cultural	 diplomacy;	 5)	 the	 difficulty	 concerning	 how	 to	 combine	 the	 efforts	 of	cultural	diplomacy	with	economic	development	and	political	stability	in	a	better	way.	 If	 these	 obstacles	 can	 be	 resolved,	 then	 it	 will	 accelerate	 the	 speed	 for	cultural	diplomacy	in	creating	or	maintain	state	trust.	 		This	 chapter	 also	 identified	 five	 factors	 that	may	 cast	 significant	 influences	 on	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building.	These	factors	are	1)	 some	 content	 of	 cultural	 policies	 and	 foreign	 policies;	 2);	 a	 clearly	 defined	social	roles,	formal	contract	and	well-established	obligations	between	states;	3)	the	 quality	 of	 cultural	 diplomatic	 programs;	 4)	 coordination	 among	different	governmental	 departments	 and	 other	 institutions	within	 and	 across	 states;	 5);	existing	mistrust	and	conflictual	issues	between	states;	6)	misuse	of	funding	for	cultural	diplomatic	programs;	7)	the	operation	of	overseas	cultural	institutions;	8)	 publicity	 concerning	 the	 programs	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy;	 9)	monitoring	 the	impact	after	cultural	diplomatic	activities.		
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7.3	Contribution	to	Scholarship	 	From	 the	 point	 of	 academic	 studies,	 research	 on	 cultural	 diplomacy	 shows	 an	increasing	 trend	with	 numerous	 hot	 debates.	 However,	 fewer	 academic	works	mention	 the	connection	 towards	 these	 two	seemingly	non-correlated	concepts,	and	there	are	almost	no	existing	studies	concerning	the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	in	state	trust	building,	academically	and	practically.	In	order	to	bridge	this	gap,	this	study	has	provided	comparative	cultural	diplomacy	and	state	trust	with	 a	 conceptual	 framework,	 and	 contributed	 to	 developing	 a	 better	understanding	 of	 these	 two	 concepts—cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 state	 trust.	 In	particular,	 this	 research	 has	 made	 an	 original	 contribution	 to	 knowledge	 by	proving	 insights	 into	 the	 concept	 of	 state	 trust,	 evaluating	 the	 how	 the	effectiveness	of	cultural	diplomacy	can	influence	state	trust	building.	 		As	 such,	 this	 research	 will	 benefit	 academics	 and	 practitioners	 regarding	 the	development	of	 cultural	diplomacy	and	 its	 effectiveness	 in	 state	 trust	building.	For	 instance,	 when	 evaluating	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	 state	trust	 building	 between	China	 and	 the	UK,	 the	 approaches	 adopted	 in	 Chapters	Five,	Six	and	Seven	could	be	enhanced	by	applying	different	national	and	cultural	contexts.	 	 		 	



































Appendix	3	 	 	 	 Questionnaire	
	
Consent	Form	Research	Title:	The	Role	of	Cultural	Diplomacy	in	Improving	International	Social	Capital	of	China	 	This	questionnaire	is	being	conducted	on	behalf	of	PhD	student	Liang	Xu	and	her	supervisor	Dr.	Martin	Steven	at	the	Lancaster	University,	UK.	You	will	be	asked	to	answer	a	few	questions	concerning	the	research.	The	questionnaire	may	take	you	approximately	10	minutes.	You	could	withdraw	at	any	time	without	giving	a	reason	and	without	penalty.	 	As	well	as	your	response	to	the	questionnaire,	we	will	ask	you	to	provide	demographic	information	and	your	name	in	case	we	need	to	contact	you	and	to	make	sure	that	the	same	person	does	not	take	part	more	than	once.	We	will	be	able	to	link	this	information	to	your	responses	on	this	questionnaire,	and	may	use	your	responses	on	this	questionnaire	to	decide	your	suitability	for	future	studies.	 	The	data	you	provide	will	normally	only	be	accessed	by	the	investigators,	Dr.	Martin	Steven	and	Liang	Xu.	We	will	not	share	your	personal	information	with	anyone	else.	Your	data	will	be	stored	on	PCs	and	lockable	in	university	offices,	although	we	cannot	completely	guarantee	their	security.	 	For	participants:	 	1.	I	confirm	that	I	have	read	and	understand	the	information	sheet	for	the	above	study	and	have	had	the	opportunity	to	ask	questions. 	2.	I	understand	that	my	participation	is	voluntary	and	that	I	am	free	to	withdraw	at	any	time,	without	giving	reason.	 	3.	I	freely	give	my	consent	to	participate	in	this	research	questionnaire. 	*Please	sign	below	to	indicate	that	you	have	read	and	understand	the	information	above.	 	
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Name	of	Participant	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Name	of	Researcher	 	 	
Participant	Information	 	*Name:	____________________  *Nationality:	____________________	*Age:	_________	 	 	 	 	*Gender:	_________	 	*Contact	Email:	____________________	 	 	 Contact	Tel.:	_______________________	(optional)	 	1.	What	is	your	“mother	tongue”	(first	language)	_______________________________	 	2.	If	you	are	a	student,	please	list	your	major,	your	degree,	and	university.	 	______________________________________________________________________________	 	3.	If	you	are	not	a	student,	please	list	your	occupation	and	job	position.	 	______________________________________________________________________________	 	
Questions	
1. Do	you	think	different	cultures	cause	conflicts?	 	
	 O	Yes	 	 	 	 O	It	depends	 	 	 	 O	No	 	
2. Do	you	think	“culture”	can	be	used	as	a	means	of	diplomacy?	 	
	 O	Yes	 	 	 	 O	It	depends	 	 	 	 O	No	 	
3. Do	you	know	about	the	concept	of	Cultural	Diplomacy?	 	
	 O	Quite	familiar	 	 O	A	little	bit	 	 O	Totally	unknown	 	 O	Don’t	know	 	
4.	Do	you	think	normal	citizens	rather	than	government	or	diplomats	can	also	be	part	of	cultural	diplomacy?	 	




O	Yes	 	 	 	 O	It	depends	 	 	 	 O	No	 	 	 	 O	Don’t	know	 	
6. Do	you	think	“Mutual	Trust”	can	promote	the	development	of	state	diplomacy?	
O	Yes	 	 	 	 O	It	depends	 	 	 	 O	No	 	 	 	 O	Don’t	know	 	
7. Do	you	think	“Trust”	plays	a	significant	role	in	states’	interaction?	 	
O	Yes	 	 	 	 O	It	depends	 	 	 	 O	No	 			O	Don’t	know	 	
8. Do	you	know	about	the	concept	of	Social	Capital?	 	
O	Quite	familiar	 	 	 	 O	A	little	bit	 	 	 	 O	Totally	unknown 	
8.1	If	you	are	familiar	with	the	concept	of	social	capital,	do	you	think	social	capital	is	important	for	a	state?	 	
O	Yes	O	It	depends	 	 	 O	No	 	 	 O	Don’t	know	 	 	
Which	word(s)	do	you	think	can	be	used	to	describe	social	capital?	 	
9.	Do	you	know	about	the	concept	of	state	social	capital?	 	
O	Quite	Familiar	 	 	 	 O	A	little	bit 		O	Totally	unknown 	
10.	Do	you	care	about	Chinese	Foreign	Affairs?	 	
O	Yes	 	 	 O	It	depends	 	 	 O	Totally	unknown 	
11.	Do	you	care	about	international	politics?	 	
O	Yes	 	 	 	 O	It	depends	 	 	 O	Totally	unknown 	
12.	Are	you	interested	in	Chinese	culture?	 	




O	Language	 	 	 O	Interest	 	 	 	 O	Belief	 	 	 	 O	_________	 	
14.	What	types	of	activities	concerning	Chinese	culture	you	would	like	to	join?	 	
15.	What	is	your	opinion	towards	the	Chinese	government’s	cultural	diplomacy?	16.	Do	you	think	that	China	poses	a	threat	to	the	world?	 	
	 	 O	Yes	 	 	 	 O	It	depends	 	 	 	 O	No	 	 	 	 O	Don’t	know	 	
17. 	 What	is	your	impression	of	Chinese	people?	 	
18. Do	you	know	about	the	Confucius	Institute?	 	






Debrief	Form	Thank	you	very	much	for	agreeing	to	participate	in	this	study! 	The	 general	 purpose	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 investigate	 people’s	 knowledgeable	level	 towards	 cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 social	 capital,	 and	 people’s	 impression	toward	China,	its	international	image	and	international	influences. 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		 	 	 在此次问卷调查中，您将需要回答一系列关于“中国文化外交与社会资本关系‘的问题。	 问卷时长约
为 10 分钟左右，	 	 	 如果此问卷内容让你感到任何的不愉快，您可以随时无理由终止答卷。			 	 	 由于需要确保“一人一答卷”的原则，必要时可能需要您提供一张照片来确定本次问卷调查参与人员的






您的姓名：	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 您的性别：		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 您的年龄	：	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
您的受教育程度	（	 	 ）	A.初中及以下	 B.高中及技校	 C.大专及本科	 D.硕士	 E.博士	
您的职业	（	 	 	 ）	A.公务员	 B.企事业单位职员	 C.企事业单位管理人员	 D.离退休人员	 E.学生务农人员	 F.个体工商户	 G.其他	
您的邮箱：	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 						
1. 你觉得不同的文化会引起矛盾和冲突吗？（  ）   
A、会   B、视情况而定   C、不会   D、不知道 
2. 你觉得“文化”可以被用来作为外交的一种手段吗？ （  ） 
A、可以   B、视情况而定   C、不可以   D、不知道 
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3. 你对文化外交的了解程度是多少？（  ）  
A、非常了解   B、了解   C、不太了解   D、完全不了解 





5. 您认为文化外交所涉及的领域有哪些？[多选题] （  ）  
A、历史发展 B、风俗习惯 C、政治主张 D、特色饮食 E、传统服饰 F、影视娱乐 G、音乐 
H、书籍     I、竞技体育 J、名人轶事 K、其他-----(请填写) 
6. 你认为除了政府外交官以外，普通公民能够参与到文化外交中呢？ （  ） 
A、可以   B、视情况而定   C、不可以  D、不知道 
7. 您对中国文化中最感兴趣的是哪一项？ [多选题] （  ） 
A、历史发展 B、风俗习惯 C、政治主张 D、核心价值观 E、特色饮食 F、传统服饰 
G、影视娱乐 H、音乐     I、书籍     J、竞技运动   K、名人轶事   
L、其他-----(请填写) 
8. 您认为文化在外交过程中对一个国家起到的作用有多重要？ （  ） 
A、非常重要   B、比较重要   C、一般重要   D、不太重要   E、不重要 
9. 你认为文化外交可以促进国与国之间对“相互理解和相互信任”吗？ （  ） 
A、可以   B、视情况而定   C、不可以    D、不知道 
10. 你觉得国与国之间的相互信任很重要吗？（  ）  
A、重要  B、视情况而定  C、不重要  D、不知道 














13. 您认为目前我国的文化外交存在哪些不足之处？  [多选题] （  ） 
A、宣传力度不够                              B、宣传内容欠佳 
C、文化本身无特点，不能得到外国人认同        D、宣传的对象选择有偏差 
E、其他(请填写)              






15. 你了解“社会资本”的概念吗？ （  ） 
A、非常了解     B、了解    C、不太了解    D、完全不了解 





17. 如果你比较了解社会资本的概念，你觉得社会资本对一个国家的发展而言重要吗？（  ） 
A、重要   B、视情况而定   C、不重要   D、不知道 
18. 你知道“国家社会资本”这个概念吗？（  ） 
A、非常了解    B、了解    C、不太了解    D、完全不了解 
19. 你平常关心中国的外事事务吗？比如说中国与别国的国际关系发展情况等。（  ） 
A、非常关心    B、一般关心    C、不关心    D、没兴趣 
20、你对国际政治感兴趣吗？（  ） 
A、非常感兴趣   B、一般感兴趣   C、不敢兴趣   D、视情况而定 
21. 你对中国文化感兴趣吗？（  ） 
A、非常感兴趣   B、一般感兴趣    C、没兴趣     D、不知道 
 
22. 如果你有机会，你会愿意向外国人介绍中国对文化吗？ （  ） 
A、非常愿意    B、一般愿意     C、不愿意    D、不知道 
23. 你觉得，外国人了解中国文化的主要障碍会是什么呢？ [多选题] （  ） 
A、语言（中文）   B、 信仰   C、兴趣   D、负面报道   D、其他          
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24. 你觉得中国会对世界安全形成威胁吗？ （  ） 
A、完全不会   B、不会    C、会    D、不知道 
如果你觉得中国不会对世界安全形成威胁，请陈述一下你的理由：           








26. 你觉得外国人对中国人的印象会是什么呢？ [多选题] （  ） 
A、友好 热情 好客   B、谦虚    C、大款 有钱 土豪    D、有素质 文化程度高 
E、少涵养，素质欠佳 F、其他  
27. 你有登陆过中国外交部的官方网站吗？（  ） 
A、经常登陆   B、偶尔   C、一次而已   D、没有 
28. 你知道“孔子学院”吗？ （  ） 
A、非常了解  B、一般了解  C、不太了解  D、完全不了解 
28. 作为中国人，你愿意去了解其他国家的文化吗？ （  ） 
A、非常愿意   B、愿意   C、不太愿意  D、完全不愿意 
29.你觉得那种方式能够让你更好的去了解其他国家的文化呢？ 
                                                 
30. 你觉得掌握一个国家的语言能够让你更好的了解那个国家吗？ （  ） 
A、绝对可以   B、可以   C、视情况而定   D、不可以 
31. 你觉得国家间的相互信任能够提高你对那个国家的信任度吗？ （  ） 
A、完全可以   B、可以   C、视情况而定   D、不知道 
32. 你觉得“国与国之间的交往” 同“人与人之间的交往”相似吗？ （  ） 
A、非常相似    B、相似   C、视情况而定   D、不知道 
 
33、如果有机会，你比较愿意参加政府组织的文化外交活动还是民间组织文化外交活动？（  ） 
A、政府组织的文化外交活动    B、民间组织文化外交活动     C、都可以 
D、视情况而定                E、不知道 
34、你觉得留学生能否促进国家之间的交流？ （  ） 
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A、完全可以    B、可以   C、视情况而定   D、不可以   E、不知道 
35. 你觉得一个国家“人与人之间的信任指数”高的话，是否有利于中国的国际发展？（  ） 
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